THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL:

A

POEM.

Publiſhed by the ſame Author,

Letters on a Tour through various parts of Scotland; printed for T. CADELL, 1794, 1 vol. 8vo.

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The Converſion of St. Paul, a Poem, which gained Mr. Seaton's Prize; printed for J. & J. MERRIL, in Cambridge.

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The Antiquities of Herculaneum, 1 vol. 4to. undertaken jointly with the Rev. T. MARTYN, Reg. Profeſſor of Botany, in the Univerſity of Cambridge.

ERRATA.

Page 62. Line 55. *read* ambitious. — p. 68. l. 126. for *yon* read you. — p. 82. l. 270. for *flower*, read power. — p. 121. l. 10. read *to* before *contemplate*. — p. 196. l. 6. from the bottom, read recordari. — p. 199. l. 6. read *Articulation*. — p. 208. l. 2. from the bottom, for *a* read *as*. — p. 226. l. 4. read *the* before *Groſſneſs*. — p. 226. l. 10. read ipſiſque. — p. 275. l. 1. read Epiphanius. — p. 304. l. 10. from the bottom, read Savoir. — p. 305. l. 10. read *regnent* for *regner*. ——— Notes added ſince the Poem was printed off, and wanting ſome mark of Reference, are on Verſes — 239. p. 78. — 341 — p. 90. —

THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL:

A

POEM:

FROM THE LATIN OF

ISAAC HAWKINS BROWNE:

TRANSLATED BY

JOHN LETTICE, B. D.

LATE FELLOW OF SIDNEY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

TO WHICH IS ADDED

THE ORIGINAL POEM;

WITH

A COMMENTARY AND ANNOTATIONS,

BY THE TRANSLATOR.

Neque enim assentior iis, qui hæc *nuper* differere cœperunt, cum corporibus, simul animos interire, atque omnia morte deleri.——Cic.

CAMBRIDGE,

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MDCCXCV.

MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

DEDICATION.

TO

ISAAC HAWKINS BROWNE, Esq.

MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT FOR BRIDGENORTH.

SIR,

THERE ſeems to have been no period in the annals of the world, when virtue and innocence needed more, than at preſent, all the conſolation to be derived from the hopes of another, and better State of exiſtence. The Poem of

of your late Father on the Immortality of the Soul, univerſally allowed one of the fineſt Latin compoſitions of modern times, has done much to ſupport theſe hopes on the ground of natural religion. As, among other marks of a degenerate age, a ſpirit of infidelity has too long prevented certain perſons, who would be thought free and unprejudiced thinkers, from lending an impartial ear to the doctrines of Revelation, he ſurely did no ſmall ſervice, who endeavoured, by the enchantments of his Muſe, to allure them at leaſt to the religion of Nature. And few perhaps have been ſincere and devout Proſelytes at her altar, who have not, at length, by the ſole proceſs of rational enquiry, been led to a conviction of the truth of Revelation: For "the Objections, againſt the ſyſtem of Chriſtianity and the Evidence of it, are of the very ſame kind with thoſe, which are made againſt the ſyſtem and evidence of natural religion." *

With a view to promote your Father's meritorious deſign, and to extend the benefits of it to thoſe,

* Butler's Analogy, p. 407.

thoſe, who could not otherwiſe have partaken it, it doubtleſs was, that ſeveral ingenious Perſons, ſoon after the publication of his Poem, undertook to communicate his arguments, and, as far as might be hoped, the beauties of his Poetry in Engliſh Tranſlations. The reaſon of my adding myſelf to their number is leſs the hope of excelling the more ſucceſsful of my predeceſſors, than that of contributing, at this momentous Criſis, which threatens the happineſs of half our ſpecies, to recal the thoughtleſs, the miſtaken, the incredulous and the wicked to a Subject, calculated above all others, and under all circumſtances, to engage the attention, and attach the affection of human Beings. Who, that has not abandoned the common feelings of his nature, can contemplate, with indifference, a Conjuncture characterized by violent, wild and unnatural efforts, not only to deſpoil mankind of every thing held moſt valuable and precious in this life; but to annihilate all expectation, and even deſire, of future happineſs? Were the Author of the following Tranſlation, and of its Accompaniments, to ſay, that he could not obſerve ſuch an aſpect of things, at

any

any moment, unmoved; and that he would rejoice in every opportunity of aſſiſting, but in the loweſt degree, to counteract thoſe direful principles, which menace the world with barbariſm and deſolation; he would flatter himſelf, that an avowal which the moſt ordinary degree of attachment to the intereſts of humanity might prompt any individual to make, will not, in himſelf, be imputed to affectation, or egotiſm.

So much, perhaps, it may be allowed me to inſinuate relatively to the motives of my preſent undertaking.

But you, Sir, will by this time, expect ſome intimation of my reaſon for ſoliciting your partial regard to the following Performance. It was natural to believe, that its relation to your Father's fame could not fail to give you ſome intereſt in its behalf; and as this circumſtance ſuggeſted a deſire, that it might have the honor of your protection; ſo that reſemblance in virtue and the love of learning, by which the world allow you the credit of emulating the character

of

of your Father, of being, to uſe his own language,

"*Clarus——patriâ pariter virtute tuâque*,"

ſhould ſeem, if theſe eſſays be thought worthy of your countenance, to afford them the beſt Earneſt of ſupport, and of recommendation to the Public. I am, with every ſentiment of conſideration and reſpect,

Sir,

Your moſt obedient,

Humble Servant,

JOHN LETTICE.

ADVERTISEMENT,

(The latter Part addreſſed, very particularly, to the attention of FEMALE READERS.)

IF I might preſume to flatter myſelf, that, from the importance of the ſubject, ſome of my Readers, may find the following Tranſlation worthy of being twice peruſed, I would take the liberty of recommending to them to read it, the firſt time, without recurrence to the Commentary, or to the Annotations. The chief object of this peruſal might be ſuppoſed an uninterrupted attention to the ſtructure and ſpirit of the Poem. If the Commentary, which is a continued one, were next to be read with ſuch occaſional reference only to the Poem, as might be found requiſite, the peruſal of it would probably afford the moſt ſatisfaction. It is needleſs to explain, that the main buſineſs of this part of the performance is, to point out the connexion of

the different ſteps in the Author's Reaſoning, which, in poetry, can proceed neither ſo viſibly, nor ſo methodically, as in proſe; and moreover to place every argument in its faireſt point of view.—A ſecond reading of the Poem would perhaps more conveniently introduce an acquaintance with the Annotations. A great part of theſe, being written in the way of Strictures, might now be read uninterruptedly, without the trouble of turning to the Poem; and, to make this the leſs neceſſary, it is, that two or three lines are generally placed at the head of each Note; ſo that the ſubject of it may, at once, be underſtood. Had the principal deſign of the Annotations been, (what it is not) the explanation of difficult paſſages, the Reader's attention to them would have been requeſted during the firſt peruſal of the Poem. But, indeed, few difficult paſſages occur. One object, which I had in view in offering theſe Annotations, was, to furniſh amuſement to the more critical Reader in the compariſon of paſſages from antient and modern Poets, &c. with thoſe of my Author on ſimilar topics; paſſages, which are ſometimes deſignedly imitated, and as often reſembled without intended imitation. To determine theſe caſes, is ſometimes found neither unentertaining, nor uſeleſs. But my more *ſtudied* and *particular* purpoſe in the production of ſtriking paſſages from a variety of Writers, both antient and modern, upon many important ſubjects treated in the Poem, has been, to renew and to continue thoſe ſerious impreſſions on the minds of my Readers, which its peruſal will ſcarcely fail to have made; and to engage them, if I might ſo preſume, to purſue their meditations on the Immortality of the

Soul

Soul to their beſt conſequence; a permament effect on the conduct of liſe, during this preſent ſtate of probationary exiſtence.

In making an obſervation, or two, relative to the execution of my undertaking, juſtice calls upon me to mention, that the parallel paſſages, on which I have formed my notes upon verſes 14 and 19, of Book I. and upon 296—329—351 and 442, of Book II. were ſuggeſted to me by a very learned friend; to whom, with ſome other reſpectable perſons diſtinguiſhed in Literature, I am under obligation for having kindly pointed out to me ſeveral paſſages in the manuſcript of my Tranſlation, which demanded correction or improvement; to effect which, I may add, I have uſed my beſt endeavours. That the partiality of friendſhip, notwithſtanding the correcteſt taſte, may have ſuffered ſtill other blemiſhes to eſcape without animadverſion, it is not unnatural to ſuppoſe. I have now only to wiſh, that the indulgence of Friends may be ſucceded by the candor of Critics; and that my Readers may not have reaſon to regret, that my ſequeſtered Situation in the Country made it impracticable for me, to receive any farther aſſiſtance than that, which I have acknowledged.

With regard to the conſtruction of my Notes, where the numerous paſſages, which I have cited from Greek and Latin Authors, might, with ſome perſons, ſubject me to ſuſpicions of an oſtentatious diſplay of Claſſic Reſearch, I hope they will be ſufficiently

ſufficiently obviated by informing my Readers, that, as it appears to have been one principal object with the Author of this celebrated Latin Poem to found his arguments on the diſcoveries, which had been made by the moſt enlightened Antients, particularly Plato and Tully, on the Immortality of the Soul, I thought it incumbent upon me, in the office of Annotator, to trace, and to produce his learned authorities.

But as my elegant COUNTRYWOMEN, though cultivated above thoſe of every other nation, do not, in general, make the dead Languages an object of their intellectual purſuit, I have been careful to tranſlate every Greek and Latin paſſage, which I have cited, except in a few inſtances, where I have given the tranſlations of others. *For I am ambitious of having many Readers of that Sex; being entirely perſuaded, that were the groveling principles of Materialiſm, and of the Mortality of the Soul, once to become as prevalent among the Ladies of this Country, as they have been for ſome time among the Female Citizens of a neighbouring people, there would want little elſe, at this alarming Criſis, than that univerſal Depravation, which ſuch a circumſtance would certainly, and quickly, produce, to ſhake the Conſtitution and Government of Great Britain to their very foundations; and to render the moſt enlightened and proſperous of all Nations, an Enemy to herſelf, and an Auxiliary in completely demoliſhing the fair Fabric of civil Society in Europe. Farewell, then, to all that is great in human Conduct; to every thing that is good, or honeſt, or liberal, or lovely, or becomming; or even characteriſtic of civilized Man.*

ADVERTISEMENT.

Man. Farewell to all, except our Form, our Habiliments, the Faculty of Speech, and Power of Miſchief, that can preſerve any prominent mark of diſtinction betwixt Man, and Beaſt.

MR. LETTICE BEGS TO EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, AND THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY-PRESS, FOR THEIR LIBERAL ASSISTANCE IN THE PRINTING OF HIS BOOK; A FAVOR HIGHLY ACCEPTABLE TO HIM.

THE

THE

IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

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BOOK I.

EACH animal, through all this ſpacious earth,
Each animal, ſave Man, the lot enjoys,
Which Nature gave, nor aſks for aught beyond.
Man ſole to knowledge born, whom high deſires
Prompt to inveſtigate the cauſes [a] dark,
And mutual harmony [b] of things, his path
In vain anxiety purſues; whilſt Death
O'er his devoted head with ſable wing
Hovers, and ſternly, doom'd in mid career,
His quarry ſtrikes. If nothing, undeſign'd,
Sprung from celeſtial Wiſdom, whence was this?
Why ſown the ſeeds of intellect divine,

If

DE
ANIMI IMMORTALITATE.

LIBER PRIMUS.

CÆTERA per terras animalia ſorte fruuntur
Quam ſua cuique dedit Natura; nec amplius optant.
Solus homo, qui ſcire ſagax, cui ſumma cupido
Scrutari cauſas et mutua fœdera rerum,
Vanum iter ingreditur; nigris namque imminet alis,
Et curſu in medio Mors intercludit euntem.
Quorſum iſthoc, ſi nil ſapientia dia creârit
Incaſſum? Quorſum hæc divinæ ſemina mentis,

References to the Commentary, v. 5—10.

In

If fruit mature muſt ne'er approve the tree?
What, thus, avails each cauſe of Nature known;[c]
What, through futurity's dark veil to pierce;
What, 'midſt the planetary worlds to ſoar,
If all our mental glory end in Death?
For ah! one general law, one common urn
Man's race awaits. With[d] Phyllis 'neath the ſhade
Is it not better then our tranſient day
In ſportive dalliance to wear? And thee,
In revelry and dance and ſong to praiſe,
God of the purple grape? To baniſh care
Is ever thine; of paſt all ſenſe, all fear
Of future, in thy joyous cup to drown.

Come then, bear hither ſtrait the flowing bowl:
Neæra's rapt'rous touch ſhall wake the lyre
To Chloe's melting voice: the feſtive board
With dainty viands crown: let mirth be ours;
Snatch, ſnatch the ſwift-wing'd moments of to-day,
Regardleſs of the morrow's doubtful boon.

But theſe delights ſoon cloy: ere taſted well

They

In proprios ſi non poterunt adoleſcere fructus?
Ecquid enim prodeſt rerum cognoſcere cauſas;
Jungere venturis præſentia; mente vagari
Solem atque aſtra ſuper, morituro? Scilicet omnes
Una manet Lethi lex et commune ſepulchrum.
Nonne ergo ſatius cum Phyllide ludere in umbra;
Teque, Lyæe pater, lætis celebrare choreis?
Novit enim Bacchus curas depellere, novit
Præteriti ſenſus abolere metumque futuri.

Quare age, vina liques: epulæ, convivia, luſus,
Pſallere docta Chloe, citharæque perita Neæra,
Non abſint; volucris rape lætus dona diei;
Quærere nec cures quid craſtina proferat hora.

Atqui pertæſum eſt harum citò deliciarum;

Reference to the Commentary, v. 20.

Scilicet,

They pall upon the ſenſe. Diſmiſs we then
Such trifling: things of graver import hence
We'll ſeek; be wealth our aim, or glory, whilſt
Ambition to the Palace points, crowded
With flattering viſitants, each morn who come
To greet its mighty Lord: the tedium ſoon
Of dull routine compels us to exclaim:
Behold, what vanity in human things!

What path then ſhall we try? what friendly ſhore
Will next receive us? Mark how reſtleſs here,
Spite of her drear impriſonment, the mind
From objects known inveſtigates thoſe hidden,
And ſtrange; till riſing, ſtep by ſtep, ſhe mounts,
Nature her guide, to Truth's eternal throne.
Theſe fleeting joys experienc'd want all power,
Her aims to fix: no; fitter bliſs, by change
Untouch'd, ſhe ſeeks; to no viciſſitude
Obnoxious; pleaſures, which for ever bloom.

Hence, then, deſpondence! Wiſdom all divine
Nor plans, nor works in vain. Theſe narrow bounds,

Which

Scilicet, hæc ſatiat vix dum libata voluptas.
Ergo, dimiſſis, quæramus ſeria, nugis.
Accumulentur opes; ducit quò gloria, quòve
Ambitio, ſtipatus eas examine denſo
Manè ſalutantum. Quid multa? Huc denique eòdem
Volveris, ut clames heu! quantum in Rebus inane!

Quænam igitur tentanda via eſt? Ubi littus amicum?
Nempe vides, ut ſemper avet, dum corpore clauſa eſt,
Mens alia ex aliis ſcire, ac, ſine fine, gradatim
Æternum (ſic fert Natura) attingere Verum.

Gaudia quinetiam non hæc fugientia poſcit,
At magis apta ſibi, vicibuſque obnoxia nullis;
Gaudia perpetuum non interitura per ævum.

Quare ſume animum; neque enim ſapientia dia
Fruſtra operam impendit; neque mens arctabitur iſtis

Reference to the Commentary, v. 41—47.

Limitibus

Which hold enthrall'd our periſhable clay,
The mind diſdains to keep. From earthly droſs
Exempt, her native vigor ſhe maintains;
Maintains to all Eternity. And when,
Her vile corporeal fetters ſhaken off,
To kindred Heav'n, its antient habitant,
'Scap'd from her priſon-houſe, ſhe wings her way,
Nectareous ſtreams from Truth's eternal fount
She quaffs, and ſhares the banquet of the ſkies.

While Life remains, if Life it may be deem'd
Beneath this darkling tenement confin'd,
In dulneſs numb'd, the vivid ſpirit droops,
Unſtretch'd her daring pinions; yet retains
Marks of deſcent celeſtial. For whence elſe
Trace we her ſtores of reminiſcence? Whence
That order fit, in which, arrang'd for uſe,
And prompt obedience, at Volition's call,
They lie? For, ſure, of intellectual wealth
This ſtore exhauſtleſs in corporeal cells
No receptacle fit could find, or power

In

Limitibus quibus hoc periturum corpus; at exſors
Terrenæ labis viget, æternùmque vigebit:
Atque ubi corporeis emiſſa, ut carcere, vinclis,
Libera cognatum repetet, vetus incola, cœlum,
Nectareos latices Veri de fonte perenni
Hauriet, ætheriumque perennis carpet Amomum.

At verò dum vita manet (ſi vita vocanda eſt
Corporis hæc cæco concluſa putamine) torpet
Vivida vis animi, nec ovantes explicat alas.
Multa tamen veteris retinet veſtigia ſtirpis.
Unde etenim tot res reminiſcitur? Unde tot apto
Ordine diſponit, mox et depromit in uſus?
Quippe haud tam locuples hæc, tamque immenſa ſupellex
Corporis in cellis poterit ſtipata teneri;

References to the Commentary, v. 51—53—57—62.

In matter competent to bid each thought,
Each bright idea ſpring to living day.

Inventive Mind, ſource of the various arts,
Defence and ornament to ſavage life
Supplied; to every object gave its name:
United ſounds to letters; Men, diſpers'd
And wand'ring like the brutes, from woods and wilds
She call'd; in cities taught them how to live,
Their wills to law ſubdu'd, binding them cloſe
In ſocial compact. Say, now, what is this
But ſome diviner power, etherial ſenſe
And virtue heav'n-inſpired? Say, whence, O Muſe!
Th' o'erflowing ſtream of eloquence, at will
That bears each paſſion in its' torrent courſe;
Language, that emulates the thunder's ſound,
Or with the lightning's liquid force pervades
The thrilling ſenſe. Tell, whence the Poet's ſong,
Led through the flexile maze of numbers ſweet
And magic ſounds, ſo captivates the ear?
When Nature's wondrous beauties are his theme,

Whence

Aut vi corpore revocari in luminis oras.

Illa etiam inventrix, varias quæ protulit artes,
Suppeditans vitæ decus et tutamen egenæ;
Nomina quæ impoſuit rebus, vocemque ligavit
Literulis; aut quæ degentes more ferarum,
Diſperſoſque homines deduxit in oppida; quæve
Legibus edomuit, fœduſque coegit in unum;
Quænam iſthæc niſi Vis divinior, ætheriuſque
Senſus, et afflatu cœleſti concita virtus?

Jam quorum undanti eloquium fluit amne, rapitque
Quò velit affectus, tonitruque et fulgura miſcet;
Divitias trahit unde ſuas? Vigor igneus ille
Num mortale ſonat? Quid cenſes carmina vatum?
Sive etenim flexu numerorum vique canora,
Oblectet varia dulcedine lapſus ad aures;
Seu, ſpecioſa canes rerum miracula, fictis

References to the Comentary, v. 75——85.

Whence that gay ſtore of imag'ry, ſo wraught
By fiction's power, to faſcinate the heart?
Naught, groveling, mean, and nothing not ſublime
Breaths the poetic art. When what befals
This ſublunary world, when all we ſee
Revolving ever, round and round, the ſame,
Fails Man's capacious intellect to fill,
Ceaſeleſs which ſeeks the new, the ſtrange, the great,
The Bard to rapture wakes the ſacred ſhell,
And lo! a new Creation ſtarts to light,
New order, more ſublime, and lovelier forms
Meet the warm wiſhes of th' aſpirant Mind,
Preſaging Immortality.

See next
The ſtudious Sage, by ſcience ſkill'd to trace[h]
Each Planet, as it rolls, in orbit vaſt,[i]
Its central luminary round; what laws
The Comet's flaming voyage, through th' Inane
Of ſpace immeaſurable, bear, he knows;
And how, in boundleſs fields of Ether bright,
Round their peculiar Suns new ſyſtems roll.

And

Ludat imaginibus, peragretque per intima cordis;
Nil parvum ſpirat, nil non ſublime Poeta.
Cumque ſuper terris quæ fiunt, quæque tuemur
Omnia, curriculo volventia ſemper eodem,
Non explent animum, varia et magis ampla petentem;
Sanctus adeſt Vates, per quem ſublimior ordo,
Pulcrior et ſpecies, et mentis idonea votis
Exoritur, vitæ ſpes auguriumque futuræ.

Quid, qui cœleſtes nôrunt deſcribere motus;
Sidera, qua circa ſolem, qua lege Cometæ
Immenſum per Inane rotentur, ut æthere vaſto
Aſtra alia illuſtrent alios immota planetas;

References to the Commentary, v. 104—106.

Nonne

And think'ſt[i] thou not ſuch intellect ſublime,
Which o'er the ſtars its empyrean flight
Holds arduous, from Heav'n deſcended erſt,
Deſtin'd its native manſion to regain?

But how, unleſs ſuppoſed ſome power her own,
Some innate force from mingling matter free?
And is not ſuch the conſcience of herſelf,
Willing, Nolition, Love, Fear, Hatred, Hope,
Sorrow and Joy; all theſe her own pure acts,
Seeking not matter's miniſterial aid?
'Tis her's by native power things to compare,
Like from unlike to ſeparate; in league
Fragments of truth, ſcatter'd and vague, ſhe knows
Friendly to join, and cauſes through effects
To trace; and hence, with ſkill inventive, arts[k]
On arts to raiſe, in beauteous order, learns.
Lo! the fair fabric of her reas'nings, ſlow
And gradual, to its ſummit riſes; whence
The whole long train of cauſes falls in view;[l]
The chain's firſt link fix'd to th' Almighty's throne.

Now

Nonne hanc credideris mentem, quæ nunc quoq; Cœlum
Aſtraque pervolitat, delapſam cœlitus, illuc
Unde abiit remeare, ſuaſque reviſere ſedes?

Quî tandèm hæc fierent, niſi quædam in mente ſubeſſet
Vis ſua, materiæ mixtura immunis ab omni?
Conſcia porrò ſibi eſt, vult, nonvult, odit, amatque,
Et timet, et ſperat,; gaudet, mœretque ſuâ vi
Ipſa; miniſterio neque corporis indiget ullo:
Viribus ipſa ſuis inter ſe comparat, et res
Sejungit rebus; vaga diſſociataque Veri
Membra minutatim legit, ac concinnat amicè.
Elicit hinc rerum cauſas, atque artibus artes
Hinc alias aliis ſuper extruit ordine pulcro;
Et magis atque magis ſumma ad faſtigia tendit,
Unde omnis ſeries cauſarum apparet, et omnis
Numinis à ſolio ad terram demiſſa catena.

References to the Commentary, v. 113—117—124—128.

Denique

Now laſt into herſelf the Mind deſcends;"
Views her ideal world; how ſprings each thought;
Her own grand ſyſtem, her own Nature ſees.
And can ſuch virtue from corporeal clay
Reſult? Can its own complicated form
By a machine be ſcan'd; or underſtood
Its moving cauſe? In bodies we diſcern
Mechanic force, by foreign motion ſole
Impell'd; interior naught, and naught their own.

From low purſuits, which draw the vulgar herd,
Forbear the Mind's exalted powers to ſcan,
Erroneous: Heroes old, of Attic fame,
With ever-blooming laurels wreath'd, or thoſe
Whom Rome, or Britain bore in better days
To this, nor that conceding, fam'd in war,
Contemplate rather.——Why ſhould I recall
Her Bards divine with inſpiration fir'd,
Or Legiſlators ſage, or ſons the powers
Of eloquence poſſeſſing? Why diſplay
Her philoſophic tribe; by whom unveil'd,

Long

Denique et in ſeſe deſcendit, et aſpicit intus
Rerum ideas, quo quæque modo naſcantur; et unde
Cogitet, ac prope jam ſua quæ ſit fabrica novit.
Tantane corporea eſt virtus? An machina vires
Percipit ulla ſuas, aut quid ſibi præbeat eſcam?
Omne etenim corpus nihil eſt niſi machina, motu
Impulſa externo, non interiore ſuoque.

Vulgi igitur ſtudiis noli altæ mentis acumen
Metiri; aſt illos, etiam nunc laude recentes,
Contemplare viros, tellus quos Attica, vel quos
Roma, nec alterutri cedens tulit Anglia, nutrix
Heroum, dum tempus erat, melioribus annis.

Quid tibi tot memorem divino pectore vates,
Totve repertores legum, fandive potentes?
Quid, per quos venit ſpectanda ſcientia; dudùm

References to the Commentary, v. 134—143.

Long tho' in ruſt conceal'd, and fearing light,
Fair ſcience ſhines? But he, above the reſt
Riſing effulgent, like th' etherial ſun,
The mighty Verulam, to every art
Open'd each ſacred avenue; he firſt
From ſophiſtry's bewildering mazes forth
Led wiſdom's footſteps by her luminous guide,
Experience ſure; and rear'd the lamp of day,
Precurſor bright! to Newton's proud career.

Illuſtrious ſpirits! aught if mortal things
Heav'n's habitants can touch; if fond regard
Of Britain's iſle; vouchſafe ye, hear my prayer:
Her vigour renovate, that ſhaken off
Lethargic ſloth, true virtue ſtill her aim,
And love of antient praiſe, her ſons may ſtill
The arduous ſteeps of glory fearleſs climb!

Such mighty genius, ſuch egregious gifts
Ne'er ſprang, I ween, without the ſmile of Heav'n.
In different ages, by the hand ſupreme
Of Deity wide-ſcatter'd, ſtarry lights

Of

Informi co-operta ſitu, lucemque peroſa?
Ante alios verò Baconus, ut ætherius ſol,
Effulgens, artes aditum patefecit ad omnes.
Hic à figmentis Sophiam revocavit ineptis
Primus; quàque regit fida Experientia greſſus,
Securum per iter, Newtono ſcilicet idem
Deſignatque viam, et præcurſor lampada tradit.

Illuſtres animæ! Si quid mortalia tangunt
Cœlicolas, ſi gentis adhuc cura ulla Britannæ;
Vos precor, antiquum Vos inſtaurate vigorem;
Ut tandem excuſſo nitamur ad ardua ſomno,
Virtutis veræ memores, et laudis avitæ.

Nempe horum egregias reor haud ſine numine dotes
Enaſci potuiſſe; Deum quin tempore in omni
Conſperſiſſe, velut ſtellas, hinc inde locorum

Reference to the Commentary, v. 162.

Of primal magnitude and dazzling ſheen,
Theſe intellectual comets riſe: once more
Warm'd by ſuch influence degenerate times
May riſe to high exertion; whence the mind
Beſt learns her own immortal origin.

Who, when diſcharg'd his Nature's fated debt,[p]
Something, poſſeſs'd within, conceives not ſtill?
That ſomething of moſt intimate concern,
Th' inſeparable ſelf? Of antient days
The wiſe their witneſs bore; the public voice[q]
This univerſal ſentiment proclaims.
No tribe ſo barbarous lives, or people rude,
Who cloſe their dreary proſpect with the tomb,
Careleſs of all beyond.

The acorn, hence,[r]
An age ſlow intervening, ere it grow
Mature to oak, is providently ſown;
Its umbrage and its uſe to future times
Deſtin'd. And, hence, th' aſpiring pyramid[s]
The wide-deſtroying hand of Time defies.

Hence,

Splendidiora animi quaſi quædam lumina; ut iſtis
Accenſa exemplis ſe degener efferat ætas,
Agnoſcatque ſuî quàm ſit ſublimis origo.

Præterea eſſe aliquid verè quod pertinet ad nos,
Morte obita, nemo ſecum non concipit; intus,
Monſtratum eſt intus; teſtatur docta vetuſtas;
Publica vox clamat; neque gens tam barbara, quæ non
Proſpiciat trans funus, et ulteriora requirat.

Hinc ſeritur, tardè creſcens, et poſthuma merces,
Quercus, natorum natis quæ profit: et ingens
Pyramidum moles ſtat inexpugnabilis annis.

References to the Commentary, v. 181—186—190.

Hinc

Hence, that unceaſing thought, that anxious care
Life's narrow limits, by a deathleſs name,
Late to extend: hence, poſthumous renown
So faſcinates the heart, that he, above
The throng whom genius lifts, no toil ſevere,
No danger ſhuns, to win the future age,
And diſtant glory's high reward to claim.

Hence, ſee we not the convict wretch condemn'd,
Juſt on his fatal exit from the world,
His guilt deny, mendacious; hoping thus
His fame entire, and honor to preſerve?
Of future ſenſe and being Nature's hand
Theſe traces dark impreſs'd: Our living fame
How generations yet unborn may hold,
Hence, ſprings that warm ſolicitude, which fills
Each human breaſt! What recks it us, the voice,
Inaudible and vain, of good report, if duſt,
Meer duſt and aſhes be our ſole remains,
And Death, an endleſs, an inſenſate ſleep?

What mean funereal rites? "Of what avail

To

Hinc cura illa omnis vivendi extendere metas,
Nomine victuro; tanti est hinc fama superstes,
Ingenio ut quisquis præcellit, nulla recuset
Ille subire pericla, nec ullos ferre labores,
Si modo venturi speciem sibi vindicet ævi,
Gloriaque ad seros veniat mansura nepotes.

Nonne videmus uti convictus criminis, ipso
Limine sub mortis, culpam tamen abneget omnem;
Mendax, ut sibi constet honos atque integra fama?
Nempe animis hæc insevit Natura Futuri
Indicia, obscurasque notas; hinc solicita est mens,
De se posteritas quid sentiat; at nihil ad nos
Postera vox, erimus si nil nisi pulvis et umbra;
Sera venit, cineres nec tangit fama quietos.

Quid porrò exequiæ voluere? Quid anxia cura

Reference to the Commentary, v. 211

Defunctis

To him defunct our piety? to him
Yon labour'd maſs of monumental pride?
The bloodleſs corſe to earth lo! theſe commit,
Its tomb with flowery wreaths bedeck, [y] and vows,
In annual tribute, pay; nor leſs,
Than if the ſacred Manes claim'd the boon:
While thoſe, with ſolemn obſequies of fire [w]
Funereal, each bone incarnate burn;
And aſhes gathering laſt with pious care,
Store them, lov'd relicks! in the peaceful urn;
Againſt the mercileſs aſſaults of Time
Fancied ſecure.

What need to witneſs thoſe,
Whom Nilus waters? Long accuſtom'd they,
Not on the flaming pyre their dead to burn,
Or ſunk in earth inhume: But firſt each corſe
Embowel'd clean they lave; infuſing then [x]
Of frankincenſe and pitch an odorous maſs
With thick bitumen, every cavity
They fill. This pious labour finiſh'd due,

In

Defunctis ſuper, et moles operoſa ſepulchri?
Pars etenim terræ mandant exſangue cadaver,
Et tumulo ſerta imponunt, et ſacra quotannis
Perſolvunt; tanquam poſcant ea munera Manes:
Extructa, pars ritè, pyra, cremat inſuper artus,
Colligit et cineres, fidaque reponit in urna;
Ut ſic relliquiæ durando ſæcula vincant.

Quid memorem fluctu quos divite Nilus inundans
Irrigat? His patrius mos non exurere flamma,
Non inhumare ſolo; ſed nudant corpora primùm
Viſceribus, terguntque; dehinc vim thuris odoram
Et picis infundunt, lentoque bitumine complent:
His demùm exactis, vittarum tegmine multo

Reference to the Commentary, v. 230.

In bandage manifold the whole incloſed,
And every part in fit coherence join'd,
The living image laſt, fondly pourtray'd,
The ſurface decks: Thus glow in every breaſt
Warm hope and confidence, that, all reſolv'd[y]
In death this mortal frame, natheleſs ſurvives
Our better part, unhurt by fate, or time.

An Indian race, behold! on Ganges' ſhore,
Of life impatient, to funereal flames
Themſelves devoting; or, before their gods,
Who, on the ſacred ſhrine their ſtreaming blood
Pour voluntary; by reſiſtleſs hope
Impell'd of viſiting thoſe bliſsful fields,
Where ſpring perpetual reigns, and cloudleſs ſuns
Shine one eternal Day. Nor leſs is fam'd
The Wife of orient climes, in faithful love
Enthuſiaſt, who ſcorns a Huſband's fate
With howling exclamations, or with tears
Effeminate to wail; but ſtrange to tell!
Self-doom'd, the willing victim mounts the pile,[z]

And

Conſtringunt, pars ut ſibi quæque cohæreat aptè;
Picta ſuperficiem decorat viventis imago.
Uſque adeò ingenita eſt ſpes, et fiducia cuique
Conſignata, fore ut membris jam morte ſolutis
Reſtet adhuc noſtri melior pars; quam neque Fati
Vis perimet, nec edax poterit delere vetuſtas.

Aſpice quas Ganges interluit Indicus oras:
Illic gens hominum medios ſe mittit in ignes,
Impatiens vitæ; vel ad ipſa altaria Divûm
Sponte animam reddit, percuſſa cupidine cæca
Migrandi, ſedes ubi fata dedêre quietas;
Ver ubi perpetuum, et ſoles ſine nube ſereni.

Nec minùs uxores famâ celebrantur Eoæ:
Non illæ lacrymis, non fœmineo ululatu
Fata virûm plorant; verùm, (mirabile dictu!)
Conſcenduntque rogum, flammaque vorantur eâdem.

And in her conſort's funeral blaze expires;
Firm of belief, ſhe, hence, ſhall ſhare his way
To other worlds, ſtill beſt-belov'd, to light
In happier realms the nuptial torch anew.

Turn next, where Boreas breaths eternal froſt, [zz]
Stern nations there invincible in war
Behold: Like ardour all inſpire: Through flames,
Through weapon'd war, with like contempt they brave
Death's frown unconquer'd. Whence this ſpirit fierce,
Theſe goading ſtings? The creed of future life
And endleſs glory points their genuine ſource.

Add too th' enchanting tales of bliſsful plains [a]
Elyſian; Styx, and Phlegethontic waves.
What tho' the tale by prieſtly arts were feign'd,
The pious fraud had ne'er acquir'd belief,
If Nature firſt no intimation, dark
And doubtful tho' it be, of Future gave;
For fiction reſts upon the baſe of truth.

But ſince 'tis hard, an unembodied mind,
Disjoin'd from parts material, to conceive,

Nimirùm credunt veterum ſic poſſe maritûm
Ire ipſas comites, tædamque novare ſub umbris.

Aſpice quà Boreas æternaque frigora ſpirant,
Invictas bello gentes: par omnibus ardor;
Par lucis contemptus agit per tela, per ignes,
Indomita virtute feros: hoc concitat œſtrum,
Hos verſat ſtimulos, ecquid, niſi dulcis imago
Promiſſæ in Patriam meritis per ſæcula vitæ?

Adde iſthuc quæ de campis narrantur amœnis
Elyſii, Stygioque lacu, Phlegethontis et unda.

Fraude Sacerdotum ſint hæc conficta; Quid ad rem?
Non fraudi locus ullus enim niſi primitùs eſſet
Infita notities, licet imperfecta, Futuri:
Subſtratum agnoſcunt etenim ficta omnia Verum.

At quia difficile eſt mentem ſine corpore quid ſit
Per ſe concipere, et craſſo ſejungere ſenſu,

Reference to the Commentary, v. 269.

Corporeas

And ſpoil'd of groſſer ſenſe; the vulgar herd
Subſtantial forms, a vital countenance, [b]
With earthly members model'd true to life,
And local habitation falſe ſupply.
Hence ſophiſts, more refin'd, ſuch fancies vain
Rejecting, yet unable to divine
Her modes of ſpiritual being, taught,
That both extinguiſh'd, in one common tomb
Sleep ſoul and body; doctrine this of men
Too proud their ignorance to own, to learn
Too ſluggiſh; for no eaſy taſk 'tis found
Plain truth from fiction's mimic form to know.
Be ours the toil this indolence of mind
To rouſe, and truth with vigour to purſue;
Maſk'd tho' ſhe be, in fabulous diſguiſe
By prieſt, or poet dreſt.

What weightier proof
Than general ſuffrage, voice of all mankind, [c]
The voice of nature held——that God exiſts?
Yet ſtill, what ſtranger dreams, or worthy leſs

Of

Corporeas illi tribuit plebecula formas;
Dat ſimiles vultus, dat membra ſimillima veris,
Et certis habitare locis dat corporis inſtar.
Unde alii, quibus hæc prava et delira videntur,
Nec conſtat quo more animus poſt fata ſuperſit,
Extingui omnino communi funere cenſent,
Vel quia diſcendi nequeunt perferre laborem;
Vel quia turpe putant quidvis neſcire fateri.
Namque opus haud tenue eſt ſincerum excernere fi&to.
Diſcute ſegnitiem idcirco, neque reſpue verum,
Fabellas propter quas interſperſit iniquus
Sive dolus, ſeu vana fuât petulantia Vatûm.

Quid, nonne eſſe Deum conſenſus comprobat omnis,
Conſenſus, qui vox Naturæ ritè putatur?
At quàm falſa homines, indignaque Numine fingunt!

Reference to the Commentary, v. 286.

Quippe

Of Him Supreme, e're bred in human brain
Than each falſe attribute to God aſſign'd;
E'en the frail characters of Man? or worſe,
As hope or fear, unſtable rul'd the heart,
Countleſs was multiplied th' eternal ONE.[d]
Yes, e'en created things, if uſeful deem'd,
Were hail'd as Gods propitious; objects fear'd
Were vengeful Deities; laſt, ſo inſane
This error grew, that e'en the periſhing beaſt
Deform'd, the garden's fruit, onion, or leak,
Diſtorted reaſon's adoration claim'd.

On ſuch ſtrange figments muſing, wiſdom's friend,[e]
That ſage Athenian, predicted erſt,
At the full period of revolving time,
Man's aid long wiſh'd, the advent of a God;
Whoſe orient ray ſhould guide our wandering ſteps
Midſt ſuperſtition's night, and lead us ſafe,
Through earth's dark labyrinth, with faithful clue.
Aided mean-time, by Nature's various ſigns
Athwart the gloom 'tis given us to diſcern

Truth's

Quippe humana Deo tribuunt, numerumque Deorum
Multiplicant, juxta ac ſpes erigit aut metus angit
Inſtabiles animos; Quid enim? Quæ profore credunt
Hæc Divos ſibi præſentes, at Numina læva,
Quæ metuêre, putant; valuitque inſania tantùm,
Beſtiolas ut deformes pro numine, et ipſum
Cæpe etiam et porrum, coleret lymphata vetuſtas.

Hæc igitur reputans Sophiæ dux, Atticus, Ille
Affore prædixit perfecto temporis orbe,
* *Attulit et nobis aliquando optantibus ætas*
Auxilium adventumque Dei; qui, Solis ut ortus,
Diſcuteret tenebras animi, et per cæca viarum
Duceret, ipſe regens certo veſtigia filo.

Interea multis licuit dignoſcere ſignis
Natura monſtrante, velut per nubila, Verum.

* Virg. Æn. viii. 200.

References to the Commentary, v. 301—308.

Truth's opening front. Where then conjecture leads,
If reaſon's cautions guidance point her courſe,
The Muſe may follow, nor diſdain her aid.

That mind and body feel, in various modes,
Common conſent and ſympathy, the law
Of cloſe alliance owning, ſtands confeſt:
From various proof, as evidently ſhown,
Marking their difference of natures wide,
The mind's diviner origin we trace:
Oft with corporeal ſtrength and vigor join'd
Obtuſer intellect we ſee; and oft,
In frailer tenement of human clay,
Spirit of higheſt proof and temper lives.
If mind with body ſhared one common fate,
Could this with ſickneſs feebly droop, and that
E'er fail to ſympathize? Yet nature oft
Th' effect diſowns; for when the ſtiffen'd limbs
Speak diſſolution nigh, the vigorous mind
Quicken'd exults, to inſpiration rais'd,
And flows in ſtreams of ſweeteſt eloquence;

Each

Ergo age, qua ducit nos conjectura, ſequamur,
Nec ſpernamus opem, ſi quam Ratio ipſa miniſtrat.

Haud equidem inficior mentem cum corpore multis
Conſentire modis; Lex mutua fœderis illa eſt:
Aſt eadem in multis diſpar ſe diſparis eſſe
Naturæ probat, ac divina ſtirpe profectam.

Sæpe videmus uti ſolido ſtant robore vires
Corporeæ, cum mens obtuſior; invalidoque
Corpore ineſt virtus perſæpe acerrima mentis.
Quinetiam interitu ſi corporis intereat mens,
Conſimili pacto par eſt, ægrotet ut ægro
Corpore, quod fieri contrà quoque ſæpe videmus.
Namque ubi torpeſcunt artus jam morte propinqua,
Acrior eſt acies tum mentis, et entheus ardor;
Tempore non alio facundia ſuavior, atque

References to the Commentary, v. 313—323.

Each word prognoſtic of approaching death.

If elemental matter form the mind,
Whence comes it, that in ſleep, the ſenſes cloſed
At ev'ry avenue, and entrance none
To outward objects giv'n, invigorate then
The mind her genuine force the more diſplays,
Claps her triumphant pinions, ſoars aloft,
And like ſome feather'd priſoner, eſcap'd
From bondage faſt, exulting ſeeks the ſkies
And roams at large th' interminable Void?

If of corporeal mould exiſt the mind [e]
Infinity of parts reſults: each owns
Its proper ſenſe, and independent will;
And varying each a different end purſues.
Say, 'midſt ſuch numbers and contention ſtrange [h]
How equity and truth their baſe can fix,
Or life one individual courſe maintain
Conſiſtent; or how conſciouſneſs of ſelf,
Of his own worth, in Man's divided heart
Its ſtation keep?

But

Fatidicæ jam tum voces morientis ab ore.

Corporeis porrò ſi conſtat mens elementis,
Quî fit ut in ſomnis, cum clauſa foramina ſenſus,
Nec ſpecies externa manet quæ pabula menti
Sufficiat, magis illa vigens, tum denique veras
Expromat vires, tum ſe plaudentibus alis
Tollat, avi ſimilis, cavea quæ fortè recluſa
Fertur ad alta volans, cœloque exultat aperto ?

Jam ſi corporea eſt animi Natura, neceſſe eſt
Partibus hæc eadem conflata ſit infinitis ;
Ergo et ſenſus erit cuique, et ſua cuique libido
Particulæ, totidemque animi in diverſa trahentes.
Has inter turbas atque in certamine tanto
Dic, quo more queat verum conſiſtere et æquum ;
Et vitæ tenor unus, et hæc ſibi conſcia virtus.

References to the Commentary, v. 331—340.

Materiæ

But haply intellect[1]
In ſome determin'd form, and apter ſite
Of matter may conſiſt; as if, forſooth
A ſquare might boaſt more ſapience than a curve!
Add quantity, or quantity ſubtract;
Mould with Protean ſkill each fancied form;
Try all the various hues of Iris' bow;
Thy craft, ſtill vain, creates nor ſenſe, nor thought.

Haply in motion's energetic power[k]
The mind conſiſts? What cannot motion do?
Yes, will, diſcourſe, and reaſon, ſcience, all
By pullies are produced, and levers—Lo!
The ſchool-boy's top beneath the laſhing thong
Genius conceives, and, wonderful to tell,
With conſcious wiſdom whirls at every ſtroke!
By motion's law, whilſt ſwells the boiling lymph,
And o'er its animated caldron foams,
Who but admires the rich and flowing vein
Of eloquence divine? But fain the cauſe[l]
Of motion's ſelf I aſk: From mind alone,

Not

Materiæ ſed fortè ſitu certaque figura
Vis animi conſit;——tanquam quadrata rotundis
Plus ſaperent;——partes ſeu demis an addis, eòdem
Res redit, ac quali fuerint corpuſcula forma, ——
Tantundem ad mentem eſt, color ac ſiet albus, an ater.

At quodam ex motu fit Vis, quæ cogitat, omnis:
Quid non conficiat motus? Nempe ipſa voluntas,
Diſcurſus, ratio, rerumque ſcientia conſtant
Vectibus ac trochleis; pueri, credo, actus habena
Concipit Ingenium, ſapit et, ſub verbere, turbo:
Nec non lege pari, liquor ut calefactus aheno eſt,
Eloquii tumet, atque exundat divite vena.
Unde autem exoritur motus? Mens ſcilicet una,

References to the Commentary, v. 349—357.

Mens,

Not from corporeal clay inert, from mind
Motion begins: As God the Univerſe,
The world of matter, moves; ſo moves the mind,
Ruling ſupreme, the microcoſm of man.

No longer marvel then, this veil of fleſh
Remov'd, that ſtill immortal lives the mind;
More wonder were, how Death could be its lot;
Since parts conſtituent the mind hath none;
Of ſubſtance indiviſible; itſelf
Its own prime mover; and whate'er itſelf, [m]
By its own eſſence, moves, will never die:
Pure eſſence never can deſert itſelf.

How without form, or local circumſtance [n]
Can aught exiſt?—Conceive how God exiſts:
Formleſs thou own'ſt the Deity; by place
Uncircumſcrib'd; or elſe, the ſophiſt's creed [o]
That God himſelf is matter, granteſt thine.
But if a ſpiritual eſſence, He,
And pure of all corporeal droſs, exiſt,
Reaſon alike of human mind concludes.

For

Mens, non corpus iners fons eſt, et origo, movendi:
Utque Deus Mundum, ſic molem corporis omnem,
Arbitrio nutuque ſuo, mens dirigit intus.

Deſine quapropter mirari quomodo poſſit
Vivere mens, omni detracto corpore; miror
Hoc potiùs, qua vi poterit labefacta perire:
Utpote quæ nullis conſiſtat partibus, ac non
Divelli queat externo violabilis ictu:
Tum porrò ipſa ſuî motrix eſt, non aliundè
Inſtincta; at quodcunque ſua virtute movet ſe,
Vivet in æternum, quia ſe non deſeret unquam.

Verùm haud conceptu facile eſt exiſtere quidvis
Poſſe quidem, formam ſi dempſeris et poſituram.
Quidnam igitur cenſes de Numine? Nam neque formam
Mens (quà ſcire licet) recipit divina, nec ullo
Circumſcripta loco eſt, niſi forte putaveris ipſum
Materiam eſſe Deum; ſin vero Spiritus Idem,
Integer et, puruſque, et fæce remotus ab omni
Corporis, humana pariter de mente putandum:

References to the Commentary, v. 373—381.

For what diſplays more natural force her own;
Etherial ſpirit more, or high deſcent
More evidently boaſts; the gift of Heaven?
Hence, while with body leagued the mind remains,[p]
Full oft ſhe ſallies forth, her wing expands
Prepared for flight: No habitant on earth,
As ſome departing gueſt, aloft ſhe ſoars,
And with glad triumph ſeeks her native ſkies.

Can'ſt thou, immortal ſpirit! loitering here
This frail and periſhing ſtate alone admire;
Fluttering in buſy idleneſs, a fly
Borne light on painted wings, as chance directs,
To ſip the dews, or wanton in the air;
Then, paſt thy momentary ſunſhine, ſink
Hopeleſs to naught? Is this the ſum of life?[q]
Are thus, in empty air, our vows diſſolv'd?
Falls thus our promis'd bliſs? His genuine life
'Tis not Man's deſtiny to live, while truth
Slow creeping, ſtep by ſtep, through reaſonings long
And tedious meditation, he purſues;

Truth

Ecquid enim per ſe pollet magis, aut magis hauſtus
Indicat ætherios, genus et divinitùs ortum?
Atque adeo dum corporei ſtant fœdera nexûs,
Exit ſæpe foras tamen, effugioque parat ſe;
Ac veluti terrarum hoſpes, non incola, ſurſum
Fertur, et ad patrios geſtit remeare penates.

I nunc, uſuram vitæ mirare caducam;
Sedulus huc, illuc, ut muſca, nitentibus alis
Pervolita, rorem deliba, veſcere et aura
Pauliſper, mox in nihilum rediturus et exſpes.
Hæccine vitai ſumma eſt? Sic irrita vota?
Huc promiſſa cadunt? En quantò verius illa,
Illa eſt vita hominis, dabitur cum cernere Verum,
Non, ut nunc facimus, ſenſim, longaſque coacti
Ire per ambages meditando, at protinùs uno

References to the Commentary, v. 389—397—406.

Truth ſole enjoy'd, when Intuition's eye
In cloudleſs majeſty her form diſcerns.

But can the mind, tis aſk'd, of knowledge aught
Acquire, or keep acquir'd, the ſenſes once
Extinct? For ſprings not all our knowledge hence?
Hence firſt derived its nutriment and growth?
Once dried that ſource, the tree of knowledge dies.

But how the mind adminiſters her aid
To failing ſenſe, and Nature's want ſupplies,
Forget not; ſince, by optic tube, her art
To the dim eye th' expiring ray retrieves,
And lends her trumpet to the deafen'd ear.

'Tis thus the mind herſelf, her lot above
And mortal ſphere, elates: Her bidding, lo!
From Heavn's high concave calls the diſtant ſtars;
Th' internal myſteries of Earth profound
Stand open at her will: Whate'er minute
Eſcapes the natural ken to light ſhe brings,
And bids new worlds enchant the wondering eye.

What? When erroneous viſion ſhe corrects;

The

Intuitu, nebulaque omni jam rebus adempta.

At ne ſcire quidem poterit mens, forte reponas,
Senſibus extinctis; hoc fonte ſcientia manat;
Hoc alitur creſcitque; hoo deficiente, peribit.

Quid verò infirmis cum ſenſibus, arte miniſtra,
Suppeditet vires, ſua quas Natura negavit?
Arte occulis oculos mens addidit, auribus aures.

Hinc ſeſe in vita ſupra ſortemque ſitumque
Evehit humanum; nunc cœlo devocat aſtra,
Intima nunc terræ reſerat penetralia victrix;
Quæque oculos fugiunt, tenuiſſima corpora promit
In lucem, panditque novi miracula mundi.

Quid porro errores ſensûs cum corrigit, et cum

References to the Commentary, v. 411—416—428.

Formamque

The diſtance true, or magnitude, or form
Of objects, falſely by the ſenſes ſcan'd,
Scorning their haſty ſuffrages, ſhe finds
With nice diſcernment; powers, apart from ſenſe,
Of origin celeſtial, do not ſigns,
Pregnant as theſe, proclaim? Soon as diſſolv'd
This league 'twixt mind and body, we infer,
That the freed ſpirit, which preluding here
Her ſtrength in ſhort excurſion tries, ſhall ſoar
A nobler flight, and graſp the throne of Truth.

If, how this mighty force the ſoul attains,
Thou ſeek'ſt to know; 'tis knowledge paſſing far
This mortal infancy; nor meant us here.
Can'ſt thou diſcover, what Man's embryo ſtate;
What, 'twixt conception and the hour of birth,
His dark exiſtence mark'd? Can one, to light
Unborn, e'er image colours; tho' aware,
By others how enjoy'd that genial gift,
Refus'd himſelf; for happier light deſign'd!

O'er all this ſpacious Earth no ſtation gives

Enjoyment

Formamque et molem mens intervallaque rerum,
Judice ſe, contra ſenſûs ſuffragia cernit?
Nonne hæc ſejunctam ſenſu vim ſigna fatentur,
Semen et ætherium? Quare, hac compage ſoluta,
Credibile eſt animum, qui nunc præludia tentat,
Excurſuſque breves, tum demùm poſſe volatu
Liberiore frui, Verumque excurrere in omne.

Si quæras quî fiat, adhuc neque noſcere fas eſt,
Nec refert noſtra; ſciſne iſtam matris in alvo
Vitam, qualis erat? Num nôrit amœna colorum
A partu cæcus? Verùm, inquis, hic quoque ſentit
Eſſe aliis, ſibi quod nato ad meliora negatur.

Mens itidem nihil hîc, terrarum quicquid ubique eſt,

References to the Commentary, v. 439–448.

Par

Enjoyment full to each deſire: The mind,
If borne by towering genius to the ſkies,
Contemplates there eternal beauty's form;
And, this impreſs'd, all other objects low
Or worthleſs deems. This ſole each wiſh inſpires;
This the whole heart abſorbs. Abſent the mind,
Its object abſent, with unceaſing care,
Fondly purſues; the buſy haunts of men,
Like the true lover flies; the ſhady grove
Courts, or bright fountain's brink, or ſtill receſs;
Where wrapt in contemplation lone ſhe bides
To muſe her Philoſophic lore, or charm
The wayward fancy with melodious ſong.

The Sage then, who, unmov'd by hope or fear,
This Sun, Earth, Ocean, Clouds and Fire hath view'd;
Creation's ſolemn Theatre! and riſen,
A fated gueſt, hath bid the world adieu,
His long and everlaſting home to ſeek;
This Sage, I deem, full happy to have liv'd,
And liv'd enough. Whether an hundred years

Thy

Par votis videt esse suis; quin omnia sordent
Præ forma æterni, servat quam pectore, Pulcri,
Ingenii cui sit vigor, et sublimia cordi.
Hoc ergo exoptat solum sibi; totus in hoc est:
Absens, absentis tabescit amore perenni;
Congressusque hominum vitans, ut verus amator,
Et nemora, et fontes petit, et secreta locorum;
Solus ubi secum possit meditarier, atque
Nunc Sophia, ingentes nunc carmine fallere curas.

Quocirca Ille mihi felix vixisse videtur,
Qui postquam aspexit Mundi solenne theatrum
Æquo animo, hunc solem, et terras, mare, nubila, et ignem;
Protinus unde abiit, satur ut conviva, remigrat.
Nempe hæc, seu centum vivendo conteris annos,

Reference to the Commentary, v. 455.

Thy lengthen'd age ſhall count, or ſhort thy ſpan,
Still the ſame ſcene, revolving round and round,
The ſame unvaried courſe thine eye ſhall ſee;
Sublimer naught than this, or better. All,
All thine allotted time on earth regard,
As in ſome forum paſs'd, or peopled inn,
Short ſojourn 'midſt a fluctuating crowd;
A countleſs hoſt in buſineſs now engag'd,
In trifles now: The whole vain ſtory this
Of human life! He firſt who quits the ſhore,
Gains firſt the wiſh'd-for port: Haſte then, expand
Thy canvas all, leſt haply fail thy ſtores,
Why loiter more? Diſeaſe, the death of friends,
Dire loſs! or worſe, the labour of old age,
Ambuſh'd with ills, awaits thy lingering life.

But whither am I borne? For his beheſt
It is, by whoſe appointment ſtation'd here,
'Twixt Fear and Hope we live, that none his poſt
Unorder'd quit, or ceaſe to follow true
His leader's ſtandard. Know, whate'er thy doom,

'Tis

Seu paucos numeras, eadem redeuntia cernes;
Et nihil his melius, nihil his ſublimius unquam:
Omne adeo in terris agitur quod tempus, habeto
Ut commune forum; peregre vel euntibus amplum
Hoſpitium, temere fluitans ubi vita moratur,
Mille inter nugas jactata, negotia mille.
Qui prior abſcedit, portum prior occupat; Eja!
Totos pande ſinus, ne fortè viatica deſint.
Quid ceſſas? ſubeunt morbique et acerba Tuorum
Funera, et inſidiis circùm undique ſepta ſenectus.

Quò feror? Haud etenim injuſſù decedere fas eſt
Illius, hac Vitæ qui nos ſtatione locavit
Spemque metumque inter, Ducis ut vexilla ſequamur.

References to the Commentary, v. 474—484.

'Tis God's decree, and thine it is to bear.

But could I firm believe this mortal ſcene,
The end of all, no warmer wiſh were mine,
Than hence on haſty wing to ſpeed my flight
Tow'rd that dark region, whither, ſoon or late,
Each Son of Man, life's toilſome Drama o'er,
Muſt paſs, to ſlumber in eternal night.

Nay, tho' permitted by Almighty power[x]
Once more the genial ſtate of youth to know,
Or infancy recal, the proffer'd boon,
Rejected with diſdain, were never mine.
No; not tho' added whatſoe'er could bleſs
This ſublunary ſcene; the brilliant gifts
Of genius rare; the powers of eloquence;
Unenvied honor; numerous progeny,
By two-fold fame, their Father's and their own,
Adorn'd; by theſe allurements ſtill unmov'd,
The ſame dull tract unceaſing to repeat,
Or wheel in one re-iterated orb,
My wearied ſpirit would refuſe: ſhe ſeeks

Objects

Quicquid erit, Deus ipſe jubet ferre; ergò ferendum.

Sin mihi perſuaſum fixumque in mente maneret
Nil ſupereſſe rogo, vellem migrare repentè
Hinc; et abire omnes ubi, ſeriùs, ociùs, acto
Dramate, in æterna ſopiti nocte quieſcent.

Immo Deus mihi ſi dederit renovare juventam,
Utve iterum in cunis poſſim vagire; recuſem.
Non, ſi contingant vitam quæcunque beârint;
Ingenii vis, eloquium, prudentia, mores,
Invidiâ ſine partus honos, longo ordine nati,
Clari omnes, patriâ pariter virtute, ſuâque;
Non tantâ mercede iſthac, dignarer eandem
Ire viam toties, et eodem volvier orbe:

Reference to the Commentary, v. 490.

Splendidiora

Objects divinely bright: faſtidious ſpring
Her eager wiſhes to a deathleſs ſtate,
Perfect, immutable; all elſe her ſcorn.

THE

Splendidiora quidem mens expetit; illius altis
Par votis nil eſt mutabile, nil periturum.

THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL.

BOOK II.

THE ONE Supreme, o'er all Creation's Round
Hath then of mild benignity impreſs'd
No argument obſcure: To all, that live,
Their portion fair of happineſs belongs,
Save to the race of Man; Man his chief work,
And image of his Intellect divine;
Unjuſtly doom'd to drag his days in woe.

"Forbear: theſe murmurs 'gainſt thy God forbear,"
Be facts our better proof: at large ſurvey
Life's ample ſcene, encompaſs'd round with ills;
And dealt, not partially, to theſe, or thoſe,
As chance befalls; the family of Man,

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Præ forma æterni, ſervat quam pectore, Pulcri,
Ingenii cui ſit vigor, et ſublimia cordi.
Hoc ergo exoptat ſolum ſibi; totus in hoc eſt:
Abſens, abſentis tabeſcit amore perenni;
Congreſſuſque hominum vitans, ut verus amator,
Et nemora, et fontes petit, et ſecreta locorum;
Solus ubi ſecum poſſit meditarier, atque
Nunc Sophia, ingentes nunc carmine fallere curas.

Quocirca Ille mihi felix vixiſſe videtur,
Qui poſtquam aſpexit Mundi ſolenne theatrum
Æquo animo, hunc ſolem, et terras, mare, nubila, et ignem;
Protinus unde abiit, ſatur ut conviva, remigrat.
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The ſame unvaried courſe thine eye ſhall ſee;
Sublimer naught than this, or better. All,
All thine allotted time on earth regard, [u]
As in ſome forum paſs'd, or peopled inn,
Short ſojourn 'midſt a fluctuating crowd;
A countleſs hoſt in buſineſs now engag'd,
In trifles now: The whole vain ſtory this
Of human life! He firſt who quits the ſhore, [v]
Gains firſt the wiſh'd-for port: Haſte then, expand
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Be facts our better proof: at large ſurvey
Life's ample ſcene, encompaſs'd round with ills;
And dealt, not partially, to theſe, or thoſe,
As chance befalls; the family of Man,

No

DE

ANIMI IMMORTALITATE.

LIBER SECUNDUS.

ERGO aliis Deus in rebus, quaſcunque creavit,
Argumenta animi dedit haud obſcura benigni;
Omnibus, excipias modò nos, licet eſſe beatis.
Nos, opus in terris princeps, nos mentis imago
Divinæ, pœnis nos exercemur iniquis.
Haud ita; — longè abſint iſti de numine queſtus.

Attamen humanam mecum circumſpice vitam;
Agnoſces, quanta urgeat undique turba malorum,
Non hunc, aut illum, fert ut Fortuna; ſed omne

References to the Commentary, v. 1—8—9.

No favor'd Son exempt, one equal lot
Partakes. What thouſands fall beneath the ſword!
What thouſands at the tyrant's nod expire,
Or bear his ponderous chain; his ruthleſs heart
Inventing, day by day, new tortures! why
Recount I thoſe, whom famine dire conſumes,
While Nature, all beneficent, her ſtore
Profuſely ſpreads; or thoſe, a wretched train
Snatch'd ſudden by diſeaſe; or guiltleſs thoſe,
Whom lingering anguiſh ſlowly waſtes away?
For that inſenſate tribe I ſcorn to name,
Whoſe inbred crimes, intemperance, or luſt,
Have led, ſelf-murder'd victims, to the grave.
Doth Virtue then, or ſanctity of life
Its Guerdon meet? "To Virtue be her claims [b]
All in full meaſure granted: all thoſe ills,
Thoſe miſeries, which life is doom'd know,
She ſchools us, by endurance, how to cheer;
Inſpiring better hopes, Man to himſelf
She reconciles: the ſtorms of anger ſhe

And

Pæne catervatim genus, ac diſcrimine nullo.
Millia quot Belli rabies, quot ſæva Tyrannis
Corpora dat morti, duris oneratve catenis;
Inque dies, varias cruciandi excogitat artes!
Quid, quos dira fames, ad victum ubi cuncta ſuperſunt,
Abſumit miſeros, aut quos vis effera morbi
Corripit, aut lento paulatim angore peredit
Inſontes? neque enim dignabor dicere, vulgò
Quot Venus, aut Vinum peſſundedit, ac ſua culpa.
Quid profit Virtus? ſanctorum ubi præmia morum?

Virtuti tribuo quantum licet; ut mala vitæ,
Quæ prohibere nequit, doceat lenire ferendo;
Spe recreet meliore; hominem ſibi concilietque;
Irarum et tumidos et amorum temperet æſtus:

References to the Commentary, v. 14—27.

And love aſſuages bland!" — But all her ſtrength
'Gainſt ills of ruder ſhock protends no ſhield
Of ſure defence: ſo fails her ſovereign power,
That oft her zealous votaries ſhe leads
To perils imminent. 'Twere better then
That they give preference to Vice, whoſe fate
To ſome imperious tyrant's ſervice binds
Their pitiable lot. For virtue's friend
The tyrant's hated object ever ſtands.

Full oft the patriot's life, whoſe merits claim
His country's brighteſt recompence, hath fall'n
Beneath th' infuriate hands of thoſe he ſav'd.
Doth Genius lift above the vulgar throng
Some lov'd aſpirant? Envy's crew, alarm'd,
Ceaſeleſs his doom conſpire; t' aſperſe his fame
Their ſerpent teeth the deadly venom ſhed.
But grant, by Virtue's perſevering force,
Theſe clouds diſpers'd, to light emerging ſlow
He gain a nation's Helm; his late reward:
What labours for a thankleſs world, reproach,

And

Verùm adeò non tutela eſt, certuſque ſatelles
Contra omnes caſus; ſæpe ut (ſi dicere fas eſt)
Sæpe etiam et Virtus in aperta pericula mittat.
Expedit eſſe malis, dominum qui ferre ſuperbum
Coguntur: probitatem omnes odêre tyranni.

Quàm multi bene promeriti de civibus, horum
Quos conſervârunt cæco perière furore!
Jam verò Ingenio ſi quis valet, omnis in Illum
Invida conjurat plebecula; dente parati
Rodere vipereo, famæque aſpergere virus.
Fac porrò, ut meritis obſtantem diſſipet umbram;
Muneraque, emergens vix demùm, publica tractet:
Sudandum ingrata eſt hominum pro gente; ferendum

References to the Commentary, v. 33—49.

Probrorum

And ſcorn, and dangers next become his lot!
Dangers, or threatned by rude faction's tribe,
Or potent rivalry's ambitions league.
Liſten, brave ſpirits! Ye, of fair renown
And honor madly emulous, what ills,
In ſecret ambuſh, wait your high career.

Glides then the noiſeleſs ſtream of private life
A ſmoother courſe? Alas! no leſs diſturb'd
Its current! See, how luſt, and rage, and fraud
In friendſhip's guiſe, malignant envy, ſtrife,
Intrigue and treachery, enſnaring wiles
Of Law, in turn, prevail! Vice o'er the world
In every form, her domination holds.

But if thy Home life's ſweeteſt charm poſſeſs, [d]
A lovely conſort; gay thy leiſure flows,
Securely happy; whilſt around thee cling,
In emulative haſte to ſhare thy kiſs,
A ſmiling progeny; at length mature,
The ſtaff, the honor of declining age.

Yes; here, or nowhere, is the bliſs we ſeek:

But

Proborum genus omne; adeunda pericula; vel quæ
Seditio attulerit vulgi, ambitiove potentûm.
Audiat hæc, ſibi qui nomen, qui poſcit honores;
Demens; nec novit ſe quanta incommoda cingant.

Vivitur an meliùs privatim? Non minus iſthic,
Cernis ut ira, libido, ſcelus dominentur ubique;
Fraus et amicitiam ſimulans; livorque malignus;
Jurgiaque inſidiæque, et iniquæ retia legis.

Attamen eſt, vitæ lenimen, amabilis uxor;
Lætus agis ſecura domeſticus otia; dulces
Arrident circùm, properant et ad oſcula nati;
Mox obrepentis decus et tutela ſenectæ.

Hîc eſt aut nuſquam quod quærimus; eſto, ſed iſthæc

References to the Commentary, v. 59—66.

Nullæne

And ſcorn, and dangers next become his lot!
Dangers, or threatned by rude faction's tribe,
Or potent rivalry's ambitions league.
Liſten, brave ſpirits! Ye, of fair renown
And honor madly emulous, what ills,
In ſecret ambuſh, wait your high career.

Glides then the noiſeleſs ſtream of private life
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Arrident circùm, properant et ad oſcula nati;
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Hîc eſt aut nuſquam quod quærimus; eſto, ſed iſthæc

References to the Commentary, v. 59—66.

Nullæne

But ah! theſe joys, can theſe the ſullen frown
Of care defy? That tedious liſt of ills
So known, ſo oft diſplay'd, need I rehearſe,
When, of the wedded pair, a different bent,
Unhappy each, to oppoſite purſuits
Leads ominous? And yet in balance true,
Before the nuptial chain has link'd them faſt,
Manners and mind how difficult to weigh!
And tho' repentance blaſt the luckleſs league,
Its bond indiſſoluble holds their lot
Till Death: — 'Till Death the fatal die is caſt!

Yet more; a progeny to good propenſe
With love of virtue, honor, faith imbued,
Can aught enſure? But on thy vows ſtill here
Should Heav'n auſpicious ſmile; alas! when leaſt
Preſag'd the direful blow, in prime of youth
Death ſtrikes the blooming promiſe of thy race.

" Say not, from Virtue ſpring theſe various ills."
Granted; would each but faithfully his part
Perform: How brilliant then would Virtue ſhine,

And

Nullæne interea corrumpunt gaudia curæ?
Quid mala commemorem, ſi quando, et ſæpiùs, ambos
Diſcolor ingenium ſtudia in contraria ducat?
Adde quod in trutina mores expendere juſta
Haud facile, ante ineunt quam fœdus uterque jugale:
Nec ſi pœniteat, fas eſt abrumpere vinclum;
Sors at dura manet; conjecta eſt alea vitæ.

Præterea natos ecquis præſtabit honeſto
Ingenio imbutos, pulcrique bonique tenaces?
Sin hac parte tuis reſpondent omnia votis;
Heu! minimè cum reris, in ipſo flore juventæ,
Mors inopina domûs ſpem protinùs abripit omnem.

At non hæc Virtus mala parturit: immo fatemur,
Munia ſi peragat ſua quiſque fideliter, eſſet

References to the Commentary, v. 84—90—91.

And golden days in long ſucceſſion run!
But no Saturnian age of Gold is ours.

Thus reas'ning, ſome, two principles of things;
Two Gods have feign'd: One, all on evil bent,
Sends down each miſchief to confound the world:
And One, all-good, in oppoſition ſtands
To ſhed his healing balm o'er mortal Ills.
Life's various colour hence: of Good and Bad
Hence ſprings the mingled growth: the ſerpent hence
Within the fragrant roſe's gay parterre
Inſidious lurks. — "Say then is thus arranged
The world's great ſyſtem? Fain would I enquire
Whether in like degree allotted ſtands
To either God his puiſſance? For if both
Share equal potency, Nature confus'd
Muſt ruſh to antient Chaos; ſoon extinct
Creative energy in each; whilſt Good
With Evil wars in one eternal ſtrife.
But grant their ſtrength unequal; quick ſubdued
One yields perforce, and ſoon the Victor's hand

Each

Nil potius Virtute; redirent aurea jam tum
Sæcula; verùm ævo non vivere contingit aureo.

His animadverſis, quidam primordia Mundi
Bina, Deos fingunt binos; quorum alter iniquo
Præditus ingenio, ſcelus omne immittit in orbem;
Alter opem præſens affert, medicina malorum.
Hinc varius vitæ color, hinc pravique bonique
Miſta ſeges, roſeiſque latens malus anguis in hortis.

Siccine res ergo eſt confecta? Sed illa poteſtas,
Quæſierim, par ſit, quam Dis adſcribis, an impar:
Si par illa quidem, ruerent aut cuncta repente
In Chaos antiquum, nihil aut potuiſſet oriri;
Quippe Bonum res eſt ſemper contraria Pravo:
Sin impar, mora nulla foret quin cederet alter
Alterius vi debellatus, et omnia deinceps

Reference to the Commentary, v. 103.

Each veſtige ſweeps, of rival hate, away.
Avaunt, ye Magi! with theſe ſottiſh dreams![f]
Far hence, ye ouze-bred monſters of the Nile!"

Reaſons the Stoic better? — Whatſoe'er[g]
Attracts Man's fondeſt wonder, he eſteems
No Good: Fame, riches, every thing derived
Without, his wife one reckons naught; or holds[h]
Himſelf their ſole poſſeſſor, tho' he live
In loweſt penury obſure. How vaunts
This wondrous wiſdom! With like reaſon, pain,[i]
Conſiſtent with himſelf, he deems no Ill.
With fire ſurround him: ſever e'en his limbs
With axe or ſaw; or nail him to the Croſs,
From his firm heart yon vainly ſeek t' extort
Acknowledgment of Ill; conceding naught
Save inconvenience in each trying ſtate.
Of health, or ſtrength, or beauty's graceful form,[k]
How think'ſt thou, Stoic? Are they Goods, or Ills?
Objects, he anſwers, not to be deſired;[l]
To be accepted rather. Who can bear

Deleret victor priſcæ veſtigia litis.
Aufer abhinc igitur ſtulta hæc commenta Magorum,
Et quæ cœnoſus fert monſtra biformia Nilus.

Stoicus an meliùs? Nempe Hic non eſſe Bonorum
In numero cenſet, nos quæ miramur ineptè:
Divitias, famam, quodcunque acceſſerit extra,
Pro nihilo ſapiens habet; aut hæc poſſidet unus;
Poſſidet, ignotus licet ac pauperrimus; Euge!
Quàm pulcrum ſapere eſt! ſimili ratione dolorem
Haud putat eſſe Malum, ſibi conſentaneus idem.
Comburas igni; tradas ferrove ſecandum;
In cruce ſuffigas; nunquam extorquebis, ut iſthæc
Eſſe Mala agnoſcat: Quidnam ergo? Incommoda dicit.
Quid tibi viſa valetudo? Quid gratia formæ,
Stoice? Quid validæ vires? Sunt hæc Bona, necne?
Non optanda quidem ſunt, at ſumenda. Sophiſtam

References to the Commentary, v. 116—132.

Quis

The Sophiſt idly quibbling thus on words,
Who means the common ſenſe of all Mankind?

Why argue more? Without external things
Spirits alone Beatitude enjoy:
Forget not, Stoic, thou wert born a Man
Alike to ſpirit, and to fleſh allied.

But if Externals, whatſoe'er their form
Fortune or give, or take; malignant now,
Now kind in turn; to others, or to me;
Nor aught be property we call our own;
Of what Avail the Stoic's wiſdom? Frail
Hangs in ſuſpenſe, like ours, his changeful day.
That mightineſs of mind, on which whate'er
Deſireable he names, or Good, depends,
Oft ſhatter'd by diſeaſe is ſwept away,
Nor leaves a trace behind. Erſt famous They,[m]
In council One,[1] and One[2] in battle, who,[n]
'Reft of all hope, Britannia's weal reſtor'd:
What martial ſkill or wiſdom could atchieve
They ſhow'd; nor leſs diſplay'd how bright, how frail

[1] Lord Somers. [2] Duke of Marlborough.

The

Quis ferat hunc, verbis non re diverſa docentem?

Quid multa? Externis ſine rebus poſſe beatè
Vivere te ſperes, ſi nil niſi ſpiritus eſſes:
Interea quinam ſis, Stoice, noſſe memento;
Natus Homo es, qui mente itidemque ex corpore conſtat.

Sin verò, acciderint quæcunque extrinſecus, iſthæc
Dat Fortuna adimitque; benigna, maligna viciſſim
Nunc mihi, nunc alii; neque ſunt quæ noſtra vocemus;
Quid ſapiente illo fiet, qui non minus ac nos
Momento dubiæ fluitat mutabilis horæ?
Vim porro hanc Animi, pendent unde omnia quæ Tu
Exoptanda putas, quàm ſæpe retundere morbus,
Sæpe ſolet delere, ut vix veſtigia reſtent!
Ille etiam qui conſiliis, Ille Alter et armis
Rem qui reſtituit, cum ſpes haud ulla, Britannam:
Teſtantur quantùm virtus, ſapientia quantùm

References to the Commentary, v. 135—139.

Poſſit,

The flower of genius, blooming, but to fade!

And ſtill more modern [3] He, whom later times
Behold their glory; in each province, who,
Of claſſic Writing, ſhone; whether aſſum'd
The Wit's, the Critic's, or the Poet's part,
How brilliant was his page! But ah! how ſoon
The period of his luſtre paſs'd away!
His mind defunct, exiſting ſtill he breath'd
Survivor of himſelf, and prov'd too well,
From outward ſhocks, how vulnerable Man!

Yet pardon'd may the Stoic's tenet reſt:
For, if beyond the tomb, nor recompence
The ſons of men, nor puniſhment await,
What is the ſum of life? Or what its end?
Either the Deity unjuſtly rules
This ſublunary world, or leaves ſupine
Its government unheeded; or, if juſt,
And vigilantly wiſe he rule the whole,
The good, as They of Zeno's ſchool inſiſt,
Live not unhappy; nor the wicked, bleſt.

[3] Dean Swift.

But

Poſſit, et ingenii quàm ſit flos ipſe caducum!

Tum porro Ille recens, quem poſtera vidimus ætas,
Scribendi omne tulit qui punctum, ſive facetas
Mimi ageret partes, ſeu rhetoris atque poetæ;
Eheu! Quantus erat! Nec longum tempus, et idem
Defuncta ſpirans jam mente, ſuîque ſuperſtes:
Uſque adeo externis nihil inviolabile telis.

Condonanda tamen ſententia, Stoice, veſtra eſt:
Nam ſi poſt obitum neque præmia ſint, neque pœnæ,
Heu! quò perventum eſt! Heu quid jam denique reſtat!
Scilicet humanas gerit aut res Numen iniquè,
Aut nil curat, iners; aut, ſi bene temperat orbem,
Nemo bonus miſer eſt, nemo improbus eſſe beatus
In vita poſſit, gens ut ſibi Stoica fingit.

Reference to the Commentary, v. 163.

But O! how thick the film! What dimneſs ſtrange
Clouds human intellect! The verge approach'd
Of truth, Man heſitates; her confine views
Aſtoniſh'd, nor completes his deſtin'd way.
Can'ſt thou, grave Stoic! then God's juſtice own,
Yet not diſcern his will? Preſs forward ſtill:
Urge on thy ſtep: Truth will not fail conclude
Man's being endleſs. Can'ſt thou yet pretend,
"In darkneſs lies that undiſcover'd bourn?"
Know, from a blind dependence on thyſelf
The darkneſs ſprings; hence all involv'd in gloom
Thy mental proſpects: Vict'ry thou proclaim'ſt
Ere reach'd the Goal: The taſk left incomplete
Thy ſkill upbraids. Thus Perſia's Magi vain,
And, Greece! thy Sophiſts triumph'd ere they won.
From this ſole germ what countleſs errors ſpring!

Now liſten, whither my reſearches tend:——
Th' exiſtence of a God acknowledg'd ſtands
Man's univerſal creed: if wiſe, if juſt
The world's Creator, by whoſe hand arrang'd

This

O cæcas hominum mentes! confinia veri
Qui ſimul attigerint, hærent; finemque ſub ipſum,
Attonitis ſimiles, opera imperfecta relinquunt.
Juſtitiamne Dei te, Stoice, poſſe fateris
Cernere, nec quid ritè velit! Quin ſtrenuus audes
Pergere ad æternam, ducit quà ſemita, vitam?
"Quicquid id eſt, celat nox, circumfuſa tenebris."
Non iſthoc, tua te potius fiducia cæcat;
Hinc nox, hinc illæ tenebræ; quia nempe triumphas,
Nondum propoſiti victor; quia ponere Totum
Neſcius, in ſpatii medio conſiſtis; ut omnes
Sive magi Perſæ, ſeu Græcula turba Sophorum.
En quantis unus portentis pullulat error!

Accipe rem quò nunc deducam. Quiſque fatemur
Eſſe Deum; Jam ſi ſapiens, juſtuſque fit Author,
Hunc Mundi ornatum qui protulit atque gubernat,

References to the Commentary, v. 183—189.

This beauteous ſyſtem rolls, well ſings the Bard:
" Whatever is, is right". Juſtice wills not
Unceaſing ill the righteous to aſſail,
Nor Vice t'exult in unreſtrain'd career.
This yet were true; if one eternal Death
Await us all —— Whatever is, is right
To him, who ſcans, with comprehenſive view,
The ſyſtem's plan entire: far otherwiſe
To him, who bounds our Being with the tomb.
The Good, the Wiſe, in juſt connexion, join
To this frail ſpan a never-ending life.
Fix'd on the empty ſhell of words, content,
There are, who mindleſs of the Univerſe,
That grand infinity of parts combin'd,
Crowd all into the narrow ſpace of world
Here viſible: To this Aſylum flies
The robber's clan; th' adulterer's wanton crew;
Th' aſſaſſin ſeeks his ſhrine of refuge here.

" But mark the ſtated plan of God's decrees,
Order immutable by naught diſturb'd;

Whether

" Quodcunque eſt fit ritè;" canit prout Ille poeta;
Nec patitur jus faſve, bonis ut ſit male ſemper,
Improbitas aut ſemper ovans incedat; at iſthuc
Res redit, omnino ſi morte extinguimur omnes.
Quodcunque eſt fit ritè, velis ſi cernere Summam;
Contra, ſi noſtri nihil ultra funera vivit.
Vir bonus et ſapiens vitam connectet utramque.
At ſunt, hærentes verborum in cortice nudo,
Singula qui, non rerum ingens Syſtema tuentur,
Atque hodierna omnem cogunt in tempora ſcenam.
Advolat huc furum turba omnis, et omnis adulter;
Hanc ſibi perfugio petit et ſicarius aram.

Scilicet ipſe rato ſtatuit Deus ordine leges,
Quas temerare poteſt nemo; probus, improbus an ſit

References to the Commentary, v. 198—208—211.

Quid

Whether the impious or the good prevail,
What recks it him? His law Man's feeble race,
Or to reſcind, or change, attempts in vain:
Nature unalter'd keeps her deſtin'd courſe."

What law, what order mean'ſt thou, Sophiſt, ſay?
One law to Man; another to the brutes;
A third to lifeleſs matter is aſſigned.

O'er matter gravity is fix'd the law,
By whoſe attraction, not its proper force,
The maſs is ſway'd: hence various motion ſprings;
Hence acts the mundane ſyſtem's vaſt machine.

What need of animated life to ſpeak;
To mention bird, or beaſt, or wild, or tame;
Or cite th' unnumber'd race, which cleave the deep?
Theſe different kinds know each their certain law,[u]
Nor leap its bounds; whether, divinely breath'd,[v]
Inſtinct 'tis call'd, or reaſon's brighter boon;
A portion limited their ends to ſerve.
Each tribe with ſkill its nutriment provides;
Each wields its proper arms; its progeny

Produces,

Quid refert? nihil hîc reſcindere homuncio poſſit,
Nil mutare; ſuum ſervant res uſque tenorem.

Dic mihi quas leges narras, quive iſte ſit ordo?
Altera namque homini eſt, animalibus altera brutis;
Altera lex rerum maſſæ rationis egenti.

Eſt ſua materiæ Gravitas; hinc, non propria vi
Attrahit, attrahitur; varios hinc incita motus
Conficit, hinc ſtat compages et machina Mundi.

Quid dicam quibus eſt vitæ ſpirabile donum,
Alituum genus an pecudes; An ſæva ferarum
Semina; fœcundo vel quæ fovet ubere pontus?
Non horum quivis temerè, et ſine lege, vagatur;
Quin, ſive afflatu divinæ contigit auræ,
Seu rationis habent quantum deſiderat uſus,
His aliqua prodire tenus datur; En ſibi ſolers
Quiſque parat victum; ſua tractat gnaviter arma;

References to the Commentary, v. 217—224.

Atque

Produces, and with fitteſt food ſuſtains,
Whilſt Nature aſks the parent's tender care:
This their fond toil, and ſweeteſt taſk of life;
Where center all their wiſhes, all their fears;
At once their being's duty and its bliſs.

Man roams a wider field; ſagacious he[x]
The world's immenſe, ſtupendous ſyſtem views;
And traces an artificer Supreme.
To him, the Father and the Lord of all[y]
Soon recogniz'd, the Child of Nature breaths
His humble prayer. Ideal beauty next[z]
His heart inflames; he riſes to its ſource;
Takes his faint tranſcript from th' exemplar fair,
And ſtamps his breaſt with characters divine.
Fairer to him naught ſeems, more godlike naught
Than the warm hearts expanſive kindneſs, borne
To others weal or woe; which feels its own
The ſtranger's caſe; its own ſmall axis round
Not wholly turn'd; ſole provident of ſelf;
But in wide orbit graſps its native land;

All

Atque edit fœtus, atque eſca nutrit amica
Quos peperit, prodeſt teneris dum cura parentum.
Hic labor, hæc vitæ eſt omnis dulcedo; nec ultra
Aut cupit aut metuit, ſatis hoc in munere felix.

Latior aſt homini campus patet; Ille, ſagaci
Ingenio, Artificis dignoſcit ſigna ſupremi,
Immenſum per opus, tot miris fertile, mundum.
Talibus indiciis, rerum dominumque patremque
Ille in vota vocat; Pulcrique imbutus amore
Exemplar ſibi divinum proponit, ut inde
Poſſit et ipſe ſuos imitando effingere mores.
Pulcrius utque nihil, nihil ut divinius eſt quàm
Proſpiciens aliis Bonitas, diffuſaque latè:
Ille aliena, ſibi putat haud aliena; nec axem
Vertitur uſque ſuum circa, ſibi providus uni;
At patriam, at genus omne hominum, genus omne animantûm,

Reference to the Commentary, v. 238.

All human kind embraces; all that breathes.

So Nature fix'd th' unalterable law
When individual Man naked ſhe form'd
And helpleſs, that ſupport and mutual aid
From other each ſhould claim; and counſel, each
In turn, and friendly admonition, give.
Thyſelf, O Man! with every being round,[a]
Partaking life, compare: So deſtitute
Of Self-defence what creature elſe exiſts?
But thine what ſtrength, what power reſiſtleſs thine,
When common friendſhip, like attraction's force
The kindred members of thy ſcatter'd Race
In ſocial league combines! This general law,
Deep on the tablet of the heart engraven,
Stands by the Deity's benignant will,
Irrevocably ſanction'd: This, at once,
Man's intereſt; This his pleaſure bids obey.

Yet whither flown its Power? Unbridled luſt
Inveterate cuſtom, Ignorance itſelf,
What havock of man's happineſs they make!

How

Ingenti, ſe diffundens, complectitur orbe.

Hæc ſtabilivit item Natura perennia vitæ
Jura, hominem per ſeſe inopem cum finxit; ut alter
Alterius depoſcat opem, et ſua quiſque viciſſim
Conſilia in medium promat, ſermone miniſtro.
Confer cum reliquis etenim viventibus; Ecquid
Eſt hominis forma magis ad tutamen inerme?
Quanta ſed huic virtus et inexpugnabile robur;
Si communis amor, Gravitas velut, alligat uno
Fœdere, conſociatque inter ſe diſſita membra?

Lex igitur, lex hæc animis inſculpta, benigno
Hæc nutu ſancita Dei eſt; hanc comprobat ipſa
Utilitas; huc quemque trahit nativa voluptas.

Quorſum abeunt tamen iſta? Videſne effræna libido,
Vel mala conſuetudo, vel ipſa inſcitia, quantas
Dent latè ſtrages: Hominum pars quantula felix!

References to the Commentary, v. 254—262—270.

How ſmall a portion of our Race is bleſt!
Where the Sun's orient, or his ſetting beam
Illumes the diſtant climes; where Boreas reigns,
Or Auſter hold his ſway; where Phœbus ſheds
His ray perennial on the middle Zone;
Behold! how darkneſs, penury and ſloth,
Or error wild, a ſavage race o'erwhelm;
Of Man no veſtige extant but his form!

But e'en ourſelves, on whom Salvation's Day
A richer ſtream hath pour'd; ourſelves, tho' led
By gentle guidance of Religion's Hand;
Bleſt by her ſacred guardianſhip, perverſe
And renitent th' immortal ray reject
And proffer'd light; to comments vain attach'd,
Vain gloſſes of the ſophiſt's dreaming ſchool,
For unſubſtantial chaff we madly fight;
Not for our altars more: What ſlaughters thence[b]
And blood fraternal flow! what impious deeds
Hath fair Religion's borrow'd ſemblance wrought!

Licentious vice, wide-raging o'er the world

All

Contemplator enim, quà ſol oriturve, caditve;
Aut loca quæ Boreas, aut quæ tenet ultimus Auſter;
Perpetuove jacet tellus ubi torrida ab igni:
Quanta ibi pauperies et inertia! quanta ferinis
Offuſa eſt animis caligo, inſanus et error!
Vix hominis, præter formam, veſtigia cernas.

Quid nos, uberiora Deus quibus ipſe Salutis
Lumina dat, ducitque manu, ſanctiſſima cuſtos,
Relligio; ducit, non vi trahit imperioſa?
Ecce renitentes jubar immortale diemque
Odimus oblatam, commentaque vana tenemus;
Vana Sophiſtarum gloſſemata, luce relicta.
His pro quiſquiliis heu! digladiamur, ut aris,
Implacabiliter: quot cædes inde, cruorque
Fraternus! Pietas quot parturit impia facta!

Uſque adeo morum vitioſa licentia miſcet

References to the Commentary, v. 274—281—292.

Fas

All right and wrong confounds, and triumphs ſtill
Unpuniſh'd. Such her giant ſtrength, ſhe braves,
Mountains on mountains piled, the pow'rs of Heav'n!
Beholds th' Almighty this? Or fruitleſs rolls[c]
His thunder in the ſkies; or reſts untouch'd
By ſtate of mortal things th' Immortal Mind?
Yes; he beholds, and, lingering tho' it comes,
Comes yet ſure recompence of human deeds;
Nor fails uncertain vengeance in delay.

I never doubted yet, that human things[d]
The Deity engage. Yes; leſt all ſenſe
Of Heav'n's avenging Juſtice ſleep in man,
Or periſh utterly, in wondrous guiſe,
Examples, ſignal of his Ire are ſent,[e]
The Nations to alarm; but ſparing yet
They come; nor ſuch, as ſuperſtition feigns
Gloomy and raſh, which wreſts the Thunderer's bolt,
And at each partially devoted Head
Points the dire vengeance of eternal Wrath.

Nor, o'er the mind, that Conſcience holds her ſway

Main-

Fas omne atque nefas, graſſata impunè per orbem.
Illa Gigantea eſt vis, quæ reſcindere cœlum
Conatur, monteſque imponere montibus audet.
Aſpicit hæc, Deus an nequicquam fulmina librat?
Pectora an Humani nihil immortalia tangit?
Aſpicit; improperata licèt, ſua quemque ſequentur
Præmia pro meritis; neque pœna incerta morando eſt.

Haud equidem humanis dubito, quin nunc quoq; rebus
Ipſe interveniat Deus, et, ne funditus omnis
Intereat ſenſus divini Vindicis, edat
Per gentes exempla modis inſignia miris.
Parciùs iſta tamen; non, ut temeraria fingit
Uſque ſuperſtitio, torquet quæ Numinis iram
In quoſcunque velit, ſuaque eripit arma Tonanti.

Nec ſum animi ignarus quid mens ſibi conſcia poſſit;

References to the Commentary, v. 302—312.

Ut

Maintain I leſs: On earth ſome recompence
The righteous know; nor ſcap'ſt thou, guilty wretch!
All puniſhment on earth. What, tho' the ken[f]
Of mortals thou elud'ſt; yet from thyſelf
Vain all attempt to fly: The Furies dire
Alarm thee; in thy boſom while remorſe,
Lodg'd conſtant, harrows up the conſcious Soul.
What feel'ſt thou, when with fell diſeaſe thou pay'ſt
The debt of Luxury? When ptyſics ſlow,
The gout's ſharp torture, ſwelling dropſy, ſpaſm,
Burning maraſmus, all aſſault thy days,
Dread family of Pain! Thence is thy life
Deſtin'd in miſery to waſte away.
Thus they, whoſe hopes entire are placed on life,
Of living weary, wiſh, and dread, to die.
But, lingering ſlow to late protracted Age
Should tedious life ſtill lengthen out thy ſpan,
What would repay thy wretchedneſs? The ſmile[g]
Of gentle friendſhip ſooths not thee; unheard
Th' applauſes of the good; nor better known

Self-

Ut neque ſit virtus jam nunc mercede ſine ulla,
Nec nullas dum vita manet des, Improbe, pœnas;
Quanquam homines fallas haud te tamen effugis ipſe:
Te Diræ ultrices agitant, te Cura remordet
Sæva comes, memorique habitat ſub pectore vindex.

Quid tibi ſæpe graves cum morbi, debita luxûs
Dona, pthiſes lentæ, tormenta et acuta podagræ,
Atque tumens hydrops, ſpaſmuſque, urenſq; mărаſmus
Incubuêre, cohors funeſta? hinc degitur ævi
Portio ſi qua manet crudeli exeſa dolore;
Et quorum in vita poſita eſt ſpes unica, tædet
Vivendi, mortemque ſimul cupiuntque timentque.

Sin horum ad ſeros aliquis pervenerit annos,
Non habet unde iſthoc compenſet; nam neque dulces
Carpit amicitiæ fructus, neque laude Bonorum
Paſcitur, atque ſua, quoties anteacta revolvit;

Reference to the Commentary, v. 312.

Self-praiſe, the conſciouſneſs of life well-ſpent.
Flown are th' aſſociates of thy pamper'd youth;
The flatterer haunts no more thy empty hall.
If, to thine inward boſom turn'd, thine eye
The faithful mirror clear of conſcience view,
Shock'd from thy own black Image thou recoil'ſt;
Thyſelf with horror ſeen! Whilſt threatning Death
His weapon brandiſhes and aims the ſtroke,
Appal'd, O Wretch! thou leav'ſt no art untried,
Nor medicine's lore unranſack'd, but to gain
Some fleeting ſpace, and this a thouſand woes
Condemn'd to prove. If laden thus with ills
Thou drag'ſt thy life, and naught ſurvive the tomb,
Whence ſo diſturb'd thy Death-bed's cloſing ſcene?
Ah! the preſaging thought of future doom,
However we wiſh its warning to contemn,
The mind ſtill urges, nor reſigns its hold.

In contraſt ſtrong, how rolls the brighter day
Of innocence unblam'd! of thoſe, who know "
By worthieſt Deeds, to captivate Mankind,

Whoſe

At ſocii jam tum luxûs fugêre prioris,
Vilis adulator vacuas quoque deſerit ædes;
Atqne illum, ſi quando oculos converterit intus,
Terret imago ſuî, ſeſe et dum reſpicit horret.
Ille etiam cum Mors adſtat, telumque coruſcat
Jam jamque intentans ictum, quas non adit artes
Anxius, ut miſerum medica vi proroget ævum
Pauliſper, mille et per curas vita trahatur?
Quòd ſi vita referta malis, noſtrique ſuperſtes
Poſt mortem nihil eſt, cur ultima territat hora?
Sic eſt, hæret adhuc quam ſpernere velle videtur,
Neſcio quæ ſortis cura importuna futuræ.

At contra, quibus innocua et ſine crimine Vita eſt,
Quique alios norûnt ſibi devincire merendo,

References to the Commentary, v. 342—350.

Whoſe rare inventions diſtant ages bleſs:
Self-praiſe, ſweet-ſtreaming from nectareous ſource
Of conſcience pure, their ſpirit ſooths; calm ſhines
Their countenance; nor fear, nor envious care
Their ſlumber breaks; their ſinewy limbs nor wine,
Nor luſt enfeebles; fortune's frown, nor ſmile,
This ne'er dejects, nor that elates their mind;
Cheer'd by remoter hopes all chance they brave.
When, gently laps'd their courſe, at length old age
Inſenſibly ſteals on, approaching Death[h]
Seems but to them, all ills, all dangers paſt,
Their port of long-ſought ſafety, now in ſight.
Approaching death brings terror and diſmay
To him alone, who fears, if aught ſucceed
The grave; not Him, whoſe blameleſs path
Fair truth and ſanctity of manners guide.
Doffing theſe mortal ſpoils, his ſpirit free
Exults; o'er Heav'n a ſweeter ray diffus'd,
Thus ſmiles the golden ſun his Setting near.
He, when, at length, arriv'd his lateſt day,

To

Aut qui præclaris ditârunt ſæcla repertis, ——
Illis nectareo manans de fonte ſerenat
Conſcia laus animum, tranquillaque temperat ora.
Non metus abrumpit ſomnos, non invida cura;
Non Venus aut Bacchus vires minuêre, neque illos
Res aut adverſæ frangunt inflanve ſecundæ:
Cui ſpes ulterior, caſus munitur ad omnes. ——
Ergo ſenectutem labentes leniter anni
Cum ſenſim attulerint, mortem iſta mente propinquam
Aſpicit, ut longis qui tempeſtatibus actus
Portum in conſpectu tenet, effugiumque malorum.
Scilicet hunc unum mortis vicinia terret,
Qui ſibi præmetuit ſi quid poſt funera reſtet;
Non hunc qui rectè vitam ſanctéque peregit.
Hic, ſeſe excutiens ſibi plaudit, et aureus ut ſol
Uſque ſub occaſum diffuſo lumine ridet:
Hic, matura dies cum mortis venerit, ævum

To life immortal lifts his gladden'd eye,
With hope triumphant hails the fields of light;
Caught here the foretaſte of celeſtial bliſs.

Such was the Sage whoſe ever-honor'd name
Fond I recal; the mitre's ornament,
And Freedom's beſt Defender, while the ſtate
Such champion needed: Worceſter's Prelate, he,
Now full of days, nigh told an hundred years,
In honors flouriſhing, each ſenſe poſſeſs'd,
Free from each malady, exempt from pain,
With living ſated calm from life withdrew;
As ſome egregious actor quits the ſtage,
Whilſt the whole Theatre's applauſes ring;
Or, won the race, amidſt the gazing plain,
The joyous victor claim'd th' Olympic palm.

Such the clear ſigns, the force of conſcience ſuch;
Conſcience that ſooths with hope, or rends with fear
Each mortal heart! But whence this fear, this hope,
If beyond Death naught terrible remain;
If naught fair expectation raiſe? Behold

How

Suſpicit immortale; Hic ſpe meliore triumphans
Cœlicolûm jam nunc prælibat gaudia votis.
Talis erat grata ſemper quem mente recordor
Ille, decus mitræ, Libertatiſque ſatelles,
Dum tanti tempus propugnatoris egebat
Houghius; Hic, numeros prope centenarius omnes
Cum vitæ explêrat; florenti plenus honore,
Senſibus integris, fine morbo, experſque doloris,
Vivendique ſatur, ſic vita exibat, ut Actor
E ſcena egregius toto plaudente Theatro;
Aut qui, poſt ſtadium ſumma cum laude peractum,
Victor Olympiacæ poſcit ſibi præmia palmæ.

His patet indiciis animi vis conſcia quantùm
Spe foveat, crucietve metu mortalia corda.
Unde ſed iſte metus, quid ſpes velit illa, rogarîm,
Si nil ſperandum eſt, obita nil morte timendum?

References to the Commentary, v. 376—388.

How all things to futurity conſpire!

Whether on earth chance well, or ill, befal,
The wiſe this ſublunary ſcene, nor love
With fond attachment, nor with frowning hate
Diſdain. Severe and adverſe be their lot,
Still conſolation ſmiles; or ſails their ſkiff
Smooth in the proſperous gale, yet mindful they,
How frail, how periſhable fortune's goods,
If goods not falſely call'd, whoſe loſs we dread,
Or, when acquir'd, deſpiſe. Fear not, leſt hence
To duty indiſpoſed, ſluggiſh the mind
Toil ſhould refuſe, or peril meanly ſhun,
When calls the public weal. No; more erect,
More boldly free th' unconquer'd ſpirit plies
Her arduous taſk, and, ſteel'd to all events,
Looks down, with diſregard, on human things.
Thy cenſure yet on theſe may haply fall,
As whom the hope of intereſt, or reward
Hath ſolely fix'd; to duty little urg'd
By love ſincere of Virtue, or pure ſenſe

Of

En ut venturo conſpirent omnia ſæclo!

Quocirca in terris benè ſeu res, ſeu malè, cedat,
Vir ſapiens nec amat vitam, neque tetricus odit:
Intus enim, quo ſe duro in diſcrimine rerum
Conſoletur, habet; ſin aura faventior afflet,
Immemor haud vivit quàm lubrica, quàmque caduca
Fortunæ Bona ſint; Bona ſi quis cenſet habenda,
Perdere quæ metuit, quæve aſpernatur adeptus.

Nec vereare quidem ne fortè ad munia vitæ
Segnior hinc animus detrectet ferre labores,
Atque pericla ſubire, vocet ſi publicus uſus:
Liberum et erectum potiùs, rebuſque in agendis
Fortem hominem invictumq; facit, caſuſq; per omnes
Roborat externarum hæc deſpicientia rerum.

Hunc tamen incuſas, ut quem, ſpes unica mercis
Non veræ virtutis amor, non ſenſus Honeſti

Reference to the Commentary, v. 402.

Of Right. Virtue, thou ſay'ſt, is cheaply priz'd
'Mongſt thoſe, who tread her ſacred paths, allur'd
By poſthumous reward; e'en ſought in Heav'n.
Him ſole thou deemeſt good, by future hope
Unmov'd; for whom the Decent and the Fair,
Sweet moral harmony, life ſimply plan'd
By reaſon's ſtandard, from intrinſick worth
Attraction ever find.—— Be that ſuppoſed;
He ſtill deſerves applauſe, who keeps in view
The diſtant Goal; by Nature's guidance led
Beyond this mortal ſphere, fond Hope purſues,
Soaring aloft to that ſupremely Fair,
Known but in Heav'n; its bright, eternal ſource!

Yet ſay, what prize, what the rewards explain,
Such mercenaries ſeek? No vile purſuits
Are theirs: Uſurious lucre, tinſel ſhow
Of ſervile retinue, mendacious praiſe*
And glory counterfeit allure not theſe:
Nor falſe ambition, trick'd in flimzy garb
To ſnare the crowd, nor brilliant titles vain.

Theſe,

Servat in officio; nempe huic eſt ſordida virtus
Qui rectè facit, ut poſt mortem præmia carpat.
Ille bonus verè eſt, quem, ſpes ſi nulla Futuri,
Ad Pulcrum atque Decens per ſe ſuper omnia ducit
Morum dulce melos, & agendi ſemita ſimplex.
Eſto; nec Ille malus qui non hîc hæret, at illam
Quò Natura trahit metam ſcit rite tueri;
Semper et innatis ultra mortalia votis
Fertur ovans, Pulcrumque petit ſine fine ſupremum.

Ergo age, dic ſodes quæ præmia, quid ſibi ſperat
Mercedis? Namque haud ſectatur vilia rerum.
Illum, non uſura vorax, non turba ſequentûm,
Non mendax plauſus, fucataque gloria; non, quæ
Prava per incautum ſpargit mendacia vulgus,
Ambitio tenet; aut titulorum ſplendor inanis:

References to the Commentary, v. 418—420—426.

Theſe, whither lead true honour, nature pure
And inborn dignity of human kind,
With manly firmneſs tread the deſtin'd path;
New virtues adding to their 'ſtabliſh'd worth,
Till, in their ſublunary warfare train'd,
And fitly form'd, to higher worlds they riſe.

Like mariners the common herd are toſs'd,
The ſport of every wind; each his own voyage
Purſues; eluſive ſhadows, never caught,
All ſtrain alike to graſp; all eager ſeek,[1]
Like infants, toys and baubles, thrown away
Ere well attain'd; yet, more diſgraceful! Man,
In years mature, ſtill froward, plays the child.
But whoſoe'er, to firm perſuaſion wraught,
Deems not this little ſpan of human life,
The ſoul's whole being, nor her deſtiny
Completed here, owns treaſure yet untouch'd;
Nor fail his hopes, deluſive all, and vain:
For ſince Man's reſtleſs ſpirit Good, unmix'd
And pure, demands, attainable ſuch bliſs

E'en

At quò verus honos, quò fert natura, decuſque
Humani generis jubet ire, viriliter ibit:
Virtuteſque alias aliis virtutibus addens,
Donec in hac vitæ ſeſe exercere palæſtra
Cogitur, ingenium fata ad meliora parabit.

Cætera pars hominum ferimur jactante procella,
Ut ratis, huc illuc; et per diverſa viarum
Conatu ingenti fugientem prendimus umbram.
Ac veluti infantes pueri crepitacula poſcunt
Ardenti ſtudio, mox, parta relinquere gaudent;
Sic etiam in plenis homines pueraſcimus annis.
At bene perſuaſum cui ſit, non eſſe ſupremam
Hanc Animi vitam, reſtare ſed altera fata,
Salva Illi res eſt, neque ſpe lactatur inani.
Quippe ubi mens hominis purum ſimplexque requirat
Irrequieta Bonum, non ſperat ſorte potiri

References to the Commentary, v. 439—449.

Jam

E'en hope, in this dark ſojourn, ne'er believ'd.
What is this mortal ſtate? A life to all
Of good with evil mingled, gay with ſad;
Where wiſdom's ſelf, her eye on trifles bent,
Inſanely doats; where deadly aconite
Poiſons the roſe's aromatic breath;
Confuſion, ſport, and fluctuation all!
Where diſappointment ever mocks our vows.
The Deity, perchance, if Man may dare[m]
His counſels ſcrutinize, our ſyſtem thus
Arrang'd; with bitter ever tempering ſweet,
Gentler with adverſe fate, that hence the mind
By friendly ills chaſtiz'd, and ſchool'd this ſcene
Of idle vanity to ſcorn, in Heav'n
Might treaſure all her hope; in Heav'n alone,
Her home, her country of eternal reſt.

Come then, ſince meaſur'd now my dubious way,
Steer'd ſafe, at length, through error's latent rocks
And ſeas unknown, I make the welcome port;
Attend, whilſt the glad Muſe her voyage paſt

Briefly

Jam nunc felici: Quid enim? nunc, vivimus omnes
Pravum ubi commiſtum recto eſt; ubi triſtia lætis;
Ipſa ubi delirans inhiat ſapientia nugas;
Atque in odoratis florent aconita roſetis:
Omnia miſta quidem, fluxa omnia, ludicra demum
Omnia, nec votis eſt quod reſpondeat uſquam.
Forſan et ipſe Deus, divinum exquirere ſi fas
Conſilium, ſic res attemperat, uſque ſecundis
Adverſas miſcens, et amaris dulcia condit;
Spernere ut hinc diſcat terreſtria mens, et amicis
Caſtigata malis, cœlo ſpem ponat in uno,
Quo domus et Patria eſt, requies ubi ſola laborum.

Quare age, jam tandem memorata recollige mecum;
Quippe viam emenſus dubiam, ſcopuloſque latentes
Erroris nunc prætervectus et æquora cæca,
Conſpicio portum. Nempe hæc quæ cogitat et vult,

References to the Commentary, v. 460—461—469.

Mens

Briefly recounts. ——— The principle of Man,[n]
Form'd of no terrene elements, this mind,
Which wills and thinks, by her own Nature's law
Claims Immortality. " Yet God ſupreme
Speaks his reſiſtleſs will, and inſtant falls
Her being into naught." This awful truth
Stands undenied, if ſuch his potent will;
But Nature cries aloud, " He wills not ſo."
Elſe were that unextinguiſhable thirſt,[o]
Which prompts the Mind to knowledge high, and far
This mortal ſphere beyond, that ſtrong deſire,
Which pants inſatiate for Eternity,
Implanted vain, and reckleſs of deſign.

Since right, moreo'er, and juſtice ſtrict require[p]
That Virtue quaff th' unmingled cup of bliſs,
And Vice, her bitter portion ever due,
The draught of woe; whilſt yet experience proves,
That in this chequer'd vale of human life,
To neither falls his lot, Reaſon infers
Some future age, when each ſhall meet his own.

This

Mens haud terrenis conflata eſt ex elementis;
Ergo naturâ eſt quiddam immortale ſuapte.
" Verùm hanc interea, Deus hanc extinguere poſſit:"
Eſto, Deus poſſit ſi fert divina voluntas;
At non extinguet: neque enim vis illa ſciendi
Tot res humana tam longè ſorte remotas;
Nec porrò Æterni, nunquam ſatiata, cupido;
Nec deſiderium noſtris in mentibus hærens
Perfecti, fruſtra eſt.

Jam ſi fas juſque requirunt
Ut ſceleri malè ſit, benè virtutique, nec illa
Alterutri ſors obtingat, dum vivitur iſtic;
Reſtat, ut hoc alio fiat diſcrimen in ævo.

References to the Commentary, v. 473—486.

This rude entangled ſtate of moral Man
So dark, no more th' Almighty's wiſdom then
Or goodneſs ſhall impeach: Each cloud diſpell'd,
Truth in tranſcendent light ſhall ſtand reveal'd,
And order found her everlaſting reign.
Doubt'ſt thou ſtill this? Then ſay, what reas'ning proves
A God ſupreme, in equity, who rules,
Or wiſdom infinite? Thine were a God[q]
Creation's lower ſyſtem ruling well,
And fitly to his end; its higheſt work
Left in diſorder all, and incomplete.

No: Time will come; Nature through all her works'
That future age proclaims, when God (but aſk
Not how) to juſtify his wondrous plan,
Shall mark the Righteous and th' Unjuſt; a Gulf
Twixt Guilt and Innocence eternal fix,
And to each Mortal deal his due Reward.

Tum vero quæ nunc rudis, et ſapiente bonoque,
Si genus humanum ſpectes, haud Numine digna eſt
Scena, revelabit dempta ſe nube, colorque
Verus erit rebus, veruſque videbitur ordo.
Hoc niſi credideris, dic, qua ratione probetur
Omnino eſſe Deum, ſummo qui conſilio Res
Juſtitiaque regit; Num cætera ſcilicet aptè
Dirigit, hac quæ præcipua eſt in parte laborat?

Haud ita; Tempus erit, noli quo quærere more,
Hoc ſatis eſt, hoc conſtat, erit poſt funera Tempus;
Cum Deus, ut par eſt, æquos excernet iniquis,
Sontibus inſontes, et idonea cuique rependet.

References to the Commentary, v. 496—498—504.

COMMENTARY

ON THE

FIRST BOOK.

COMMENTARY

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THE Poet conſcious of the dignity and importance of his Subject, enters at once upon it without the parade of invocation, or any other conventional form of exordium. Ver. 1

He commences his firſt argument on one of the moſt acknowledged facts in the moral hiſtory of Man; namely, that while every inferior race of animals upon the Earth is contented with its ſituation in the ſcale of created Beings, and ſhews no ſign of wiſhing for any thing beyond it, Man, the Lord of all, actuated by a noble deſire of knowledge, and endued with faculties to acquire it, who feels an exalted ſatisfaction in ſearching into the hidden cauſes and relations of things; Man, notwithſtanding theſe perfections and privileges of his nature, purſues his way through life with unavailing ſolicitude, and is often cut off by Death in

Ver. in the midſt of his courſe, leaving unaccompliſhed
10 the beſt purpoſes of his being. But if it be true, that divine wiſdom hath created nothing in vain, or without intention, what ſolution can be given of this ſtrange phænomenon? How do the emptineſs and vanity of human life conſiſt with thoſe impreſſions of Divinity ſo viſibly ſtampt on the mind of Man? Can it poſſibly be thought, that a Being capable, to a certain degree, of diſcovering future events, of raiſing his ſpeculations to other worlds, and of conceiving ſomething of the order and immenſity of the planetary ſyſtem of the Univerſe, ſhould have been created for no other purpoſe than, after a few fleeting years of anxious exiſtence, allotted him here, to crumble into duſt
20 in the grave, and to periſh for ever? If this be the whole ſcope of our being, ſhould we not act moſt wiſely in contriving, how to make it paſs pleaſantly away, in every indulgence that can flatter the ſenſes; in the full gratification of all our appetites and paſſions? But, alas! if we recur to this expedient, the Poet ſuggeſts, that all we gain, even on the ſuppoſition, that nothing oppoſes our wiſhes, is but ſatiety, ennui, or diſguſt; and that, at the end of all the various purſuits of pleaſure, intereſt or ambition, we are forced to acknowledge the vanity of human things.

To

ſpirit, concludes the Deity to have formed the human Soul of his own ſpiritual nature. Ver.

Leſt however, we ſhould be led to wrong concluſions concerning the exalted nature of the human Soul from its more ordinary appearances in connexion with matter, the Poet exhorts us, whilſt we are purſuing our enquiries concerning its nature and dignity, not to confine our view to the low habits of vulgar and uneducated perſons; but rather contemplate the excellencies of the greateſt Men, who have ariſen among the moſt cultivated and refined nations, whether of antient or modern Times; the heroes and ſages of Greece and Rome, and particularly the diſtinguiſhed characters of our own country. Among the latter none, we are told, more deſerve our attention and regard than thoſe illuſtrious Philoſophers, Lord Bacon, and ſir Iſaac Newton; the former of whom, as the forerunner of the latter, in the brilliant walk of experimental Phyſics, is characteriſtically, and finely, pourtrayed by the Poet. 143

Next follows a beautiful and ſpirited apoſtrophe to theſe illuſtrious ſpirits, propoſing them as models of imitation to their countrymen of the 162

Ver. preſent age in their purſuit of Glory and Renown through the paths of ſcience. Reflecting on theſe extraordinary men, our Author is naturally recalled to his ſubject; their talents and wonderful exertions ſuggeſting a ſtrong argument for the heavenly origin of the Soul.

178 The Poet, thus far, having dwelt chiefly on topics of internal evidence, if they may be ſo called, for the Immortality of the Soul, and particularly thoſe, which tend moſt directly to refute the degrading ſyſtem of materialiſm, proceeds to a kind of external proof in the great hiſtorical Argument, drawn from univerſal conſent. Who is there, it is aſked, not, however, without ſuppoſing exceptions on the part of certain individuals of the ſophiſt tribe, that does not conceive ſomething remaining after Death, which he can call his property; ſomething which may preſerve in him the conſciouſneſs of his perſonal Identity?

> That ſomething of moſt intimate concern,
> Th' inſeparable Self.———

181 In theſe and the two preceding lines, the Immortality of the Soul being declared the natural and general Creed of individuals, each with reſpect to his own, ariſing from internal perſuaſion and Self-obſervation, it is added that this, its high Deſtination,

tination, has ever been matter of univerſal Belief with reſpect to the Souls of all mankind. For the wiſe and ignorant have equally concurred in admitting it: The moſt barbarous Tribes, and Nations the moſt uncivilized, are not excepted. None can be perſuaded, that this tranſient ſcene of mortality is meant to compriſe the whole of Man's Exiſtence. Ver.

The Author attributes, to the influence of this univerſal ſentiment and belief, all thoſe labours, ſchemes and devices of Men, which, they know, cannot have their accompliſhment within the longeſt term of human Life, and with which they themſelves could not have any future concern, but on the ſuppoſition that they ſhall, in another ſtate, be ſenſible of ſome ſort of pleaſure from the benefits, they may have conferred on ſucceeding generations. Hence it is, we ſow the Acorn, or the ſeed of any other ſlow-growing Tree, to give the fulneſs of its ſhade, or the advantages of mature timber to our Poſterity. It is partly to the like influence, that we owe many of thoſe great and ſtupendous works, which men have found it practicable to finiſh and bring to perfection in their own Days. Theſe have been conſtructed of the moſt durable materials, and 186 190

Ver. upon principles beſt calculated to preſerve them to diſtant ages, partly with a view to ſome ſuch ſatisfaction; which they were ſuppoſed capable of adminiſtering to their founders in a future ſtate. In illuſtration of this it is, that the pyramids of Ægypt are mentioned. All our exertions of genius, induſtry and wiſdom; whether in letters, arts, arms or legiſlation, &c. and even in ſome caſes, where bad and diſhonorable means (not perhaps deemed ſo by their Authors) have been reſorted to for the acquirement of laſting diſtinction; they have, I ſay, all a reference to a ſuppoſed poſtumous ſenſe of fame or renown, as well as to advantages, which may accrue to them before Death. For

> ———What recks it us, the voice
> Inaudible and vain of good report,
> If duſt, &c.——v. 207.

211 To ſhew farther, the univerſal prevalence of that Belief, ſo much inſiſted on; namely, that the Dead not only exiſt in another ſtate, but that they look back with ſatisfaction on the world they have quitted, and on the monuments they have left in it of their genius, their power, their virtues, &c. the Poet proceeds to deliver it as an opinion, not leſs general, that the ſpirits of the Defunct delight ſcarcely leſs in that which is done for them by

by others, as memorial of gratitude, affection or piety. Hence, he derives the cuſtom of performing ſolemn rites and obſequies to the dead; that of erecting pompous tombs and mauſoleums to their memory; of burning their bodies and inurning their aſhes; or laſtly that of embalming the corpſe, in order to preſerve, as long as poſſible, the living reſemblance. In dilating upon this ſubject, he deſcribes the whole proceſs of this latter ceremony, as performed by the antient Ægyptians. Ver. 230

To ſtrengthen the argument of univerſal conſent, in regard to the Soul's Immortality, our Author's Muſe now leads us to India, on the ſhores of the Ganges; where we meet with men, whoſe belief of a future exiſtence is proved by ſacrificing themſelves on the altars of their Deities, from meer haſte and impatience to change this anxious ſcene of mortality for the never-ending joys of Heaven. But a ſtill more remarkable evidence of the power of this perſuaſion is repreſented to us in the Wives of India, who ſometimes devote themſelves voluntarily on the funeral Pile of their Huſbands, in the hope of accompanying them to the Regions of eternal Bliſs. 238

The

Ver. 255 The laſt inſtance of this nature, adduced by the Poet, is in the ceaſeleſs labours and atchievements of war, diſplayed by the antient heroes of the North, always attended by the moſt ſignal contempt of Death. Their hiſtorians all aſſure us, that this invincible ſpirit has ariſen wholly from the powerful influence of a future exiſtence, and of the immortal happineſs, they were to enjoy after Death.

269 But although the foregoing arguments for the Immortality of the ſoul have been admitted among mankind to ſo wide an extent; yet, as it has been already hinted, objections have not been wanting; even among great pretenders to learning and philoſophy. Theſe men, becauſe the vulgar have entertained groſs and ſuperſtitious notions on the ſubject of departed ſpirits, have, partly to ſhew their contempt of ſuch ignorance, and partly becauſe unable to diſcover the modes of the ſoul's ſpiritual exiſtence, inculcated the gloomy doctrine of its extinction with the body. But this our Author, probably with juſtice, attributes to their pride and affectation, or to a certain want of mental exertion, always found requiſite to ſeparate truth from error and falſehood; and more particularly, when Poetry or Prieſt-

Prieſtcraft have laboured to give them her di- Ver.
vine ſemblance.

An obſervation follows, highly worth atten- 286
tion, and which ſhews the inconſiſtency of theſe ſhallow and idle reaſoners; who, though they have been far from denying the ſtrength of this argument of univerſal conſent in proving the exiſtence of God, yet might have rejected it on the ſame ground, on which they have done it, in the caſe of the Soul's Immortality. For many of the Heathen Nations, who have acknowledged the being of God and his claim to the adoration of his Creatures, have yet deformed their Creed and their manner of worſhip with as many unworthy and monſtrous ſuperſtitions, as ever have been invented, relatively to the ſtate of the Soul after its departure from the Body. To illuſtrate this aſſertion, the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of ſome of the antient people, and particularly of the Ægyptians, are here repreſented by the Poet in ſtrong and lively colours; but conformably to the authentic records of their hiſtory.

Socrates, he adds, according to the account of 301
Plato, contemplating the ſtrange errors and wild imaginations, in which the Heathen world had involved

Ver. involved their ideas of Religion and the Immortality of the Soul, far from making any handle of this corruption, to draw concluſions to the diſadvantage of the argument, ariſing from a general belief of theſe articles, deduces, with ſomething of prophetic wiſdom, the reaſonableneſs and probability of a future revelation of the Supreme will, and that, apparently, in ſome Divine perſon, to be commiſſioned from Heaven.

308 The Poet, who muſt have been aware, that in his alluſion to this famous conjecture of Socrates, he cannot but have recalled to his readers the idea of its accompliſhment in the perſon of our Saviour, who brought life and immortality to light through the Goſpel, may be conceived to glance at an objection, that might now be made to reſearches into the natural grounds of this doctrine; as if they were, at preſent, ſuperſeded by the Revelation of Jeſus Chriſt. In anſwer, ſomewhat indirectly, to this ſort of objection, at moſt but ſlightly hinted at, he ſhould ſeem here to wiſh it underſtood, that the doctrine of the Immortality of the Soul, as a queſtion of natural religion, may in a Chriſtian country be conſidered by ſome rather as matter of learned curioſity than
310 of neceſſary reſearch or diſcuſſion. And if treated

thus,

To what then ſhall we have recourſe for more ſolid ſatisfaction? We ſee that active principle, the Mind, notwithſtanding its connexion with the groſs material ſubſtance of the body, is ever diſpoſed to exert its powers in making new experiments and diſcoveries. By her reaſoning faculty ſhe riſes from one degree of knowledge to another; from things known ſhe traces out thoſe, which were at firſt concealed and ſtrange to her, and at length attains to the ſublimeſt truths. Convinced by her experience of thoſe fleeting gratifications and worldly purſuits, above inſtanced, how little they conduce to her happineſs, and conſequently how unworthy, and indeed unable they are to fix her deſires, we naturally ſeek for objects better fitted to her Nature; for joys not ſubject to be impaired either by time, or change.

Ver. 41 47

Having thus far conſidered the nature of the ſoul and the inſufficiency of all ſublunary objects to produce her happineſs, the juſt concluſion, we are led to, by the next ſtep of our Poet's reaſoning, is, not that we are now to deſpair of that happineſs, which ſhe is ever in queſt of, and cannot ceaſe to deſire; but, that infinite Wiſdom, an attribute of the Supreme Being, which ſhe is ſuppoſed to have already deduced from the con-

51

Ver. 53 templation of his works, can neither have planned, nor created any thing in vain. Dwelling ſtill on the review of our nature, we plainly ſee, that the ſphere of the ſoul's action is not confined to the body, and from that circumſtance, as we ſhall from a variety of conſiderations hereafter ſpecified, we conclude that her ſubſtance is entirely different from that of the body; imperiſhable and 57 eternal. The Poet apparently admitting, with Plato and ſome of the antient Philoſophers, the opinion of the ſoul's præ-exiſtence, would induce us to regard her connexion with the body as a ſtate of impriſonment; from whence releaſed by diſſolution, ſhe regains her priſtine habitation, recovers and maintains her vigor, enjoys the delicious intuition of truth at its fountain head, and partakes the felicity of Heaven.

62 He proceeds next to inſiſt on the celeſtial origin of the ſoul; inſinuating again the notion of its præ-exiſtent ſtate at v. 65. ——

—— yet retains
Marks of deſcent celeſtial ——

But perhaps the whole paragraph taken together, from v. 62 to 74, (both included,) is more directly meant to prove its ſpiritual nature, or, at leaſt, the abſolute difference of its nature from that

that of the body. Although the Author acknowledges, how much the ſoul is influenced by its connexion with matter, he repeats his former aſſertion, that it poſſeſſes qualities totally diſtinct from that groſs ſubſtance, and powers of which matter is incapable. Ver.

He now goes into a detail of many of its peculiar attributes and characters; repreſenting the mind as the diſcoverer of all thoſe multifarious arts, by which human life has been advanced from its ſavage ſtate to its preſent degrees of comfort, ſtrength and refinement. From the conſideration of the uſe of ſounds to diſtinguiſh ſurrounding objects; from that alſo of the invention of letters, for the viſible communication of names; from the improvement of them into language, by means of which, ſhe hath drawn mankind into mutual intercourſe, and at length arranged them, by written laws and compacts, under all the various conſtitutions of civil ſociety; from the conſideration of theſe ſeveral particulars, it is juſtly infer'd, that the mind partakes ſomething of a diviner nature, and ſtands in a nearer relation to its Supreme Author than any other of his works falling under our inſpection. The author continuing to detail thoſe gifts and faculties of the ſoul, which moſt evidently diſ-

Ver. tinguiſh it from matter, ſpecifies the gift of oratory, and its mighty powers; and next, that of poetry; the enchanting influence of its numbers on the ear, and of its imagery on the mind. He proceeds to ſpeak of the grandeur of ſuch ſubjects, as are moſt worthy of the Muſe, and, laſtly, deſcribes, with much force and beauty, and, as becomes a Bard on his own profeſſion, in a ſtile ſingularly poetical, the wonderful effects of Poetry on the imagination; a light in which he exalts the art to great dignity and importance. For how could he ſet its merits in a higher or more admirable point of view, than by ſhewing us, when we are grown weary of the perpetual recurrence of the ſame objects in the dull tract of ordinary life, and wiſh to gratify that curious and reſtleſs ſpirit of the mind, which is ever carrying it out in queſt of the New, the Grand, the Wonderful, that we have only to reſort for ſatisfaction to this literally magic art?

> The Bard to rapture wakes the ſacred ſhell,
> And lo! a new Creation ſtarts to light:
> New order more ſublime, and lovelier forms
> Meet the warm wiſhes of th' aſpirant mind;
> Preſaging Immortality ———

That plaſtic and combining power of the imagination, by which the mind, poſſeſſing it, is capable

pable of revelling in eternal novelty and variety of ideas; in all the poſſible changes of figure, colour, numbers, extenſion, action, paſſion, &c. could not be expreſſed with more animation than in the original of this paſſage, however the Tranſlator may have failed to do it juſtice. Nor ſhould it paſs unnoticed, that whilſt the Author is recounting theſe ſplendid faculties of the mind, among thoſe characters, which peculiarly diſtinguiſh it from matter, he inſinuates that her warm wiſhes and aſpirations after that higher novelty and perfection, which ſhe can only image forth, and that, imperfectly, in her preſent ſtate, are no uncertain preſage or earneſt of a future exiſtence, in which ſhe ſhall ſubſtantially poſſeſs and enjoy them. He doubtleſs alludes here to that metaphyſical axiom, before inſiſted on, "that the Divine wiſdom neither plans, nor works in vain." For why ſhould he have infuſed into the mind this ardent and ceaſeleſs thirſt of variety, novelty and perfection, if it were never meant to be completely ſatisfied?

Ver. 104

Our attention is then drawn to other intellectual powers and exertions; to the reaſonings of Philoſophers on the phænomena of the Heavens; on which is founded the ſublime ſcience of Aſtronomy.

106

Ver. nomy. The diſcovery of the law of Gravity is particularly intimated; that law by which the planets are retained in their Orbits and revolve
113 about the Sun. The Poet here demands, whether it be not allowed highly probable, that a being endowed with ſuch noble Faculties ſhould be deſtined to a higher ſtate of Exiſtence?

117 But a difficulty ariſes on this Hypotheſis; inaſmuch as matter is periſhable and ſubject to decay, diſſolution and other accidents, apparently incompatible with the Idea of immortal duration. Man muſt therefore be ſuppoſed a compound being, and poſſeſs ſome other principle inherent in his nature beſides body; ſome immaterial ſubſtance, not liable to the imperfections of his corporeal one. And can any thing more clearly prove this different principle or nature to exiſt in him, than his conſciouſneſs of a voluntary choice or refuſal of different Objects, and that the whole train of his paſſions; love, hatred, fear, joy, &c. each of them effects of which matter appears incapable, and to which its nature, according to all our conceptions of it, ſeems by any means unable to contribute; though it may be mechanically inſtrumental to acts of thinking, &c. and certainly, is, inaſmuch as all our Ideas of ſenſation are derived to the mind through the body.

But

But the abſolute difference of mind and body be- Ver.
comes, if poſſible, ſtill more evident from the con- 124
templation of ſome other powers belonging to the former, and equally her own; particularly that, by which ſhe compares one thing with another, whether among outward objects, or her own Ideas; that of ſeparating like from unlike, and of joining Ideas which reſemble each other, and, from this ſeparation or conjunction, the power of drawing certain concluſions with reſpect to their Diſagreement or Relation, and hence that of tracing the cauſes and effects of the multifarious objects, which preſent themſelves around us in this ſtate of exiſtence; and thus enabling man to uſe and apply them according to their natures in the various actions and concerns of his Life. By the ſame 128
proceſs it is, that principles of ſcience are ſtruck out from the obſervation and compariſon of numerous inſtances of ſimilar effects correſponding with certain cauſes; and from theſe principles are derived all thoſe uſeful and ornamental arts, through which man, by the beſt and eaſieſt means, converts all the world of nature, animate and inanimate, to his ſervice, or his entertainment. Hence too he connects one Art or Science with another, and at length, by the ſlow and gradual deductions of his reaſon, riſes from his knowledge of this

Ver. world to that of another; eſtabliſhing a ſeries of cauſes and effects till he arrives at the firſt cauſe of all things; the Creator of the Univerſe; the Author of all things viſible and inviſible: With reſpect to that Being who created matter, that ſubſtance out of which is formed this viſible world; nothing is more evident than that he himſelf muſt be ſomething ſuperior to and eſſentially different from matter, paſſive and inert, poſſeſſing neither thought nor power, which that Being muſt do in the higheſt and moſt perfect degree, who created and arranged it under all its various forms and ſubjected it to that order and thoſe laws, ſo conſpicuous in all the works of his Hands. To expreſs our ideas of this Being under the notion of a ſubſtance, and yet as diſtinctly as poſſible from matter, we call him a Spirit.

134 The mind, having by its reaſonings eſtabliſhed theſe important truths relative to the Firſt Cauſe, deſcends again into herſelf for the farther conſideration of her own nature. She now perceives her own proper operations to have as little appearance, as thoſe of the Deity, of reſulting from matter, which, under its moſt perfect forms and modifications, riſes only to machinery; and conceiving every exiſtence, as reſolvable either into matter, or

ſpirit,

thus, he may be thought to intimate, that as before the Goſpel ſeveral Truths, relative to this ſubject, were diſcovered, or, at leaſt happily gueſſed at, under the light of nature; ſo conjecture, aided by the ſober inveſtigations of reaſon, may ſtill poſſibly add to their number. And we may perhaps be allowed to conclude, that our Author's deſign, in this performance, is, to adduce promiſcuouſly, ſuch arguments, whether antient or modern, as nature alone hath hitherto ſuggeſted, or may ſtill be able to diſcover. In this ſcheme, the benefit of thoſe, who will not admit Revelation, whatever be their ſentiments or their motives for rejecting it, cannot at leaſt but be greatly conſulted, if natural Religion may be ſuppoſed to influence the moral conduct of men; which, to a certain degree, cannot be doubted. Ver.

The cloſe connexion and ſympathy, ſo viſible betwixt the mind and the body, having ſometimes given handle to the falſe concluſions of the Materialiſts, the Poet, though he grants the fact in ſome reſpects, inſiſts, that their diſagreement is equally evident in many others; and that too in ſuch inſtances, as ſhew the ſuperior nature of the Soul, and point out her celeſtial origin. Bodies too, the moſt perfect, and of more than ordinary 313

Ver. ſtrength and activity, are ſometimes found coupled with dull and feeble minds, and *vice verſâ*.

323 If the ſympathy of mind and body ſubſiſted without exception; or ſo, as in any manner to prove them of the ſame nature, it could never happen, as we ſee it very often does in fact, that the former ſhould ſuffer from Diſeaſe, and the latter partake nothing in the effects of it; nay, inſtances without end have occurred of perſons appearing, at the approach of Death, and under great bodily diſorder, to poſſeſs unuſual clearneſs, vigor and even vivacity of mind. Something not unlike inſpiration, or anſwerable at leaſt to our Ideas of it, hath, in this awful moment, been known to exalt the faculties of the Soul in a wonderful manner, and to produce in ſick and dying perſons, predictions of the very day, and even hour of their Departure.

331 It is argued, againſt the Materialiſts, with great plauſibility and force, that, if the mind were formed of corporeal elements, the phænomenon of dreams, not only on account of their nature, but in point of fact, would be very inexplicable; inaſmuch as the ſenſes being then all cloſed, and the body reduced to a ſtate of inaction and repoſe,

poſe, and all acceſs denied to Ideas of external objects, the mind in that ſtate, notwithſtanding, diſplays her greateſt activity, and expatiates abroad in the moſt unreſtrained liberty, and ſeems to exult like a priſoner eſcaped from irkſome confinement. Ver.

Again, were it to be conceded, that the Soul is material, it would follow, that it muſt conſiſt of numberleſs elementary particles, and it might reaſonably be preſumed, that one particle of matter ſhould as much be endued with a capacity of thinking as another, till as leaſt the contrary be proved; and till then it might as fairly be concluded, that each particle muſt poſſeſs its own proper perception, will, &c. and each individually form its own ſeparate purpoſes and deſigns. As every particle of Soul, or rather every particular Soul would be infinitely diviſible like other particles of matter, it ſhould appear, that every man muſt thus poſſeſs an infinity of Souls. This being the caſe, the Poet may well aſk how, amidſt ſuch an infinity of thinking beings combined in one man, and amidſt all that difference of thoughts and inconſiſtency of opinions naturally to be ſuppoſed from this ſtrange combination, any uniform priciples could be eſtabliſhed for

Ver. the conduct of life? How could a man's perſonal Identity to be determined, or in what could the conſciouſneſs of himſelf, or of his merit or demerit,
349 conſiſt? All this abſurdity and confuſion following from the ſuppoſition of Mind conſiſting of elementary particles, the Materialiſt has recourſe to another, which will as little bear examination: namely, that intellect may perhaps ſpring from a certain configuration of matter and relative poſition of its parts; in other words, from its organization, or mechaniſm. The Author, however, thinks this Hypotheſis too abſurd to deſerve a ſerious refutation, and treats it only with ridicule; intimating that it involves the idle and manifeſt abſurdity of thought and intellect reſulting from round or ſquare, or that a circle may diſplay greater or leſs wiſdom than a figure of four ſides. He goes on to affirm, that quantity, greater or leſs, form or colour, however variouſly or ingeniouſly imagined, will as little contribute to produce any thing reſembling intellectual faculty.

357 Among other wild Hypotheſes, the mind has been ſuppoſed by ſome to be derived from motion. This might indeed poetically enough, and not very improperly be called the ſoul of mechaniſm; but if we make it the ſoul of man, the Poet's

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Ridicule, which repreſents the power of the lever and of the pully upon the ſame foot of excellence with the intellectual principle of man, and ſuppoſes will, reaſon, diſcourſe and knowledge to be as producible by the former as by the latter, is not unjuſtly placed. The ſchool-boy's top alſo, and the cauldron, under their higheſt energies of motion, are neither more ludicrouſly, nor leſs rationally exalted to the ſame pretenſions. But when the Poet begins ſeriouſly to examine on what foundation this doctrine ſtands, he finds the ſtructure itſelf a meer philoſophical caſtle in the air; the baſeleſs Fabric of a Viſion. The cauſe of motion, whether the moving ſubſtance be ſimple, or mechanically organized, is without itſelf; impreſſed by ſomething foreign, by ſome ſuperior and voluntary agent. That agent we find to reſide with different degrees of power, or energy, in all animated Beings. To a certain meaſure, be Man as jealous, as he may, of his intellectual prerogatives, we muſt acknowledge ſome portion of them, relatively greater or leſs, in all the inferior orders of the animated Creation. All of them in ſome degree or other are capable of impreſſing motion upon matter, and even of changing its forms. As God moves and rules the Univerſe, ſo he has implanted, in every liv- Ver.

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Ver. ing Being, ſome degree of voluntary power over inanimate matter: Man ſhares a portion much ſuperior to that of the moſt perfect race of animals.

373 Whatever may be concluded reſpecting the future condition of the Brute Creation from arguments of natural Religion, Revelation has diſcloſed nothing in their favour on the ſubject. And our Poet, on the ſcheme of natural Religion, having hinted nothing upon it, the Commentator will confine himſelf here to the general concluſion ſtated by his Author from v. 313 to 380—which imports, that the premiſes being conſidered, it is very much more probable, when our material Bodies are diſſolved, that the Mind or Soul ſhould live in a ſtate of Immortality, than that it ſhould ceaſe to exiſt; the Mind being a ſimple indiviſible ſubſtance, endued with a principle of Self-motion, as well as with a power of impreſſing motion upon matter. The principle of Self-motion being of the eſſence of the Soul, according to the ſuppoſition of the Poet, he concludes, that it cannot ceaſe to be.

381 But another ſort of objection meet us here; it being demanded;

> How without form, or local circumſtance,
> Can aught exiſt?——

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Ver.

The Poet refers his objector, whom he ſuppoſes to admit the exiſtence of God, to his own ſolut on of the ſame difficulty in this latter caſe. You muſt either, ſays he, admit the Deity to be void of form and uncircumſcribed by place, or you muſt ſuppoſe God and Matter to be the ſame. If you acknowledge him to be a ſpiritual eſſence, you cannot avoid the ſame concluſion with regard to the human mind. In confirmation of which, he alludes again, at v. 389, to what has been inſiſted on; namely, the aſtoniſhing vigour of the Mind, as a native and inherent Virtue, by which it ſallies forth, even during its connexion with the Body, till loſt in the infinity of ſpace and being; and ſeems to ſhew itſelf deſtined to a more exalted and freer ſtate of exiſtence.

The Poet now, in a beautiful manner, apoſ- 397
trophizes the Soul; as if it were reproachful for an immortal Spirit, under the ſtrong ſenſe, which ſhe muſt feel of a future and ſuperiour deſtiny, to waſte her thoughts on the trivial and tranſitory enjoyments of this ſublunary condition.

He intimates, that the preſent Life, whilſt the 406
mind can arrive at Truth, the end and aim of all its enquiries and its pureſt object of delight, but by

Ver. by the ſlow ſteps of reaſoning and inveſtigation, can be little elſe than the earneſt of a future State; for that Truth can never be really felt and enjoyed, nor Man live the life for which he ſeems, by his mental powers, to be deſtined, but in a ſtate, where he at once, and by intuition, ſhall ſeize the true knowledge of every object within his ſphere of contemplation.

411 A new objection now preſents itſelf: Can the mind in another ſtate, it is aſked, either acquire, or retain Knowledge, but by means of the ſenſes; thoſe organs by which alone ſhe obtains ſo great a portion of all ſhe learns here. Is not indeed the foundation of her whole ſtock of Knowledge laid in the ideas of ſenſation? Should not the ſenſes, therefore, appear neceſſary for the retention of her intellectual ſtores? The ſenſes being allowed the primary ſource of all her Knowledge, is not that grand ſource as it were dried up, when Death has annihilated all Senſation? Can the power of intuition, above ſuppoſed, be then imparted without the aid of the ſenſes?

416 The Poet meets this difficulty by deſiring the objector to recollect, that the mind, even in this imperfect ſtate, has invented arts by which

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the ſenſes, particularly thoſe of hearing and ſeeing, when injured, or nearly worn out by age, are ſtill ſupplied with a power of acquiring ideas from thoſe external objects, which are fitted by Nature to excite them. Why may we not therefore, in a more perfect ſtate, poſſeſs the means of ſupplying an entire want of the ſenſes; faculties adapted equally with them to the acquiſition and retention of Knowledge. The Author enlarges, very poetically, upon the invention of theſe auxiliary arts, in alluſion particularly to the aſſiſtance derived from optical inſtruments, by which the Sciences of Aſtronomy and Natural Hiſtory have been ſo wonderfully advanced.——See a paſſage from Wollaſton, in a note on v. 411—perhaps more ſatisfactory in a philoſophical view. Ver.

But whatſoever weight may be allowed to theſe conſiderations, the mind evidently poſſeſſes faculties of acquiring Knowledge, which are quite diſtinct from, and ſuperior to thoſe of the ſenſes; thoſe, for inſtance, of reflection, abſtraction, &c. and particularly the important one of correcting ideas acquired through the medium of the ſenſes. Almoſt all our original ideas of the form, magnitude, and diſtance of external objects are in ſome degree falſe, or confuſed, and would ever continue 428

Ver. ſo, were they not corrected by the judgment, and thereby rendered true and proper materials of Knowledge. If it be ſaid, that though the difference and ſuperiority of theſe faculties ſhould be allowed, yet that the primary and ſimple ideas, on which they are exerciſed, are derived through the ſenſes, and that the faculty of retaining theſe materials of thought ſhould, at leaſt, be proved to belong to the Soul after its ſeparation from the Body; it may be anſwered, that, till it ſhall be proved by the objector leſs probable, that the Soul naturally poſſeſſes a faculty of retaining them, than that it does not, the former ſuppoſition ſhould ſeem as good as the latter. But it might be here inſiſted on, had the Poet but ſuggeſted ſuch an argument for our illuſtration, that the abſolute and neceſſary exiſtence of mind, or a thinking power, prior to the Creation of any kind of matter, and conſequently their original independence upon it, would admit of demonſtration, and the whole weight of the objection be for ever removed. After making, however, thoſe obſervations, which I have noted above, the Poet believed himſelf authorized to conclude, that the Soul, in its preſent ſtate, diſcovers the ſtrongeſt indications of a Nature purely ſpiritual, and ſuch as prognoſticates her future pre-eminence in the acquiſi-

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tion of Truth, Knowledge and intellectual Perfection. Ver.

Although, after all, ſays our Author, it ſhould be inexplicable, how the Soul either acquires or retains ideas in a ſtate of ſeparation from the Body, that difficulty no way diminiſhes the reaſonableneſs of ſuppoſing her to poſſeſs that power. We have, he tells us, as great difficulty to encounter in attempting to explain our ſenſations and faculties in that embryo ſtate, which precedes our Birth. But, nevertheleſs, we have reaſon to believe, that we poſſeſſed both in ſome degree, or other. Perſons born blind, in like manner, are unable to conceive ideas of colours; yet they know, that ſuch ideas exiſt in the minds of others. The inference is, that the difficulty of conceiving any thing, whether paſt or future, makes nothing againſt its exiſtence in either time ſuppoſed. 439

The conſolatory obſervation, at v. 447, with regard to thoſe who are born not to ſhare the light of the Sun, enables the Poet, by an eaſy tranſition, to ſlide into his next argument for the Immortality of the Soul. — If we caſt our eyes over the whole Creation of Man, we ſhall find there is no ſitua- 448

Ver. tion or condition, even the moſt promiſing which the imagination can form, in which the full and perfect enjoyment of all his wiſhes can poſſibly be obtained. The fact indeed ſtands very much lower: Few are the individuals, who find an opportunity of gratifying the ten-thouſandth part of thoſe deſires, of which ſublunary things are the ſole object. What then? Was Man made but to torment his exiſtence with wiſhes and deſires, that were never to be accompliſhed? No: when he perceives earthly objects to fail him; or, when proving moſt ſatisfactory, that ſtill they bring ſomething of diſappointment with them, he is led by the natural force and dignity of his Mind, by his ideas of that *Fair* and *Beautiful*, which, from the portions of it, ſhed over the various parts of the viſible World, he conceives as reſiding in conſummate perfection more immediately in the preſence of the all-perfect Creator; he is led, I ſay, after having experienced the vanity of this lower World and its incompetence to ſatisfy his continual cravings after happineſs, to carry his deſires to that brighter ſtate of exiſtence, and to believe it prepared for his future enjoyment.

4 Thoſe more refined ſpirits, who, by virtuous habits,

habits, are uſed to diſengage the mind from low and worthleſs objects, in order to purſue more at liberty theſe ſublime ſpeculations, find at length their hearts become wholly abſorbed in them; and that they can neither think, nor wiſh for any thing elſe, but that divine condition of Being. They contemplate their ideas of it with fondneſs and unceaſing affection: they ſhun the buſy ſcenes of Life, and like the true Lover, loſt in the thoughts of his abſent object of affection, and ſhunning the more public ſcenes of the World to feed his imagination on her charms, they ſeek the ſtillneſs and retirement of woods and groves, or linger by the ſide of clear, calm waters, the emblem of ſerenity and peace, and muſe in ſilent delight on the Supreme wiſdom and beauty; or if they awake from the ſilence of meditation, in which they are engaged, it is but to expreſs the enthuſiaſm of their Souls in rapturous ſtrains of Muſic or Poetry. Since then there is nothing in this world found competent or worthy to ſatisfy the beſt deſires of Man, and it appears impoſſible to reſtrain his continual longings after Immortality, the Poet draws towards the concluſion of his firſt Book, with obſerving, that the wiſe Man, who has lived long enough, in philoſophic tranquility, to contemplate the ſolemn

Ver. 462

Theatre

Ver. Theatre of the Univerſe; to examine its various Phænomena; to learn the contrivance and order of the general ſyſtem of Nature; and to admire the wonderful Power and Wiſdom of the Creator, diſplayed in every part of it; and then immediately has riſen, like a ſatisfied gueſt from ſome grand entertainment, and departed to his everlaſting home; might, after having thus made the nobleſt uſe of his intellectual faculties, and thence enjoyed the pureſt and moſt exalted pleaſure, of which the Soul is capable in its preſent ſtate, be deemed to have led a happy Life, and to have lived enough. For whether his Life were extended to the longeſt date of human Exiſtence, or contained only within the ſpace of a few years, he would have beheld the general order of Nature and its great and conſtant effects; and, in the admiration of theſe, would have enjoyed the higheſt ſatisfaction he could taſte in this World; but ſtill his admiration and his ſatisfactions would be confined within the ceaſeleſs revolution of the ſame Phænomena; a ſtated Round for ever repeated, of the greater and leſſer wheels of the ſyſtem.

474 We may conſider the whole ſcene of human Life under the images of a public Forum, a crowded Inn, or Caravanſary, in which we ſee a vaſt

vaſt multitude, ſometimes giving their attention to concerns of importance, at others, to mere trifles or amuſements; a fluctuating body of comers and goers; of whom, he, who firſt departs, has the advantage of arriving ſooneſt at that eternal Home, whither all are travelling. The Poet, under the increaſing fervor of his imagination, adviſes the loiterers to preſs forward in their courſe, ſince he who ſtays the longeſt on his route, will but experience the greater ſhare of this world's evils; probably more diſeaſe; and laſtly the labour and ſorrow of old age. Ver.

But at this point, under the awful recollection of the Almighty Being, by whoſe appointment man is placed upon Earth, the Poet checks the petulant warmth of his Muſe, inſiſting, that no one ought prematurely to deſert his ſtation; but, that we muſt wait patiently our releaſe by the hand of God, of whatever length be the term of our earthly exiſtence, or how great ſoever the weight and preſſure of its troubles. 484

But could I, ſays he, be once perſuaded, that the Soul is not immortal, and that an eternal ſleep ſucceeds the moment of Death, I ſhould deſire nothing with more ardour and impatience, than 490

Ver. than to finiſh my mortal career, as ſoon as poſſible. Were I permitted by the Almighty, continues the Poet, to renew my paſt life, to recommence it from childhood, and to recal the beſt enjoyments of my youth, I ſhould refuſe the offer with ſcorn; and that even, though the greateſt bleſſings, as they are uſually eſteemed, were offered to enhance it; as genius, eloquence, honor without envy, and even a numerous progeny, equally diſtinguiſhed by the fame of their progenitors, and by their own virtues; my wearied Spirit would ſtill feel no temptation to repeat the dull and irkſome Round of human Life; in which every object, employment, appetite, or ſatisfaction unceaſingly revolves to the ſame point. There being nothing new under the Sun, and all there is, but vanity; nothing leſs than the Perfection and Immutability of immortal Life and Happineſs can ever content my ambitious wiſhes: All, ſhort of theſe, I treat with diſdain.

COMMENTARY

ON THE

SECOND BOOK.

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MR. BROWNE, having in the former Book produced the natural and metaphyſical arguments, for the Immortality of the Soul, reaſons to the ſame concluſion in this, and, with equal cogency, upon moral Grounds. Ver.

The moral topics being ſuch as a curſory ſurvey only of human Life muſt ſuggeſt to almoſt every man of reflection, new or recondite matter cannot be ſo much ſuppoſed the Poet's aim in this part, as juſt and forcible Repreſentations, clear Deductions from Premiſes well eſtabliſhed, and the application of high poetic ornament to every paſſage fairly ſuſceptible of it. With what ſucceſs our Author acquits himſelf of each part of this deſign, will appear, as we proceed in the conſideration of the Poem.

Ver. 1 The ſecond Book opens, like the firſt, with adverting to the ſtate of animated nature, and infers from its general condition, that each being, man excepted, appears to be ſo conſtituted and provided by the benevolence of the Creator, as to be capable of fulfilling all the purpoſes of its exiſtence, and of enjoying the whole* meaſure of happineſs, and that a conſiderable portion, allotted to it. Man alone the principal work of the Creation, at leaſt within his own cognizance, and formed, reſpecting his Intellect, and moral properties, to ſome reſemblance of the Divinity and his Attributes, is deſtined to paſs his Life in miſery and ſorrow.

" Forbear: theſe murmurs 'gainſt thy God forbear,"

8 In the Lines preceding this, the Poet exhibits the ſentiments of an objector; and anticipating, from his gloomy declamation, ſome concluſion inconſiſtent with the wiſdom and goodneſs of the Deity, admoniſhes him not to proceed in this impious ſtile of murmuring and diſcontent.

9 His opponent anſwers, that he will ceaſe then to hold the language of Declamation, and will ſhew, that his opinions are founded in fact. If we turn our eyes, continues he, to the general con-

* See a Note on V. 236 of this Book.

condition of man throughout the world, we must obſerve, that evil, in ſome ſhape or other, is indiſcriminately dealt to the whole race. The miſeries of individuals may differ much in ſpecies or circumſtance; but the meaſure of each is apparently not unequal, and no one can claim exemption from the common lot. He now proceeds to particular inſtances. Ver.

What infinite numbers of mankind periſh in war! How many languiſh out their lives under the cruelty of Tyrants! Many die for want of neceſſary ſuſtenance; famiſhed amidſt the plenty of their Fellow-creatures. Endleſs is the catalogue of thoſe, who are carried to their grave, whether by ſudden or lingering diſeaſes; not to mention a multitude, who deſtroy themſelves by intemperance and debauchery. From this repreſentation, the juſtice of which perhaps the Poet is not altogether inclind to deny, the objector would precipitately infer, that Virtue then remains without recompence or reward. 14

But this conſequence the Poet will, by no means, admit without great abatement; inſiſting on the ſalutary influence and valuable privileges of Virtue even in the preſent condition of man. 27

Its

Ver. Its peculiar efficacy in enabling us, when it is reſorted to with ſincerity, to bear, with patience, the heavieſt misfortunes and calamities, cannot be denied; but its power extends farther. The conſciouſneſs of ever doing and intending that which is right in whatever circumſtances we may happen to be engaged, has a wonderful effect in ſoothing the ſevereſt evils, of reconciling us to them, and even of inſpiring hope and cheerfulneſs under their immediate preſſure: Nor is the influence of Virtue in any thing more conſpicuous than in checking the firſt inordinate movements of paſſion, and in controling, for example, the violence of anger, or the madneſs of animal love; affections, which, unoppoſed, moſt diſturb the moral ſyſtemof the world.

33 But it is urged by the other party, that there are evils, againſt which Virtue is unable to protect us; nay, that ſhe often leads thoſe, who manifeſt the ſtrongeſt devotion to her Cauſe, into ſituations of great peril and hazard. Caſes are inſtanced, in which it is pretended, that ſafety conſiſts only with poſitive wickedneſs. He, particularly, whoſe deſtiny ſhall have linked him to the ſervice of a Tyrant, will find it expedient to adopt his Maſter's vices, ſuperadding thoſe of in-

insincerity and adulation: Virtue in a Vassal or Slave would be thought insulting to the character of his tyrannical Lord; supposed its irreconcible enemy. Ver.

The patriot, continues the objector, who dedicates his life and its most laborious exertions to the service of the Common-wealth, frequently experiences no other reward than its ingratitude; or persecution, and even death itself from the very people, whose state he had preserved from Ruin. Another, distinguished, above his countrymen, by genius and talents, is supposed, for some time, to be making his way under the advantages of general prejudice in his favor, to the Helm of Government. He soon finds a number of envious Competitors, united to thwart the laudable efforts of his ambition by every malicious attempt to blacken, or to ruin his Reputation. But allow, that by extraordinary merit and perseverance, he shall have struggled successfully through all impediments to the high object of his wishes; how often is it, after all the sacrifices of his time, ease and quiet, that he meets with nothing but disgrace, or lives in continual danger from factious Combinations against him, or from the ambitious stratagems of Rivalry? 49

In

Ver. 59 In the ſame ſtrain, it is next intimated, that the virtuous man in a private ſtation, is not more exempt from a long train of evils, perpetually at war with his enjoyment of life. The vices of others, under one character or another, are enumerated, as ſo many ſovereign Demons holding univerſal ſway over mankind, from the effect of which no ſituation in Life is exempt.

66 As the moſt promiſing caſe of private life, a man is repreſented in the ſtate of marriage with an amiable woman. The intervals, of his leiſure at leaſt, are ſuppoſed to paſs in the moſt delightful ſenſations of joy: Children crown his love: The charms of their innocence and ſimplicity, during their younger years, furniſh many a rapturous moment to his exiſtence: Their youth fills him with hopes; and in their maturity he experiences the beſt comfort and ſupport of his own declining age. In this ſituation, or in none, we may expect to meet with ſincere and genuine Happineſs. But we are ſoon mortified with the contraſt of this picture: Care and anxiety are the natural and neceſſary attendants of domeſtic life. A thouſand ſchemes of Economy, Education, Diſpoſal of children, &c. with a continual mixture of ſucceſs and diſappointment in each, muſt neceſſarily occupy a great portion of our thoughts and

and our time. And it will probably happen, Ver.
even where an ordinary ſhare of merit and good intention are found in the married Pair, that tempers and diſpoſitions very different, if not oppoſite, and a ſtrong bias to different purſuits, and perhaps to different principles of action ſo frequently divide them, as to become the ſource of the bittereſt uneaſineſs and chagrin. It moſt generally happens too, that Paſſion or Intereſt thicken or obſcure the medium, through which each party, previouſly to their connexion, views the other's character and manners; ſo that this important eſtimate is too commonly a miſtaken one. Severe repentance at length blaſts the faireſt auſpices of the compact; and that, which completes its Miſery, is, that the general Good of Society has induced both Sacred and Civil Legiſlators to make it, in moſt caſes, indiſſoluble.

With reſpect to Children; notwithſtanding all 84
the vigilance and ſolicitude of Parents to educate them in habits of Virtue, Honor and Sincerity, they will often, from a thouſand unavoidable cauſes, be liable to corruption, and grow up to maturity without principles, or worth. But ſuppoſing their Characters and Manners to anſwer the moſt ſanguine wiſhes of their Parents; too

Ver. often ſhall we ſee, juſt as they are ſtepping into Life with every appearance in their favour, that Death in one fatal moment has cut them off, and blaſted all the hopes and happineſs of their neareſt ſurviving Relatives.

90 Here the Poet interpoſes: "Say not, from Virtue ſpring ſuch various Ills;"—warning his Opponent, as he proceeds in his melancholy picture of the moral ſtate of Man, not to impute the Evil, upon which he inſiſts, to Virtue, as its immediate or efficient cauſe.

91 The Diſputant, more willing, than able, to purſue his oppoſition, makes a weak and needleſs exception; a diſtinction almoſt without a ſhade of difference, in ſaying; that if every Man would but faithfully fulfil his own ſhare of duties in Life, he might then allow the Poet's opinion, that Virtue is not the cauſe of Evil. But what does this exception amount to, but that, if all Men were virtuous, none would be wicked; or that moral Evil would be at an end for want of evil agents? This reaſoning making in fact for our Author's own argument, inaſmuch as he is left to infer from it, that all the Evil, which happens to good Men comes from thoſe, who do

not

not fulfil their proper duties, in other words, from the Vices of others, and not from their own Virtues, he quits his defeated antagoniſt, and (at v. 95) enters into diſpute with the Magi, whoſe opinions were in aftertimes revived by the Manicheans. Ver.

This antient ſect of Perſia, judging from a general ſurvey of things, like the Sophiſt whom we have juſt left, admitted a large portion of Evil to exiſt in the World in continual oppoſition to Good; and the conſequent production of Miſery and Unhappineſs; and ſo far our philoſophical Poet controverts the opinions of neither; but, in their different concluſions from this prominent fact, he equally diſſents from both. The Magi meaning not, like the other ſect, to confound the different natures and conſequences of Virtue and Vice, imagined two Gods or ſovereign Principles of Things; one the Diſpenſer of all Good, moral or phyſical; the other, of all Evil of either kind, to the World. They imagined the powers and energies of the two Principles to be engaged in eternal oppoſition and hoſtility to each other. Hence they, according to their ideas, accounted for the checquered aſpect of things, the univerſal contention of Good and Evil, and

Ver. their alternate equality, or predominance in the affairs of Man.

103 Can this, ſays the Poet, be the true ſolution of this mixture of Good and Evil, which we perceive in the grand ſyſtem of the Moral and Phyſical World? Tell me, whether you aſſign an equality of powers and energies to your two ruling Principles? If this be your poſition; nothing can follow from it but alternate Creation and Annihilation, inſtantly and continually ſucceeding each other. No ſyſtem of things, either Good or Evil, could ever be eſtabliſhed, or ſtand in any ſolid or viſible ſtructure for a moment; each Principle inſtantly undoing what the other had done, whichſoever of the two, you ſuppoſe firſt to have begun to act ſo that nothing can be more abſurd than this Hypotheſis. But if you allow their Strength and Force to be unequal, one of theſe principles muſt yield to the other, and leave the Victor ſolely to his own deſigns and operations.

116 This weak and incoherent Hypotheſis being thus demoliſhed, the Poet next conſiders the Philoſophy of the Stoics, as it regards Good and Evil, whether moral or phyſical. This oſtenta-

tious

tious Sect, apparently more determined to ſurprize Mankind with the Novelty of their opinions, than to convince them by their Truth; pretends, that all thoſe things which Man moſt values, and to which he ſhews the ſtrongeſt attachment, are no Goods: Reputation, Wealth and whatever is independent on the Man himſelf, is held in contempt by the Diſciple of Zeno. Rich or Poor, he poſſeſſes every thing alike: Pain and Misfortune are with him no Evils: Inflict each upon him, in their greateſt degree, he allows Himſelf to perceive nothing in them, worſe than Inconvenience: Health, Strength and Beauty are, in his Language, not deſirable; but meerly things which a wiſe Man may accept. Ver.

But all this extraordinary pretenſion, anſwers the Poet, is no better than a ſtile of affectation; or an idle quibbling upon words: For Inconvenience is Evil; and whatſoever is acceptable is good, in ſome meaſure or other; which if the Stoic denies, it is only becauſe he chuſes to give another apparent meaning to the words *inconvenient* and *acceptable* than that which he knows to be commonly received. But this proceeding alters not the nature of things, and there is no doubt, that all Men have different and contrary ſenſations 132

Ver. tions and ideas of Pleaſure and Pain, of Strength and Infirmity, of Health and Sickneſs, &c. in what manner ſoever they may be diſpoſed to expreſs themſelves.

135 Spiritual Natures may perhaps enjoy Happineſs, or have perceptions of Miſery without external means; but the Stoic, in forming ſuch pretenſions, forgets himſelf to be a Man, endued with corporeal ſenſes, and dependent upon them for all his firſt ideas, and all the ſenſe of ſatisfaction, or diſſatisfaction, inſeparably connected with them, which he derives, and that involuntarily from external objects.

139 Such then being the dependence of Man upon Externals, while theſe in their turn, are ſo little dependent upon him (or, in other words, while the ſure and conſtant poſſeſſion of them is ſo little in his power) that he is continually liable to looſe, though he cannot help valuing, them, for the utility, or the ſatisfaction they afford; of what Avail, in caſe of their loſs or removal, is the Stoic's affectation of giving them names diſſimilar from thoſe, which they bear in the Language of the World; and of a pretenſion, that they are indifferent to our Happineſs or Miſery? The State of

of life, the circumſtances and condition of theſe Men, can, we know, claim no exemption from that mutability and fluctuation, to which thoſe of all others are ſubject. That ſtrength and greatneſs of mind, which they would ſeem to poſſeſs in a proportion above ordinary men, and acknowledge to be ſo highly valuable, are equally obnoxious in themſelves, and in others, to the power of diſeaſe, which is often known to deſtroy the fineſt and moſt brilliant endowments, and to obliterate every trace of them from the Mind. What memorable inſtances of the fragility of the moſt vigorous intellects, and of all thoſe great and ſhining faculties of the Mind, which conſtitute Genius, are preſented to our reflection in the mortifying cloſe of a Career, ſo glorious in its meridian, exhibited by Somers, Malborough, and Swift in the different walks of politics, war, and literature. Ver.

Yet the Poet intimates, that the falſe pretenſions of the Stoic Philoſophy might be innocent, at leaſt pardonable enough if man had no expectation of a future State of Rewards and Puniſhments: For without this—"What is the ſum of life? Or, what its end?" It offers nothing worth our attachment, or regard, under any other 163

Ver. other conſideration than that our preſent ſtate is a probationary one, and meant, through the means it offers us of Improvement in the continual trial of our beſt powers and diſpoſitions, to prepare us for a better condition of Being. Without theſe ſuppoſitions, which the Stoics, in their dark and imperfect ſyſtem, ſeem to have omitted, it would be but too natural to conclude, as they do, that the Deity adminiſters the Government of the world; without attention to the happineſs of his reaſonable creatures, or, that the Good muſt neceſſarily be happy, and the Wicked miſerable in their preſent condition.

183 Here the Poet takes occaſion to apoſtrophize on the ſtrange Blindneſs of Man's underſtanding, which, in the inſtance of the Stoics, after they had reached the very confines of the moſt important Truths, has prevented them from proceeding but a few ſteps farther to the natural and juſt Concluſion that ſeemed to lie before them. Is it not ſurpriſing, that, whilſt the diſciples of Zeno conſider Juſtice as one of the Attributes of God, they ſhould not ſee, how natural, indeed how neceſſary it was, to infer from it his Will in the appointment of a future Retribution for the different actions of Men, and conſequently their im-

immortal exiſtence? Our Author appears, but too juſtly, to aſcribe the doubts which they entertained on this ſubject to their blind Self-ſufficiency, and haughty dependence on themſelves. From this, and perhaps from other cauſes united with it; but from any thing rather than fairly concluſive reaſoning, it aroſe, that both the Perſian Magi and the Sophiſts of Greece, of the ſtoic and ſome other ſects, aſſumed an air of triumph in their philoſophical reſearches, whilſt, in fact they had ſtopped ſhort of the goal, that is of the great truth of the Immortality of the Soul; to which they ſeemed ſucceſsfully tending, and nearly arrived at in their progreſs. Ver.

Our Author having thus far expoſed the falſe reaſonings, which ſome of the ancient ſects have fallen into, relative to the important ſubject of his Poem, now beſpeaks the attention of the reader in behalf of his own argument. 189

The Exiſtence of God having been ſo rarely diſputed, and any diſpute about it having probably ariſen either from ignorance, affectation of ſingularity, or the fear of having forfeited his approbation, the Poet aſſumes it as a truth generally acknowledged among mankind; and on the

Ver. ſtrength of univerſal conſent makes it the corner ſtone of his argument. The train of reaſoning, neceſſary to demonſtrate, that wiſdom and juſtice are among the Attributes of Deity, being ſo obvious and eaſy to thinking men, on the moſt ſuperficial obſervation of that beautiful order and wiſe arragement diſplayed in the phyſical and moral ſyſtem of the world, thoſe Attributes are here almoſt taken for granted without farther Conſideration; and the philoſophical Maxim of Pope, in the Eſſay on Man, that "whatever is, is right," is immediately inferred from them. If Juſtice then and univerſal Rectitude obtain in the Diſpenſations of the Deity, it may ſafely be concluded, that the good ſhall not always ſuffer, nor the wicked triumph at their expence, in the perpetual enjoyment of Proſperity and Happineſs. Yet this muſt happen in a greater or leſs degree, if every thing terminate with this world, and Man be not deſtined to a future exiſtence.

198 The Author anticipating ſome doubts, which may ariſe reſpecting the truth of Pope's celebrated Maxim, juſt cited, intimates, that they only can receive it on ſolid conviction, who underſtand it as applied to the whole ſyſtem of the divine Economy; and that it muſt needs appear deficient

cient in truth to thoſe, who do not take a future ſtate of Man into the Plan of God's Providence. The good and wiſe, he aſſerts, have always concurred in this conprehenſive Idea of it; whilſt none but ſuperficial Thinkers, regardleſs of that Infinity of parts, cloſely linked together and riſing in continual gradation from the loweſt to moſt ſublime, and which conſtitute an Idea of the Univerſe, have circumſcribed the whole of Man's exiſtence and concerns within the narrow limits of this ſublunary world. Ver.

That all is to end here, and no account or retribution of human actions to take place in a future ſtate, is the melancholy conſolation and ſole refuge of the wicked, who probably firſt ſuggeſted, as they alone are intereſted in propagating, the degrading ſyſtem of the Mortality of the Soul. 208

An Objector, however, of the Epicurean ſchool comes forward with a principle, by which he indirectly oppoſes the Doctrine of a future Retribution. He pretends that God's eternal Decrees, and the whole order of his providence founded upon them, being abſolutely unchangeable and ſubject to no diſturbance, it muſt be inconſiſtent with his Nature and Perfection to regard the Actions 211

Ver. of Men; and that, whether they be good or bad, it cannot but be mattter of indifference to him. It is not, ſays he, for the frail and feeble Race of preſumptuous Man to entertain Hopes, that he can poſſibly alter the Laws of God, or that any thing ſhall reſcind them on the behalf of a creature, ſo inconſiderable in the great ſyſtem of the Univerſe: "Nature unaltered keeps her even Courſe."

217 What limited and narrow ſcheme of Decrees, demands the Poet, is this, which thou haſt deviſed for the Almighty Governor of the world? Recollect, that, within our own contracted Sphere of Obſervation, we manifeſtly diſcern a variety of Laws and a difference of Orders in the different parts of this lower Creation. Man is ſubject to one Law: The Brutes to another: The Laws of matter are diſtinct from thoſe of the two former. To apply this Obſervation more particularly to the three caſes ſpecified—Gravity is called the Great Law of the material world. This attractive principle it is, which univerſally effects matter, whether at reſt or in motion, and is the grand ſecondary Cauſe of the Revolutions of the heavenly Bodies.

With

With regard to Animals, not conſidered as rational, whether Birds, Beaſts, Inſects, or Reptiles; each keeps invariably its own ſphere and habits of life under the great Law of Inſtinct: A kind of paſſive and involuntary reaſon meaſured out to each Claſs or Species in ſuch portions, as, under the caſual improvement of Experience, ſerves the various ends of their Being. Some of the more viſible effects of Inſtinct are poetically ſpecified. Ver. 224

Our Author next developes the more general Laws, or Principles, meant to regulate the conduct of Man, and to render it conformable to the purpoſes of his Exiſtence. His ſphere of Life and Action is of infinitely wider ſcope than that of the Brute-animals beneath him. A ſenſe of moral, as well as of phyſical Good and Evil, (whereas the Brutes apparently poſſeſs nothing beyond an inſtinctive ſenſe of either) places him above their order with great diſtinction. His rational and thinking powers enable him to obſerve and contemplate all objects around him, and to obtain an extenſive knowledge of them. From the obſervation of thoſe nearer to him, he proceeds to that of others more diſtant, and at length carries his thoughts to the great ſyſtem of the world. 238

From

Ver. From the wonderful combination of parts, the order, regularity, beauty and grandeur, with which they are all found to conſpire to the formation of one ſtupendous Whole, he is firſt led to deduce an all-intelligent Creator, and ſupreme Governor of the Univerſe. As the ſovereign Lord and Father of all things, on whom every thing depends for its Exiſtence and Preſervation, Man ſoon recognizes, in the Deity, a fit object of his humble adoration and prayer: Hence ariſe his primary Ideas of natural Religion. As he cannot long contemplate the various phænomena of the Univerſe without emotions of wonder on account of that beauty, fitneſs and order, which they continually diſplay, and of thoſe effects of Benevolence equally conſpicuous in them, his Mind conceives certain abſtract Ideas of the Good and the Fair; for the origin of which he recurs to the Divine Being, in whom he traces the moral Attributes each in their higheſt conceivable perfectio n. He dwlls on the contemplation of them with delight and Enthuſiaſm, till he conceives a deſire of transferring ſomething of them, by imitation of, into his own Character. Hence our Author, in the ſpirit of the Platonic Philoſophy, ſuppoſes the heart of Man naturally to glow with an ardent love of Virtue, and regards that expanſive Benvolence which

which diſpoſes him to feel for the miſeries of his Fellow-Creatures, and to promote their welfare, as an affection continually enlarging itſelf from the beginnings of tenderneſs to our neareſt relatives till it includes a neighbourhood, branching out from the nearer, to its more diſtant ramifications: From thence it expands itſelf to a love of our country; a pure and diſintereſted affection, ſtill widening to a larger circle which embraces the whole human ſpecies, and, in ſome ſort, all the living creation upon the face of the Earth. The movements of the heart, ſays our Poet, in a truly benevolent and virtuous Man, reſemble thoſe of a Planet which revolves not ſolely round its own axis; but, taking the ſweep of a vaſt Orbit, embraces, within its revolution, an infinity of other objects. This benevolence and generoſity of ſpirit, of which, more or leſs, every reaſonable Being, till corrupted, apparently partakes, when they increaſe in extent and energy as above repreſented, are juſtly conſidered by the Poet as the faireſt characters of our Nature; as thoſe which perhaps exalt it to ſome diſtant reſemblance of the Divinity. Ver.

But the great code of the moral Law, to which Man is univerſally ſubject, is beſt diſcovered, except 254

Ver. cept where Revelation has offered its aid, in the conſideration of human Nature itſelf; and hence we may anticipate our Author's ſtrongeſt moral Argument for the Immortality of the Soul. But his reaſoning will introduce it, as we proceed.

The naked and helpleſs condition, in which Man comes into the World from the hands of his Creator, demonſtrates the abſolute neceſſity, under which he is originally placed, of obtaining the ſupport and aſſiſtance of his Fellow-Creatures: He could not poſſibly ſubſiſt without them. The Child in his progreſs toward manhood, and ſtill infinitely more when arrived at that ſtate, perceives the neceſſity, in other words, the natural duty of rendering to others the help, he had once received, and which he ſtill, in various ways, finds indiſpenſably needful to his comfort and well-being, if not to his very ſubſiſtence. Thoſe Individuals, who are ſo ſituated among the different orders of their ſpecies, as to contribute little to the aſſiſtance of others by the ſtrength or activity of the body, may ſerve mankind not leſs uſefully with wiſe counſel and advice, derived from ſuperior knowledge, a more enlarged experience and better education. Thus from the common neceſſity of mutual aid and

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ſervice ariſe mutual obligations and duties. Man has only to compare himſelf with every living Creature around him in order to perceive, that he is, leaſt of them all, provided by Nature with the means of defending or of preſerving himſelf. Ver.

But his mortification is ſoon relieved, when he obſerves that power, which is derived from the combination of individual ſtrength and talents; where, conſiderable numbers are collected into civil communities; in the benefit of which each ſingle member cannot but partake. That force of attraction by which bodies of Men, greater or leſs, are naturally carried to the point of union, which leagues them together in ſociety, invariably actuates the heart of Man as a general and primary law impreſſed upon it by the Creator. 262

But the principle of ſelf-preſervation and that of ſelf-love, natural laws, meant equally to operate on the heart of Man, are found, when attended to beyond their due meaſure, to interfere with the general good of ſociety, and more particularly with that of our nearer neighbourhood; and hence ariſe numberleſs moral Evils, which affect the happineſs of Mankind, and leſſen, or deſtroy the Virtue and Worth of Individuals as free mo- 270

Ver. ral Agents, ever placed betwixt Good and Evil, to chuſe which of the two they pleaſe. Public and private welfare are alike diſturbed by their preference of Evil, and Miſery is introduced in every ſhape, and into every quarter of the World. Moral Evils once occaſioned, whether by the violence of our Paſſions, by wilful ignorance or by inadvertence, often become habitual and grow into inveterate cuſtom with individuals, and even ſometimes with communities; So that the Poet exclaims with too much reaſon ——

"How ſmall a portion of our race is bleſt!"

274 So far as the choice of Evil ariſes from the predominance of our paſſions, from voluntary ignorance, or want of due attention; ſo far Men, as free Agents, are undoubtedly accountable. But ſome part of human Miſery has its origin in phyſical Evil or Imperfection, both which involuntarily affect the moral ſtate of our ſpecies. From this conſideration, although no blame attaches to Man's will, the ſum of his Miſery is however increaſed; and there is no region of the Earth, in which, from local circumſtances or other cauſes, of a nature purely phyſical, we ſhall not find ſome portion of Mankind, little raiſed above the condition of Savages and overwhelmed with Darkneſs, or Error, Penury, or Sloth;

Sloth; and theſe imputable only to their ſituation, or to reaſons not in their power to conquer, or to oppoſe. Ver.

But that, which is more humiliating to a general obſerver of Mankind, is, that even thoſe quarters of the Globe, which ſeem to have been more favoured by Heaven than the reſt, in the earlier participation of the revealed will of God; thoſe to whoſe moral conduct has been offered the guidance of the beſt and faireſt light, and that ſet up moſt conſpicuouſly to view, and its influence made in ſome degree habitual by public eſtabliſhments, have nevertheleſs been found to reject theſe diſtinguiſhed advantages; at leaſt ſo far as to prefer the corrupt Traditions, Doctrines and Gloſſes of Men to the pure word of God himſelf; from whence they are pretendedly derived. Hence it has happened, that inſtead of adhering ſimply and rationally to the original ſource of the waters of Life, men have engaged in the bittereſt and moſt deſtructive quarrels about the preference to be given to this or that, among a thouſand ſpurious and empoiſened ſtreams —— 281

——— What impious deeds
Hath fair Religion's borrow'd ſemblance wraught!

Ver. 292 It is partly a conſequence of this ſtrange perverſeneſs, that, notwithſtanding the ſalutary means and encouragements held out by the poſitive Revelation of God's will for the reformation of Mankind in aid of natural Religion, ſuch are the licentious triumphs, ſuch the frequency of Vice, that ſtill ſhe ſeems to ſet the powers of Heaven at defiance; and thence weak and ſhort-ſighted Men, giving way to deſpair, or to ſcepticiſm, fall into the errors of different ſects among the antient Sophiſts and demand with ſome;—whether all this diſorder eſcapes the knowledge of the Almighty? with others;—whether his power is ſufficient to remove it? or, with a third party; whether, wrapt up in the enjoyment of his own Happineſs and and in the perfections of his Nature, it be poſſible, that he ſhould concern himſelf with the Miſeries and Infirmities of our mortal ſtate? But the Poet, under conviction, that infinite Juſtice, Power, Wiſdom and Knowledge are demonſtrable attributes of the ſupreme Being, declares that nothing can elude his Omniſcience, and that Juſtice, however ſlow, will at length overtake the wicked with vengeance, and that his Wiſdom and Power will be ſeen in recompencing the ſufferings of the virtuous and the good.

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The Poet inſinuates, that even without abſtract proofs of God's Juſtice, he ſhould never have doubted, that the Interference and Regards of the Deity were extended to this ſublunary world, and particularly to the affairs of Mankind; for leſt a ſenſe of his avenging Juſtice, which ſeems almoſt natural to every Man's Mind, or at leaſt within the ſlighteſt power of reaſoning to arrive at, ſhould be obliterated or forgotten, ſuch ſignal manifeſtations of God's wrath againſt the wickedneſs of nations are ſometimes executed, as cannot fail to give them deep impreſſions of his Omniſcience and his Juſtice. The Author intimates however, that theſe divine Judgments are to be cautiouſly conſidered, and not applied by ourſelves to particular Individuals, as ſuperſtition, or private revenge may happen to dictate. Ver. 302

But without theſe external Indications of God's Juſtice, Man could have been at no loſs to infer his averſion to Evil from the continual information and warnings of his own Conſcience; that diſcerning and impartial Monitor, placed in every Man's boſom by the hand of the Creator. From the approbation of Conſcience the righteous may be ſaid to feel ſome degree of recompence for their Virtues even in this life; as the wicked, on 312

the

Ver. the other hand, to experience no inconſiderable puniſhment of their Vices from the ſame Cauſe. This ſentiment is very poetically amplified and the force of Conſcience in profligate and impious Men is deſcribed with great warmth of colouring from v. 335. to 341; where the Author by a ſhort reflexion, converts the preceding deſcription, and particularly that part of it which relates to the death-bed Horrors of the wicked at the end of it, into a ſtrong preſumptive argument for the Immortality of the Soul.

342 For if ſuch be the miſerable lives of bad Men and ſuch their dreadful compunctions of Conſcience toward their expected Cloſe, that nothing ſtill is left untried to prolong them, the Suppoſition with which they had often flattered themſelves, that Exiſtence, with all its pains and ſorrows, is then to be extinguiſhed, and nothing to ſurvive the Grave, muſt have been falſely made, and now entirely fails: They can no longer maintain it. Can any thing elſe account for that intolerable diſturbance of Mind on the approaching death of a wicked Man?

Ah! the preſaging thought of future doom,
Howe'er we wiſh its warning to contemn,
The Mind ſtill importunes, nor quits its Hold.

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The Poet here omits a very obvious Idea, which however deſerves to be noticed on account of the force which it lends to this preſumptive argument, viz: that theſe tormenting preſages can never have been given in vain, nor for any other reaſon ſo probable, as that they are meant, to intimate to the ſurviving witneſſes of ſuch ſcenes the Exiſtence of Man in a future ſtate. Ver.

The ſame kind of argument ariſes from the conſideration of the happy effects of Conſcience in good Men, which the Author beautifully deſcribes in contraſt to the forgoing Paſſage, as far as v. 375. But as it is, in this caſe as in the former, from the reſult of the deſcription, and not from particulars of it, that the ſtrength of the argument is derived, it is not neceſſary to draw them out at length in the Commentary; by which the poetic Spirit would be liable to evaporate without gaining any advantage to the reaſoning.—In making however any inferences from the laſt ſcenes of an innocent Life, as well as from thoſe of a wicked one, the Commentator is aware of an Objection, which, though not * noticed by the Author

* Of this Paſſage it may be ſaid, as perhaps of another, or two, occurring in the Commentary, that they ſhould have been made the ſubject of Notes. The Commentator, however, thought the objection

Ver. Author, it may be proper briefly to advert to. Were we to admit what ſome have haſtily inſiſted on, that Virtue is its own complete Reward, the Happineſs reſulting from good actions, or from the conſciouſneſs of having abſtained from bad ones, might rather be thought a preſumption againſt a future ſtate than for one. A good Man might thus be conceived to have accompliſhed the beſt, and only deſirable purpoſe of his Being, inaſmuch as his Life had been happy. What claim or title, it would be aſked, could be prentended to future reward? But this objection to our argument will be found to have gone on falſe grounds; and it looſes all its force, when we reflect, that, by the Happineſs of a good Man, is meant nothing more than that pleaſing and triumphant ſenſe of his own Worth, which he experiences on the completion, or atchievement of ſome virtuous deed; that pleaſure, which he partakes with another on whom he may have conferred ſome good; or that ſerene and quiet ſenſation (a negation of Miſery rather than poſitive Hap-

tion here mentioned ſo likely to ariſe in the Minds of moſt Readers, that, as he flattered himſelf, he ſhould be able to remove it, he conceived it beſt to take the earlieſt occaſion. With reſpect to the other Paſſages alluded to, as his reaſons for placing them in the Commentary can hardly be miſtaken, he leaves them to the Candour of the Critics.

Happineſs) which he perceives from a Retroſpect on the general Innocence of his Life. For when we conſider the ſhort duration of all theſe ſenſations, and, on the other hand, the difficulties, exertions and painful perſeverances, the mortifying conteſts with wickedneſs and vice, and a thouſand other diſagreeable circumſtances, to which a good Man muſt ſubmit, in order to the entire accompliſhment of great and virtuous actions, it will be found, that his real and poſitive Happineſs in this life is very inconſiderable, and that the beſt part of it conſiſts in his expectation of a better. As it muſt be granted too, that bad Men enjoy ſome pleaſure and delight in the gratifications of ſenſe, the ſum of a good Man's Happineſs in this preſent Life, though often undoubtedly greater than that of a bad one, is much leſs on the whole than, may, in a haſty eſtimate, be imagined: So that he ſhould ſeem to have reaſonable wiſhes and expectations of much more than ever he finds upon earth; and hence it is, that, approaching his end, he experiences gladneſs and exultation of Spirit; the fair preſage, or foretaſte of immortal Happineſs. This ſentiment cloſes our Poet's deſcription at V. 375. In the ſubſequent lines the advantages of a uſeful, virtuous and innocent life are beautifully exemplified in an

Ver. 376

Ver. animated portrait of the venerable Hough; formerly Biſhop of Worceſter.

388 From the foregoing deſcriptions of good and bad Men, and of the pleaſant or diſagreable impreſſions and effects made ſeverally on the Minds of each by the difference of their conduct, we clearly diſtinguiſh the exiſtence and force of that Conſcience, which approves, or condems every Man's own actions to himſelf, and fills his heart with hopes of Reward, or fears of Puniſhment, according to the nature of his behaviour; in other words, according to the impartial Judgment pronounced upon him by himſelf. But as theſe Rewards, or Puniſhments, are ſeldom experienced in any due proportion to Merit or Demerit in this Life; on what ground, it is again demanded, do the hopes of the former, or the fears of the latter, affect them in ſo lively and ſenſible a manner? This queſtion cannot, perhaps, be ſatisfactorily anſwered on any other ſuppoſition, than that already made, of a future Retribution; to confirm the belief of which various circumſtances, the Poet indeed ſays, *all things* conſpire: Among which the following conſiderations deſerve particular Attention. Whether Proſperity or Adverſity be the portion of good and wiſe Men in this life, they regard their lot with

with a certain Indifference; with ſo much at leaſt, as neither to be fondly attached to it on one hand, nor, on the other, to hold it in contempt. How ſevere or adverſe ſoever be their deſtiny, they want not conſolation: Or if they glide ſmoothly down the gentler current of Life, ſtill ever aware, that they are liable to ſtorms, they depend not, with too much aſſurance, on the proſperous gale which happens at preſent to waft them ſo agreeably along. Ver.

If from this repreſentation any apprehenſion ſhould ariſe, leſt their want of ſtronger attachment to the world might render them indolent and indiſpoſed to the greater and more public duties, and willing to ſhun the arduous labours and perils, with which they are frequently attended: No; ſays the Poet, we may diſmiſs all doubts of this nature; for the chief and ultimate object of a good Man's wiſhes lying beyond the limits of this narrow Exiſtence, and being of the firſt importance to his Happineſs and moſt laſting Intereſts; he knows, that by the accompliſhment of all his duties to the beſt of his power, he uſes the beſt means to ſecure theſe objects; and feeling himſelf thus armed againſt human Events, preſſes forward, upright and undaunted, through all obſtacles in the performance of his various Obligations. 402

Ver. 418 The Platoniſts and their followers, who refine with too much fancy on the beauty of Virtue, would now derogate from the merit of the Poet's virtuous Man under the notion of his being ſtimulated to great and noble actions, ſolely by the mercenary hopes of future recompence; little moved by a diſintereſted love of virtue and rectitude of conduct. A poſthumous reward, even though ſought in Heaven, is eſteemed by this affected tribe of Philoſophers, a mean and unworthy motive of good conduct. Him only they would denominate truly good, who is led to Virtue ſolely by a ſenſe of the Decent and the Fair, of moral Fitneſs and Harmony; preferring what is good before all things elſe, and that only for its own intrinſic Value.

420 If this doctrine were allowed, yet when we conſider the true and natural character of Man, he, who poſſeſſes ſtrength and reſolution not unfrequently to forego preſent advantages for the ſake of thoſe, which are remote; and ſtill oftener to endure mortifications, difficulties and labours, rather than ſwerve from the path of duty; ſurely merits commendation: He, who not contented with the partially Good and Fair, as our beſt Portion in this ſublunary ſtate, is nobly carried forward

forward on his way to Supreme perfection, (actually attainable, notwithſtanding the pretenſion of the Platoniſts, only in a nearer approach to Deity, than our preſent condition allows,) deſerves, ſurely, no inconſiderable Praiſe. Ver.

Yet, after all, the Nature of thoſe intereſts and rewards, which engage the purſuit of theſe mercenaries, if they can be truly ſo called, ought, in all reaſon, to be conſidered. There is, at worſt, nothing in them of meanneſs or of vanity. Every thing of this ſtamp they heartily diſdain: The ſordid gains of uſury or extortion; the trivial flaſh and glitter of a parti-coloured retinue; the poor praiſe of flatterers and falſe worldly glory; unſubſtantial glare or ſounding titles, which captivate the vulgar in the road of ambition, hold out no allurement to theſe generous ſpirits: No; they purſue real honor: they aſpire to all that is lovely and graceful in human Nature: they keep their deſtined courſe with unſhaken firmneſs, and, notwithſtanding all thoſe obſtacles to Right, or temptations to Wrong, which form the warfare of Virtue, they ceaſe not to add one degree of moral perfection to another, till they become fitted for the glory and felicity of immortal Beings in Heaven. 426

Though

Ver. 439 Though ſome few among Mankind, perſons of a more exalted ſpirit, are vigorouſly actuated by ſuch nobler motives; motives affectedly called mercenary by the too refined moraliſts before alluded to; the maſs of our ſpecies are toſt about betwixt Good and Evil, the ſport of every guſt, excited, whether it be by paſſion, by chance or better Cauſes, on the fluctuating ocean of Life. Each purſues his own wayward fancy in that, which, without much deliberatron, he conceives to be the path of Happineſs: Some vain object is principally propoſed, which either eludes the graſp of him, who continually follows it; or, if attained, it is ſoon caſt aſide, like an infant's play-thing, with indifference or diſguſt; but the moſt humiliating circumſtance is, that this puerility of conduct is ſeldom corrected by old age itſelf. Now whence ariſes this miſerable trifling, but from the habit of confining our views wholly to this Life?

449 They, who extend the deſtination of Man beyond the grave, and order the conduct of their lives, ſo as to merit future recompence, have always treaſure in reſerve, on the promiſe of, at leaſt, the moſt rational of our hopes. The moſt natural and conſtantly prevalent deſire of Man is that

that of pure and uninterrupted Happineſs; but in this ſtate of his probationary ſojourning, ſo much was not meant for his enjoyment: He was purpoſely placed in this world, to act ſuch a part as might entitle him to a better. Ver.

For what is the beſt of human Life, but a mixture of Good and Evil, or, as our Poet expreſſes the idea, a State; —— 460

——— Where deadly Aconite
Poiſons the Roſe's aromatic Breath?——

Confuſion, uncertainty, and diſappointment preſent themſelves in its faireſt ſcenes.

From this view of our ſublunary condition the Author raiſes the ſtrongeſt of all moral arguments for the Immortality of the Soul. If Man may preſume to ſearch the counſels of the Almighty, it ſhould ſeem highly probable, that the ſyſtem of this World hath been arranged with this mixture of Good and Evil, to render it the proper ſtate of a probationary Being, whoſe Merits and Happineſs were hereafter to be determined according to the choice he had made of the one, or the other: Both were therefore neceſſary to furniſh matter for the trial. And the circumſtances, which of all others, unrevealed, ſhould ſeem 461

calculated

Ver. calculated to diſpoſe the belief and wiſhes of Mankind to a future Exiſtence, and to encourage their beſt efforts to merit a happy one, are ſurely that rude obſtacles and diſappointments, which the Evil of the world is continually oppoſing to the gratification of the ſtrongeſt and moſt natural of all their deſires; the Thirſt after Happineſs. This Craving is ſeen to be perfectly inſatiable, and yet there is nothing below competent to its ſatisfaction. Could an all-wiſe, omnipotent and juſt Being, be poſſibly imagined to have implanted this inextinguiſhable affection; but with the ultimate view of ſatisfying it?

469 The Author having at the preceding verſe, concluded his beautiful inveſtigation of the Immortality of the Soul on the ground of metaphyſical, natural and moral Argument, winds up the Poem with a conciſe recapitulation of the principal points, on which his reaſoning throughout the whole has proceeded. In the four next lines this review is poetically propoſed under the idea of recollecting a paſt voyage; a philoſophical peregrination, which had carried him through many dangers and uncertainties; or, at leaſt, what had appeared ſuch previouſly to experience and examination in the extenſive range of his excurſion.

excurſion.—From the principle of Thinking and Willing, of which Matter has been proved incapable, the Immortality of the Soul ſeems to be inferred, as it were by a prerogative of her nature. But, ſays an Objector, immortal Being, though it may appear her natural prerogative, is not a neceſſary one; for the Fiat of the Almighty can extinguiſh her Being at any inſtant he pleaſes. This truth, anſwers the Poet, is conceded; but the Voice of nature univerſally proclaims ſuch a decree to be contrary to his Will. For on no other ſuppoſition can be explained, with any appearance of probability, that inſatiable curioſity and thirſt of knowledge, which carry the Mind continually out beyond the narrow ſphere of this viſible world into the boundleſs regions of being, ſpace and time, &c. that unconquerable deſire, which never quits it, of living for ever, and its abſolute abhorence of falling into naught; to which muſt be added its ardent and inextinguiſhable Craving after the enjoyment of conſummate beauty and intellectual perfection, dimly contemplated in this ſtate, at ſuch immenſe diſtance from the Deity, their true and inexhauſtible ſource. How are all theſe propenſities and aſpirations to be otherwiſe explained? or, in the words of Addiſon's Cato— Ver. 473

Ver. Elſe whence this pleaſing hope, this fond deſire,
This longing after Immortality?——

486 The Author proceeds, as ſlightly, to glance at the great moral argument, which has been ſo extenſively treated in this Book.—Since, according to our ideas of Rectitude and Juſtice, they, whoſe conduct has been intentionally and actually good, ought to experience that Happineſs themſelves, which their Virtues cannot fail in ſome degree to procure for others; and they whoſe conduct has been intentionally and actually evil, ſhould themſelves feel that Miſery, which their wickedneſs occaſions to their Fellow-creatures; whilſt ſtill in this world we obſerve the Reverſe continually to happen, and that the good are very frequently miſerable, and the wicked happy; what is the fair concluſion of reaſon, but that, in a future ſtate of Exiſtence, all this Confuſion and Diſorder muſt be rectified; the good rewarded, and the bad puniſhed?

496 By this final retribution the wiſdom and juſtice of God will ſtand clearly vindicated in the ſight of the Univerſe. All myſterious and gloomy doubts ſhall be diſpelled: Truth ſhall appear in her native luſtre, and order reign for ever.

If

If the Sceptic can ſtill heſitate to embrace this concluſion, he muſt either deny the exiſtence of a ſupreme Governor of the world, or diſown his moral attributes of infinite wiſdom and juſtice.— The exiſtence of God has been ſhewn to ſtand on the irrefragable argument of univerſal conſent.— From the rejection of his moral Attributes, juſt named, this abſurdity will follow, that, whilſt in the lower part of the ſyſtem, in the order of the Animal and Vegetable world, and in the conſtruction of mere Matter under ſuch a variety of forms and to ſuch infinite ſervices, every thing is moſt wiſely arranged and fitted to its end; or, in other words, we behold ſuch indubitable marks of wiſdom and power; the moral and higher portion of the ſyſtem is left in an unfiniſhed ſtate, diſcovering great diſorder and imperfection. Ver.

No; a time will arrive, and nature predicts it in all her works, when the Almighty, though the manner of operation be hidden in the depth of the divine Counſels, ſhall juſtify the wondrous plan of his Providence, in the government of the world; when he ſhall ſeparate the righteous from the wicked, and diſtribute, to each Individual, a recompence according to the general tenor of his conduct, during his ſtate of probation. 504

ANNOTATIONS

ON THE

FIRST BOOK.

ANNOTATIONS

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Verſe 5. *Prompt to inveſtigate the cauſes dark,*

ALTHOUGH our philoſophical Poet aſcribes to Man an ardent deſire of knowing the cauſes of things, and ſomething, approaching to paſſion, in his inveſtigation of them; and another of the order exclaims:

Felix! qui rerum potuit cognoſcere cauſas,—

Yet it is worth while to attend to the following paſſage on this ſubject from the admirable Wollaſton. "It is impoſſible for us to come at the true principles of things, or to ſee into the œconomy of the fineſt part of Nature and workings of the firſt ſprings. The Cauſes that appear to us are but the Effects of other Cauſes: The veſſels, of which

which the Bodies of Plants and Animals conſiſt, are made up of other ſmaller veſſels: The ſubtileſt parts of matter, which we have any notion of (as Animal Spirits or particles of Light) have their parts, and may, for ought we know, be compound Bodies; and as to the ſubſtances themſelves of all theſe things and their internal conſtitution, they are hid from our eyes. Our Philoſophy dwells on the Surface of Nature." Relig. Nat. Sect. V. p. 81. Edit. quarto, 1726.

May it not be ſuppoſed poſſible, that the Addition of new Senſes of a texture ſo exquiſite as to render thoſe hidden combinations, which perhaps conſtitute the remoter Cauſes of things, perceptible to our minds, may be made inſtrumental to no inconſiderable portion of our Happineſs in a future ſtate; inaſmuch as the gratification of our Thirſt of Knowledge is one of our beſt and higheſt Pleaſures here, and the works of God, as diſtinguiſhed from thoſe of Man, the nobleſt Object of our Reſearches?

V. 6. *And mutual harmony of things* ——

The mutual harmony (or relation of things) determines their nature, as far as Men in this State are concerned with it. Theſe relations become the guide of our phyſical and moral actions. Relations, like cauſes, not immediate, are diſcoverable by ſuch as are intermediate. Wollaſton, in different places, expreſſes himſelf much to this effect.

V. 14. *What*

V. 14. *What thus avails, &c.* ——
What, 'midſt the planetary worlds to ſoar,
If all our mental glory end in Death?

Ecquid enim prodeſt, ——
—————— mente vagari
Solem atque aſtra ſuper, morituro?

A learned Friend ſuggeſted to the Tranſlator, that this paſſage is a cloſe Imitation of the following beautiful lines from Horace. Lib. I. Ode 28.—It may amuſe the claſſical Reader to compare the two.

—————— nec quicquam tibi prodeſt
Aërias tentaſſe domos, animoque rotundum
Percurriſſe polum, morituro. ——

Ah! what avails it, that thy piercing Soul
Could heav'n's majeſtic firmament aſcend,
Graſp the bright wonders of the ſtarry Pole,
Since here at laſt thy cares, thy labours, end?
BOSCAWEN.

V. 19. —— *with Phyllis 'neath the ſhade; &c.*

This, and the two following Lines, are imitated from Milton:

Were it not better then, as others uſe,
To ſport with Amaryllis in the ſhade?
LYCID.

V. 58. *To kindred Heav'n; its antient habitant.*

The Pythagoreans and their Followers would not allow, that human ſouls are generated out of matter. They inſiſted on their Creation by the immediate hand of God, and that, having pre-exiſted, they were inſinuated and introduced into bodies by generation. With reſpect to their Pre-exiſtence; they thought it incongruous, that Souls, which are in the order of Nature ſenior to bodies, ſhould in order of Time be junior to them; and alſo not reaſonable, that divine Creation, being as it were proſtituted, ſhould perpetually attend and wait upon natural Generations. See this more at large in Cudworth's True Intell. Syſtem, Folio, 1678, p. 744, 5.

Cicero—de Conſolatione, ſays: Quod ſi auctoritas quærenda ſit, quem graviorem nominare auctorem poſſum, quam eum, quem Apollo ipſe ſapientiſſimum omnium pronuntiavit? Cujus teſtimonium tale fuit, ut divinos eſſe hominum animos, et eos, corpore ſolutos, in cœlum remigrare, unde priùs veniſſent, in omni ſermone aſſeveraret; in quo, cum Philoſophis illis conſenſit, quos quondam Italicos nominavit antiquitas, maximèque nobiles judicavit.—Tom. IV. p. 627. Edit. Genev. 1660.——"But if we muſt have recourſe to authority, whom can I name of more weight than him, whom Apollo himſelf pronounced the wiſeſt of men? His teſtimony imported, that the Souls of Men are divine, and that, being ſeparated from the body, they returned to Heaven, from whence they originally came. This he aſſerted in all his diſcourſes, and in this opinion

nion agreed with all thoſe Philoſophers, whom Antiquity has reckoned of the Italic Sect, and conſidered as particularly diſtinguiſhed."

Ramſay, in his "Diſcours ſur la Mythologie," underſtands, Cicero, at the beginning of the above paſſage, to be ſpeaking of Thales. The latter part, however, ſhews the opinion of Socrates, to whom the reference undoubtedly belongs, to have perfectly coincided with that of the Mileſian Philoſopher, according to Ramſay's notion of his Sentiments.

Although the learned Reader, ſhould not, with Sigonius, and other reſpectable Writers, be diſpoſed to admit the Diſcourſe "de Conſolatione" as a genuine work of Cicero; yet the paſſage, above cited, is ſo entirely conſonant with what he has from Plato and Ariſtotle aſſerted, in treatiſes undiſputed, that the opinion it conveys may fairly be allowed as a point, in the hiſtory of Philoſophy, partly eſtabliſhed on the authority of Cicero. The paſſage following, at leaſt, will leave no doubt of his Sentiments. See the concluſion of the firſt paragr. 25th Sect. Lib. I. de Divinatione. Edit. Olivet.——Cum animus Eudemi è corpore exceſſerit, tum domum revertiſſe videatur. "When the Soul of Eudemus departed from his Body, it ſeemed to have returned home." See alſo Sect. 21st de Senect: Eſt enim animus cœleſtis ex altiſſimo domicilio depreſſus, et quaſi demerſus in terram, locum divinæ naturæ æternitatique contrarium. "For the celeſtial Spirit is thruſt down from its ſublime habitation, and as it were ſwallowed up in the Earth; a

Situation contrary to its divine Nature and Eternity." ——Lælius, in the 4th Section of the dialogue de Amicitia, ſpeaking of many antient authorities for his opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, ſays: ——vel ejus, qui Apollinis Oraculo ſapientiſſimus eſt judicatus: qui non tùm hoc, tùm illud, ut in pleriſque, ſed idem dicebat ſemper, Animos hominum eſſe divinos, iiſque, cum è corpore exceſſiſſent, *Reditum* in cœlum patere. "Or of him, who was judged the wiſeſt Man by the oracle of Apollo: who did not, like many others, ſide now with one opinion and then with another; but conſtantly affirmed, that the Souls of Men were divine, and that, at their departure from the Body, the way lay open for their *Return* to Heaven."

V. 66. ——— *whence elſe*
Trace we her Stores of Reminiſcence? &c.

Cicero, accounting for human knowledge according to the opinions of Plato and his Maſter, Socrates, ſays: Non potuit animus hæc, in corpore incluſus, cognoſcere; cognita attulit: ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio tollitur. Neque ea planè videt animus, cum repentè in tam inſolitum tamque perturbatum domicilium immigravit: Sed cum ſe conlegit atque recreavit, tum agnoſcit illa reminiſcendo. Ita nihil eſt aliud diſcere, niſi recordari. Tuſc. Diſp. Edit. Daviſian. Cantab. 1730. p. 58. "The Mind, whilſt ſhut up in the Body, could not diſcover theſe things; She brought them with her as already known: Whence our wonder at her extraordinary treaſure of Knowledge ceaſes. Nor does the Mind plainly diſcern her

her Stores on her firſt migration into ſo ſtrange and diſordered a tenement; but when ſhe hath collected and refreſhed herſelf, ſhe then diſcovers them by Reminiſcence."——Ex quo effici vult Socrates, ut diſcere nihil aliud ſit, niſi recordari—docet enim quemvis, qui omnium rerum rudis eſſe videatur, bene interroganti reſpondentem declarare, ſe non tum illa diſcere, ſed reminiſcendo recognoſcere.—p. 56. "From whence Socrates thinks it may be made out, that to learn is nothing elſe than to remember—for he teaches, that an appoſite anſwer, given by an illiterate and uninſtructed perſon to any one aſking him a queſtion, proves, that he does not then learn (illa) the matters of which he is ſpeaking; but that he recognizes them by an act of Reminiſcence."

Under the article of Socrates in the *New and General Biography*, Vol. XI. octavo, the Compiler, in his abridged repreſentation of that Philoſopher's Metaphyſics from Plato, Zenophon, and Plutarch, ſays, "that he taught the Soul to be pre-exiſtent to the Body, endued with Knowledge of eternal Ideas, which in her union with the body ſhe looſeth, as ſtupified, until awakened, by diſcourſe, from ſenſible objects; on which account all her Learning is only Reminiſcence; a recovery of her firſt knowledge—&c." But Plato ſhall ſpeak for himſelf:

Και μην, εφη ὁ Κεβης—Ω Σωκρατες, συ ειωθας θαμα λεγειν, ὁτι ἡ μαθησις ου αλλο τι ἡ αναμνησις τυγχανει ουσα, και κατα τουτο αναγκη που ἡμας εν προτερω τινι χρονῳ μεμαθηκεναι, ἁ νυν αναμιμνησκομεθα. τουτο δε αδυνατον, ει μη ην που ἡμων ἡ ψυχη,

ἡ ψυχη, πριν εν τωδε τω ανθρωπινω ειδει γενεσθαι. ὡσπερ και ταυτη αθανατον τι εοικεν ἡ ψυχη ειναι. Phædon. Edit. Ficini. p. 55. "O Socrates, ſaid Cebes, you uſed to ſay, that our knowledge is nothing elſe than Reminiſcence; and, according to this poſition, we muſt neceſſarily, have ſomewhere learnt, in a former Time, that which we now remember. But that would be impoſſible, unleſs our Soul had exiſted ſomewhere before it came into this mortal Body: So that it ſhould hence appear, that the Soul is immortal."

V. 75. *Inventive mind, Source of the various arts.*

This line, and the whole paſſage, are happily imitated from Tully.—Tuſc. Diſp. p. 61.—Quid? illa vis quæ tandem eſt, quæ inveſtigat occulta, quæ Inventio atque Excogitatio dicitur? Ec hac-ne tibi terrena mortalique natura et caduca concretus eſſe videtur, aut qui primus, quod ſummæ Sapientiæ Pythagoræ viſum eſt, omnibus impoſuit nomina? aut qui diſſupatos homines congregravit, et ad Societatem vitæ convocavit? aut qui ſonos vocis, qui infiniti videbantur, paucis literarum notis terminavit?—p. 63. —Mihi verò ne hæc quidem notiora et inluſtriora carere vi divina videntur; ut ego haud poetam grave plenumque carmen, ſine cœleſti aliquo mentis inſtinctu, putem fundere, aut eloquentiam, ſine majori vi quâdam, fluere, abundantem ſonantibus verbis uberibuſque ſententiis.—"What, laſtly, is that power which inveſtigates things hidden, and which is called Invention and Thought? Does that Faculty, which firſt gave names to all things, conſidered by Pythagoras

goras as a mark of ſuperior knowledge, ſeem to have been formed of our earthly, mortal and periſhing nature? or that, which collected mankind, in their wild State of diſperſion, and ſummoned them to ſocial Life? or, which confined the tones of the voice, infinite as they ſeem, to the articluation of a few Letters? —But theſe more known and diſtinguiſhed faculties appear not to diſplay leſs of a divine force: for I cannot conceive, the Poet to pour forth his ſolemn and full Stream of Song without a certain celeſtial Inſpiration; or the Orator's harangue, marked by copiouſneſs of Sound and richneſs of Sentiment, to flow unaided by ſome ſuperior Inſtinct."

The Reader will have obſerved, that in tranſlating the firſt of the above paſſages, in order to make the progreſs of it anſwer better to the beginning, I have ſubſtituted the *faculties* of Man for *Man* himſelf.

V. 106. *The ſtudious Sage by ſcience ſkill'd to trace*
Each Planet, as it rolls in orbit vaſt, &c.

If the Reader be not diſinclined to dwell on this noble theme, he may perhaps receive conſiderable gratification from an opportunity of obſerving the manner, in which it has been treated by two diſtinguiſhed Bards, and of comparing them with our philoſophic Poet.——

In ardent Contemplation's rapid car
From Earth, as from a barrier, I ſet out.
How ſwift I mount! Diminiſh'd Earth recedes:

I paſs

I paſs the Moon; and from her farther ſide
Pierce Heav'n's blue curtain, ſtrike into *Remote*;
Where, with his lifted tube, the ſubtile Sage
His artificial airy journey takes,
And to celeſtial lengthens human ſight.
I pauſe at every Planet on my road,
And aſk for HIM, who gives their orbs to roll,
Their foreheads fair to ſhine: From Saturn's ring,
In which of Earths an army might be loſt,
With the bold Comet take my bolder flight
Amid thoſe Sovereign glories of the Skies;
Of independent, native luſtre proud.
——————— What behold I now?
A wilderneſs of Wonders burning round;
Where larger Suns inhabit larger Spheres.
Pauſe then; and for a moment here reſpire;
If human thought can keep its Station here.
Where am I? where is Earth? nay, where art thou,
O! Sun?——On Nature's Alps I ſtand,
And ſee a thouſand firmaments beneath;
A thouſand Syſtems! ———

YOUNG's Night Thoughts;—from the *Conſolation.*

Some lines in the above animated flight, where Dr. Young ſeems loſt in apoſtrophes and far-fetched conceits, are omitted. Thoſe which I have exhibited here are characteriſtic of his beſt manner, and will be thought more proper therefore for a compariſon, meant only to give pleaſure. Dr. Akenſide will furniſh the reſt of our claſſic Entertainment, from his Pleaſures of Imagination.

——The

——— ———The high-born ſoul
Diſdains to reſt her heav'n-aſpiring wing
Beneath her native quarry. Tir'd of Earth
And this diurnal ſcene, ſhe ſprings aloft
Through fields of air; purſues the flying ſtorm;
Rides on the volley'd lightning through the Heav'ns,
Or, yok'd with whirl-winds and the Northern blaſt,
Sweeps the long tract of Day. Then high ſhe ſoars
The blue profound, and hov'ring o'er the ſun
Beholds him pouring the redundant ſtream
Of light; beholds his unrelenting ſway
Bend the reluctant planets, and abſolve
The ſtated Rounds of Time. Thence, far-effuſed,
She darts her ſwiftneſs up the long career
Of devious Comets; through the burning ſigns
Exulting circles the perennial Wheel
Of Nature, and looks back on all the Stars,
Whoſe blended light, as with a mighty Zone,
Inveſts the Orient. Now amaz'd ſhe views
Th' empyreal waſte, where happy Spirits hold,
Beyond this concave Heav'n, their calm abode;
And Fields of Radiance, whoſe unfading Light
Has travell'd the profound ſix thouſand Years,
Nor yet arrives in ſight of mortal Things.
E'en on the Barriers of the World untir'd,
She meditates th' eternal Depth below;
Till, half-recoiling, down the headlong Steep
She plunges; ſoon o'erwhelm'd and ſwallow'd up
In that Immenſe of Being.——

I know not, whether it be worth while to lengthen this Note by obſerving, that Akenſide by his *perennial Wheel* of Nature, cannot well be ſuppoſed to mean any thing elſe than the *perpetual* Revolution of the heavenly Bodies; and that the *empyreal Waſte*, ſeems to allude to one of the conſtituent parts of Ptolemy's exploded ſyſtem of the Univerſe: viz. the *Cœlum Empyreum*, or Heaven of Heavens, which has place in that ſyſtem.

V. 107. *Each Planet, as it rolls, in orbit vaſt,*
Its central Luminary round;——

Since the Spirit of literary reſearch has taken place, among our Countrymen in Aſia, an opinion gains ground, that the dawnings of the true ſolar ſyſtem, long ſuppoſed the diſcovery of Pythagoras, ought to be attributed to the Brahmins of India. "There is, ſays Mr. Maurice, ſpeaking of the Learning of this Tribe of Hindoos, every reaſon from the Doctrine of the ſeven ſuperior "Bobuns" or purifying Spheres, through which they ſuppoſed the tranſmigrating ſoul to paſs; and from the "Circular Dance" in which, according to the Hiſtorian Lucian, in his Treatiſe "de Saltatione," they worſhipped the Orb of the Sun, to believe they had, in the moſt early Periods, diſcovered, that the Earth in form was *Spherical*, and that the Planets *revolved round* the Sun. Beſides the knowledge of the true ſolar ſyſtem, which Pythagoras moſt probably learned in India, there is every reaſon to think, that they were acquainted with Spherical Trigonometry,

gonometry, and that ſomething very much like the Newtonian ſyſtem of Attraction and Gravitation was known among them. Indeed Sir William Jones ſeems to confirm this, when he informs us, that "the Works of Yavan Acharya are ſaid to include a ſyſtem of the Univerſe founded on the principle of *Attraction* and the *central* poſition of the ſun," which I think far more likely, Pythagoras learned of this Philoſopher in India, than this Brahmin of Pythagoras in Greece; for to have gone thither he muſt have renounced the ſelf-ſufficient character of that haughty Tribe, and have violated a leading precept of the Religion and Policy of Brahma. This very early knowledge of the great fundamental Principles of Aſtronomy ſeems to be inconteſtably proved by a paſſage, "directly affirming" in the third Diſcourſe of Sir W. Jones, that the names of the Planets and Zodiacal Stars, which the Arabs borrowed from the Greeks, are found in the older Indian Records." See Pref. to the Indian Antiquities, and Aſiatic Reſearches. Vol. I. p. 430.

V. 127. —— *and hence, with ſkill inventive, arts*
On arts to raiſe in beauteous order, learns.

Our Author, after having, from v. 123 to theſe lines, given a conciſe account of the principal faculties of the Mind; thoſe, for inſtance, by which ſhe compares and diſtinguiſhes her own Ideas, inveſtigates the Cauſes and diſcerns the Relations of things, and is thence enabled to proceed to the Invention of Arts and Sciences, and, at length, to their orderly Concatenation

tenation, or connexion one with another (if that be meant here) may ſeem to have had in view ſome arrangement or claſſification of them, under the Ariſtotelian Categories. Perhaps the Reader will not be diſpleaſed to ſee, how they are thus connected by the late Mr. Harris, in his philoſophical Arrangements, p. 460.—"In conplating theſe orderly Arrangements, ſays he, we may ſee whence the ſubordinate Sciences and Arts all ariſe: Hiſtory, natural and civil, out of *Subſtance*; Mathematics out of *Quantity*; Optics out of *Quantity*; Medicine out of the *Same*; Aſtronomy out of *Quantity* and *Motion*; Muſic and Mechanics out of the *Same*; Painting out of *Quality* and *Site*; Ethics out of *Relation*; Chronology out of *When*; Geography out *Where*; Electricity, Magnetiſm and Atraction out of *Action* and *Paſſion*, and ſo on in other Inſtances."—With reſpect to the Accuracy, with which the late Philoſopher of Saliſbury has derived the Sciences, &c. each from its particular Source as above ſpecified, ſome doubts may, not improbably, be entertained. But ſtill there may be thought ſomething ingenious and uſeful too in eſtabliſhing the Relation of Arts, Sciences and philoſophical principles to the Catagories, in order the more clearly and readily to point out their nearer or remoter Connexion one with another. But in the whole of this Note nothing more is pretended than mere conjecture.

V. 131. *The whole long train of cauſes falls in view,*
The chain's firſt link fix'd to th' Almighty's throne.

This Paſſage manifeſtly alludes to the famous lines of Homer.

Il. VIII.

Il. VIII. v. 19—25. Σειρην χρυσειην εξ ϰρανοθεν ϰρεμασαντες,

Let down our golden everlaſting chain, &c.

Σειρην μεν γαρ επειτα περι ριον Ωλυμποιο
Δησαιμην————

I fix the chain to great Olympus' Height.
POPE.

Our Poet's application of the chain to the long Series of ſecondary Cauſes, by which the Creator is traced up through his works, and Man arrives at his higheſt knowledge, is more happy than Homer's; inaſmuch as the meaning of the Grecian Bard ſeems conſiderably involved in myſtery; and that rendered more than myſterious by the controverſy of *Critics*; unleſs we except Macrobius; who ſays: Cum omnia continuis ſucceſſionibus ſe ſequantur per ordinem ad imum meandi; invenietur preſſiùs intuenti à ſummo deo uſque ad ultimam rerum fæcem una mutuis ſe vinculis religans, et nuſquàm interrupta, Connexio. Et hæc eſt Homeri catena aurea, quam pendere de cœlo in terras Deum juſſiſſe commemorat.—In ſomn. ſcip. Lib. I. c. 14.—"Since all things follow in continual ſucceſſion, degenerating, in order, to the very bottom of the ſeries; the more attentive obſerver will diſcover a connexion "of parts" down from the ſupreme God to the laſt off-ſcouring of Nature, mutually linked together and without any interruption. And this is Homer's golden Chain, which, he tells us, Jupiter ordered to be let down from Heaven to Earth." The Britiſh Poet's "long

"long train of Cauſes" probably means a continued ſucceſſion of cauſes and effects, alternately connected; which perhaps would be more naturally contemplated in the aſcending ſeries from the loweſt Being in the Univerſe to the Supreme; the Creator of all things.

V. 133. *Now laſt into herſelf the Mind deſcends;*
Views her ideal World, &c.

Cicero, after having talked about the ſubſtance and form of the Soul and its ſituation in the body, comes to this concluſion: Non valet tantum animus, ut ſe-ipſum ipſe videat; at, ut oculus, ſic animus, ſe non videns, alia cernit—adding a little lower—Vim certe, ſagacitatem, memoriam, motus celeritatem videt. Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 67.—The former part of this paſſage might be given in the words of Locke, who has adopted it in the introduction to his Eſſay on Human Underſtanding—"The Underſtanding, like the Eye, whilſt it makes us ſee and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itſelf." But if by *taking no notice of itſelf*, Mr. Locke meant any thing more than that it diſcerns not its own ſubſtance, form, &c. he muſt here have miſtaken Tully—who in the latter part of the paſſage proceeds to affirm of the Mind or Underſtanding, that "it certainly perceives its own Power, Sagacity, Memory and its Faculty of quick Tranſition from one Object to another." This is the meaning (paraphraſed indeed) of our Poet in the lines, which have ſuggeſted this Note.

Tully in a paſſage a little previous to that above-cited,

cited, ſpeaking of terreſtrial and compound Subſtances, expreſſes himſelf as follows: His enim in naturis nihil eſt, quod vim memoriæ, mentis, cogitationis habeat—nec invenietur unquàm, undè ad hominem venire poſſint, niſi à Deo.—"For there is nothing in theſe natures, which can poſſeſs the power, of memory, of underſtanding or thought; nor can ſuch faculties be traced to any other ſource than the Deity." The Poet had probably his eye on this paſſage in the following Reflection:

> And can ſuch virtue from corporeal clay
> Reſult? ———————

To conſider this topic a little more particularly—ſince no Mind could ſpring out of dead and ſenſeleſs matter, and Minds could not poſſibly be made nor produced from one another *infinitely* (points demonſtrated by Cudworth, in his Intellectual ſyſtem) we may conclude with that Author, that there muſt of neceſſity be an *eternal*, *unmade* Mind; from whence our imperfect Minds are derived; which perfect omnipotent Mind, he adds, was as well the Cauſe of all other things, as of human Souls.

V. 156. *The mighty Verulam*, ———

The life of Lord Bacon by Mallet, and thoſe which we find of him in the different Dictionaries of Biography, are too well known, not to render any account of this great Man here, in the way of Hiſtory or Anecdote, unneceſſary; but the following philoſophical

cal character of him, as ſketched by the late Monſ. D'Alembert, may not be unacceptable to my Readers —— "On conſidering attentively the ſound, intelligent and extenſive views of this great Man, the multiplicity of objects, which his piercing wit had comprehended within its ſphere, the elevation of his ſtile, that every where makes the boldeſt images coaleſce with the moſt rigorous preciſion, we ſhould be tempted to eſteem him the greateſt, the moſt univerſal, and the moſt eloquent of Philoſophers. His works are juſtly valued; perhaps more valued than known; and therefore more deſerving of our ſtudy than elogiums. Bacon, born amidſt the obſcurity of the moſt profound night, perceived, that philoſophy did not yet exiſt; though many had undoubtedly flattered themſelves with having excelled in it; for the more any age is groſs or ignorant, the more it believes itſelf informed of all, that can be poſſibly known. He began by taking a general view of the various objects of all the natural Sciences; he divided thoſe ſciences into different branches; of which he made the moſt exact enumeration; he examined into all that was already known as to each of theſe objects, and he drew up an immenſe catalogue of what remained to be diſcovered. This was the aim and ſubject of his admirable work, "Of the Dignity and Augmentation of natural Knowledge." In his "New Organ of Sciences," he perfects the views, which he had pointed out in the firſt work; he carries them farther and ſhews the neceſſity of experimental Phyſics, which was not yet thought of. An enemy to ſyſtems, he beholds Philoſophy a the only part of our knowledge, which ought to contribute

tribute to make us better, or more happy. *(Lord Bacon's* idea of *Philoſophy comprehends Religion.)* He ſeems to limit it to the ſcience of uſeful things, and every where recommends the ſtudy of Nature. His other writings are formed on the ſame plan. Every thing in them, even their titles, are expreſſive of the Man of genius; of the Mind that ſees in great. He there collects Facts; he there compares Experiments, and indicates a great number to be made. He invites the learned to ſtudy and perfect thoſe Arts, which he deems the moſt illuſtrious and moſt eſſential parts of human knowledge. He expoſes, with a noble ſimplicity, his conjectures and thoughts on different objects worthy of intereſting Men, and he might have ſaid, with the old Gentleman in Terence, 'that nothing affecting humanity was foreign to him.' Science of Nature, Morality, Politics, Economics; all ſeemed to be within the ſtretch of that luminous and profound Underſtanding; and we know not which moſt to admire, the richneſs he diffuſes over all the ſubjects, he treats of, or the dignity with which he ſpeaks of them. His writings cannot be better compared than to thoſe of Hippocrates on Medicine, and they would neither be leſs admired, nor leſs read, if the culture of Mankind were as dear to *Mankind* as the Preſervation of their Health. But there are none but the Chiefs of ſects of all kinds, whoſe works can have a certain ſplendor." —— Old An. Reg. vol. xvi. ——

V. 169. *Such mighty genius, ſuch egregious gifts*
Ne'er ſprang, I ween, without the ſmile of Heav'n.

The Reader's reflections upon the philoſophical portrait of Bacon, as preſented in the laſt note, will give him ſome intereſt in the following remark from Moſes Mendels-ſohn's Phedon —— Entret. III. —— " Un être ſi parfait, objet de la complaiſance divine, doit être la derniere fin de la Creation —— Tous les traits de ce Tableau ne regardent pas, à la vérité, l' homme en general; mais le petit hombre de Sages, qui font l' ornement du genre humain, &, ſi l' on veut, la ligne de ſeparation entre les hommes, & les eſprits d' un rang ſuperieur.

V. 178. *Who, when diſcharg'd his nature's fated debt,*
Something, poſſeſs'd within, conceives not ſtill?

Quod ſi omnium conſenſus naturæ vox eſt, omneſque, qui ubique ſunt, conſentiunt eſſe aliquid, quod ad eos pertineat, qui è vita ceſſerint, nobis quoque idem exiſtimandum eſt. —— Tuſc. Diſp. L. I. Sect. 15. Olivet. —— " But if the Conſent of all Men be the Voice of nature, and all Men do univerſally conſent, that ſomething belonging to them remains after their departure from life, we cannot but adopt the general opinion."

V. 182. —————— *the public voice*
This univerſal Sentiment proclaims;
No tribe ſo barbarous, &c. ——

Permanere animos arbitramur, conſenſu omnium nationum. Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 36. Davis. —— " In our

our opinion, that Souls continue to exiſt, we have the Conſent of all Nations on our ſide."

V. 186. ——————— *The Acorn hence,*
An age ſlow intervening, &c.

Maxumum verò argumentum eſt naturam ipſam de Immortalitate animorum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ ſunt, et maxumæ quidem, quæ poſt mortem futura ſint,

——————— *Serit arbores,*
Quæ alteri Sæculo proſint ———

Ut ait Statius (Cæcilius) in Synephebis: quid ſpectans, niſi etiam poſtera ſæcula ad ſe pertinere? Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 32. — "But the ſtrongeſt argument is, that Nature herſelf is tacitly perſuaded of the Immortality of the Soul; which appears from that great concern ſo generally felt by all, for what ſhall happen after death." —— "He planteth trees which ſhall benefit another age," ſays Statius in his Synephebi —— but with what view, unleſs future ages may in ſome ſenſe belong to himſelf?" —— Cicero, in his Book *de Senectute*, *Sect.* 23, Edit. Olivet, purſues this argument and that with his uſual eloquence and ſpirit.—— Nemo unquam mihi, Scipio, perſuadebit, aut patrem tuum Paulum, aut duos avos —— Paulum et Africanum, aut Africani patrem, aut patruum, aut multos præſtantes viros, quos enumerare non eſt neceſſe, tanta eſſe conatos, quæ ad poſteritatis memoriam pertinerent, niſi animo cernerent, poſteritatem ad ſe pertinere. An

cenſes (ut de me ipſo aliquid more ſenum glorier) me tantos labores diurnos nocturnoſque, domi militiæque ſuſcepturum fuiſſe, ſi iiſdem finibus gloriam meam, quibus vitam, eſſem terminaturus? Non-ne melius multò fuiſſet, otioſam ætatem et quietam, ſine ullo labore et contentione traducere? Sed, neſcio quomodo, animus erigens ſe, poſteritatem ſemper ità proſpiciebat, quaſi, cum exceſſiſſet è vita, tum denique victurus eſſet. Quod quidem niſi ità ſe haberet, ut animi immortales eſſent, haud optimi cujuſque animus maximè ad immortalem gloriam niteretur. — "Nobody; Scipio, will ever perſuade me, that your father Paulus, your two grandfathers, Paulus and Africanus, or the father of Africanus, or his uncle and many other excellent perſons, whom it is not neceſſary to enumerate, would have attempted ſuch noble things to challenge the remembrance of poſterity, unleſs they had been convinced, that they themſelves were perſonally intereſted in it. Do you think, (if I may be allowed an old Man's privilege of boaſting) that I ſhould ever have undergone ſo many labours, day and night, in the Senate and in the Field, if my glory were to terminate with my life? Would it not have been much better to ſpend my days, without labour or contention, in indolence and tranquility? But my Soul lifting herſelf up, I know not how, always looked forward to poſterity, as if, when ſhe ſhall have departed from the body, ſhe will then at length be but beginning to live. But unleſs the caſe be, that our Souls are deſtined to Immortality, not that of any perſon, however excellent, would thus exert itſelf for the ſake of immortal glory."

V. 190. ——

V. 190. —— *And hence th' aſpiring Pyramid*
The wide-deſtroying hand of time defies.

Quid ipſa ſepulchrorum monumenta, quid elogia ſignificant, niſi nos etiam futura cogitare? —— Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 33. —— "What mean the monuments of the Dead, and the panegyrics inſcribed on them, unleſs we ourſelves are able to contemplate them hereafter?"

Biſhop Warburton, after having examined, at large, the different opinions of ſome learned Moderns, concerning the uſe and deſign of the pyramids of Ægypt, concludes thus, with regard to the ſentiments of the Antients: "Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Pliny, Tacitus, &c. all aſſure us, that the pyramids were ſepulchres. Nay Diodorus, to put the matter out of doubt, informs us, that the ſacred Commentaries of their Prieſts ſaid ſo."—Divine Leg. Vol. III.

V. 207. ——————*What recks it us the voice,*
Inaudible and vain, of good report, if duſt,
Mere duſt and aſhes be our ſole remains,
And death, an endleſs, an inſenſate Sleep?

The paſſage from Cicero in the laſt note ſhews, perhaps, the antient ſource of our Poet's concluſion in theſe lines. And is it not probable, that the ſentiment of Man's poſthumous regard of his earthly character, or fame, has, in all ages been ſufficiently general among our ſpecies, to give it no inconſiderable weight as an argument for the Immortality of the Soul?—May the Annotator, without offence, take the liberty of hinting to his Readers,

ders, that they might find it perhaps a uſeful queſtion to put each to himſelf: Whether, apart from all conſideration of a future account to be given of his conduct in this life according to the doctrines of Revelation, he finds himſelf indifferent, in what light his actions and character ſhall be regarded among mankind after his Death? Were he to anſwer, that he is not indifferent, and then to ſeek within himſelf the reaſon of feeling himſelf intereſted, would a more probable one be found than a ſtrong and natural perſuaſion, that he ſhould be ſenſible of the merit or demerit of his paſt actions in a future State, and of ſatisfaction, or uneaſineſs as a conſequence of one, or of the other.—If this be a true ſtate of the matter, another natural queſtion ſeems to ariſe: Why was this ſentiment implanted in our boſoms, unleſs it were meant to produce in us an expectation, or belief of the Immortality of the Soul? This is at leaſt a very reaſonable ſuppoſition; for, inaſmuch as this ſentiment does actually operate to produce that expectation or belief, were ſuch after all not the real deſtination of Man, the effect of ſuch a perſuaſion on our minds were vain and deluſive, and conſequently unworthy of the Deity, by whom it muſt have been impreſſed. Were it to be advanced, that it might have been impreſſed only to furniſh thoſe hopes and fears of Futurity, which are found to have a ſtrong influence on our moral conduct, and to conduce to the peace and order of this world, the ſentiment ſtill, not being founded in truth, would reflect on the wiſdom of God. If therefore it be acknowledged generally prevalent, as ſeems to be the fact, in order not to impeach the wiſdom or truth of the Deity, we muſt ſuppoſe

poſe it well founded. The concluſion is, that the concern, which Men feel for their poſthumous fame, affords a ſtrong preſumption of a future State, in which they ſhall experience, that it had its foundation in truth. — This way of reaſoning will apply to many orher arguments for the Immortality of the Soul.

V. 211. *What mean funereal rites?*

For a general account of theſe among the Antients, ſee the article in Wilſon's Archæol. Dictionary and in Potter's and Kennet's Antiquities. For the Poet's reaſoning upon them with regard to his ſubject, the reader is referred to the preceding Notes.

V. 215.—*Its tomb with flowery wreaths bedeck*

Illa mihi ſancta eſt; illius dona ſepulchro,
Et madefacta meis ſerta feram lacrymis.
Tib. L. II. El. 7.

Sacred to me her ſhade; I'll weep her doom,
And bring the tear-ſteep'd garland to her tomb.

V. 218.—*Whilſt thoſe with ſolemn obſequies of Fire.*

Et fleat ante meum mæſta Neæra rogum.
Tib. L. III. El. 2.

Thus pathetically paraphraſed by Hammond—

Wilt

Wilt thou in tears thy lover's corſe attend,
With eye averted light the ſolemn fire;
Till all around the doleful flames aſcend;
Then, ſlowly ſinking, by degrees expire?

V. 227. ——————————*infuſing then*
Of frankinſcenſe and pitch, an odorous maſs,
With thick bitumen, every cavity
They fill. This pious labour finiſh'd due,
In bandage manifold the whole encloſed, &c.

Συμπεσον γορ το σωμα και ταριχευθεν, ὡσπερ οἱ εν Αιγυπτω ταριχευθεντες, ολιγου ὁλον μενει αμηχανον ὁσον χρονον.
PLATO in Phœdone. Edit. Ficini. p. 61.

"For the Body lying bound up and embalmed, after the manner of the Egyptians, remains firm and entire an incredible time."

Condiunt Ægyptii mortuos et eos ſervant domi; ut quam maxumè permaneant diuturna corpora. Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 108. This paſſage, conveying the ſame Ideas as that of Plato above, needs not be tranſlated.—Some Readers perhaps may tell me, that a reference to any muſeum or cabinet, for the actual Inſpection of an Egyptian Mummy, had, (at this time of day), afforded a better proof of the long duration of embalmed Bodies, than any claſſical quotation. Granted; if the dates of a very remote Antiquity, generally pretended to, could be aſcertained. But here is a difficulty. Till that be ſurmounted, theſe learned Authorities may have their value.

——Ægyptia

——— Ægyptia tellus
Claudit odorato poſt funus ſtantia ſaxo
Corpora, et a menſis exſanguem haud ſeparat umbram.
Sil. Ital. XIII. 474.

When life departs, th' Egyptian ſtraight, the corſe
Cloſed in an od'rous ſepulchre of ſtone,
And plac'd upright, detains the bloodleſs Shade;
At meals his daily viſitant.——

This paſſage, beſides its relation to the note, is brought in partly for the ſake of the melancholy pleaſing idea of theſe ſhadowy Gueſts hovering about an Egyptian table; and partly for the occaſion it gives of hinting, that Horace's "Locus eſt et pluribus umbris," may perhaps be thought to receive ſome illuſtration from it, as *umbræ* in alluſion to theſe Egyptian ideas might perhaps, in his time, be proverbially uſed to ſignify familiar Friends and Gueſts at table, or elſewhere.

The learned Reader needs not be informed, that popular opinion, among the Antients, ſuppoſed every man to be poſſeſſed of three different Ghoſts, which after the death of the body were differently diſpoſed of: Ovid, to whom the lines ſubjoined are attributed, may inform them in what manner.

——— Tumulum circumvolat Umbra,
Orcus habet Manes, Spiritus aſtra petit.

Shades hover o'er the tomb, to Orcus fly
The Manes ſad, and Spirits ſeek the ſky.

How their Philoſophers expreſſed themſelves on this ſubject, the following citation from Seneca will ſhew. —Ex humili et depreſſo in eum emicabit locum, quiſquis ille eſt, qui ſolutas vinculis animas beato recipit Sinu.—" From its humble and depreſſed ſituation it (the Soul) will ſpring up to that Place, whatſoever it is, which receives the Souls, delivered from their chains, into its bleſſed Retreat."

V. 235. ——— *that all reſolv'd*
In death this mortal fabric, &c.

Perhaps in the Poet's " Membris jam morte ſolutis" the participle conveying the idea of an entire Diſſolution of our mortal Body, or Reſolution of it into its conſtituent elements, is not in this particular paſſage, immediately following an account of Embalment, the moſt happily choſen. As however an Egyptian Mummy, notwithſtanding its duration for Ages in an intire ſtate, muſt, ſome time or other, crumble beneath the all-deſtructive hand of Time; and as it muſt be ſuppoſed, that no particular time is meant here, the expreſſion may be juſtified.—Could the word " Solutis," without manifeſt violence to the context, be here underſtood of that Diſſolution, which is uſed to ſignify the actual ſtroke of Death, or ſeparation of the Soul from the Body, it would, we muſt confeſs, appear a more eligible Word in this Place.

V. 250. ——*the willing victim mounts the Pile*
And in her Conſort's funeral blaze expires.

This

This is one of the moſt curious Facts in the hiſtory of Man; and, being confirmed by the teſtimony of numerous reſpectable Writers, both antient and modern, deſerves the particular attention of the Philoſopher and of the Naturaliſt. It is true, that wars and religious Perſecutions have, in all times, produced wonderful Inſtances of an enthuſiaſtic preference of Death to Life. But then in theſe caſes one or other has been propoſed alternatively on certain terms, and the perſon embracing death was no more than conditionally free to avoid it. But in the Sacrifice, alluded to by the Poet, the perſon who makes choice of death, does it under the circumſtances of abſolute freedom; at leaſt, from every thing external. If now it be aſked, How does this differ from the ordinary inſtances of Suicide? it is anſwered, that deſpair and madneſs influence Men to the latter; whilſt this ſelf-devotion of the oriental Women to the funeral Pile of their Huſbands takes place in a pleaſurable ſtate of the mind and under the effect of one of its moſt delightful affections, and is undergone with a tranquility and conſtancy, which appear to be exceeded in no other inſtance; and that too by the weaker Sex.

As Mr. Guthrie, the Geographer, and ſome other modern Authors, having aſſerted, that this cuſtom has long ceaſed in India, authentic proofs of their error have more than once been produced, within theſe late years. A very remarkable one appeared in the Annual Regiſter of 1777. As that valuable Repoſitory is much too voluminous to be in every body's hands, and eſpecially in thoſe of many of my younger Readers,

an abridgment of the Letter, in which we find the account, may not be thought here obtruſive, or be unwelcome. Mr. Wilſon, the Author of it, was an eyewitneſs to the fact and its circumſtances, being eſtabliſhed at Azumabad in Bengal, where they occurred. ——Jananca, a Gentoo-woman, as ſoon as her huſband was given over, declared to a Bramin her intention of burning herſelf with her huſband. Otram Goſe (the huſband) ſhortly expired, and her neighbours in vain uſed every argument to diſſuade her from her purpoſe. She ſpent the evening before the ceremony in great mirth with her friends. Her Son came to Mr. Wilſon, to beg his permiſſion to burn his father and mother in the Bazaar belonging to that Gentleman's Plantation. The Son convinced Mr. Wilſon, that the act, on the part of his mother, was perfectly volunluntary; ſhe having rejected a maintenance offered her for the reſt of her life, and ſhewn the moſt unchangeable reſolution and ardent deſire to be burnt with her Huſband; he found himſelf obliged therefore, according to his own repreſentation, to conſent to the requeſt. Jananca diſtributed fried rice to the populace as ſhe proceeded to the Bazaar; where, the pile not yet being made, ſhe gave directions about it with evident marks of joy. On Mr. Wilſon's aſking her now, whether the ſtep ſhe meant to take was by her own free choice and conſent, ſhe aſſured him, it was; expreſſed herſelf much obliged by his permiſſion to uſe the Bazaar, and added, that ſhe would certainly lay violent hands upon herſelf, if he ſhould attempt to fruſtrate her preſent deſign.—She ſat by the body of her huſband an hour, talking to her friends during

during the preparations: ſhe went then to be waſhed with him in the Ganges,* at a little diſtance. Both were dreſſed in clean garments; and a painted paper-crown, as at marriage, being put upon the man's head, a Bramin Woman brought four burning lamps, placed three of them on the ground, and put one into Jananca's hands, at the ſame time repeating ſome prayers. Jananca now put a garland of flowers round her head, and a ring of graſs round one of her Son's fingers, giving him at the ſame time boiled rice mixed with plantains. Theſe he put three times to his father's mouth, and as often to his mother's; but ſhe did not taſte them. After this Jananca never ſpoke; but made three Selams by putting her hands to the ſoles of her huſband's feet, and then on her own head. Her huſband being now carried to the pile, ſhe followed with a pot under her arm, containing Cowries, pieces of Saffron and Pons of Betel-nut, twenty-one of each, with a leaf of Betel made ready for chewing, a piece of Iron and another of Sandal wood. She now looked at her huſband, and then walked ſeven times round the pile, ſtopping when ſhe came to his feet, to make him the ſame obeiſance as before. She then mounted the pile

* "The learned among the Hindoos have compoſed volumes in praiſe of the Ganges, all parts of which are ſaid to be holy; but ſome particular places are eſteemed more ſo than others. The great people have the water of this river brought to them from vaſt diſtances; it being eſteemed neceſſary in the performance of certain religious ceremonies. The water of the Ganges has been celebrated in all ages, not only for its ſanctity, but alſo on account of it's ſweetneſs, lightneſs and ſalubrity, and becauſe it does not become putrid though kept for years."

Indian Antiq. Vol. I. p. 97.

pile without any help, and laid herſelf down by her huſband's ſide. Putting the pot, which ſhe had borne in her hands, cloſe to her head, ſhe claſped her huſband in her arms. The Son ſtood by with a whiſp of ſtraw, which he put, blazing, three times, to the mouths of his father and mother, and then ſet the whole pile on fire. The bodies were burnt to aſhes in leſs than an hour; the populace throwing reeds and light wood upon them. Mr. Wilſon ſays, he believes the woman never ſtirred; though there was no weight upon her, which ſhe might not have overſet, had ſhe been ſo inclined.

V. 255. *Turn next where Boreas breaths eternal froſt;*
Stern Nations there, &c.

The antient people of the North, the Goths and Scandinavians were proverbial for their contempt of death, eſpecially in war; conſidering death when happening in this circumſtance, as their beſt privelege of entrance into the Hall of Odin; the place deſtined for the happineſs of Heroes in a future ſtate. Sir William Temple, in his Miſcellanea, Part II. Sect. IV. tells us, that theſe Northern people were diſtinguiſhed from all others by a fearleſſneſs of death, grounded upon the belief of another life, which made them deſpiſe the care of preſerving this. Mallet's Northern Antiquities, publiſhed together with his French Hiſtory of Denmark, abounds with curious facts in proof of this their character, taken from Bartholinus, Saxo Grammaticus, and other Writers of the North. The antient Songs in Olaus Wormius's Literatura Runica, and eſpecially

that

that of Regner Lodbrog, a celebrated Northern Hero, which he ſung under violent torture juſt before his laſt moments, afford ſufficient confirmation of the principle which inſpired theſe people with a contempt of death.—The following lines, from Lucan, ſhall conclude my authorities.

Orbe alio, longæ, canitis ſi cognita, vitæ
Mors media eſt. Certè populi, quos deſpicit Arctos,
Felices errore ſuo! quos, ille timorum
Maximus, haud urget, lethi metus; inde ruendi
In ferrum mens prona viris, animæque capaces
Mortis, et ignavum redituræ parcere vitæ.
Pharſal. Lib. I.

In diſtant Lands (known truths the Muſe relates)
Death points the path to long-enduring life.
Happy, though error ſhould miſlead their ſteps,
Are thoſe of northern climes, a dauntleſs race,
By Man's moſt dreaded object all unmov'd,
Who firmly brave the battle's iron front,
Ruſhing on death; and hold it baſe to ſpare
A life, by fate ſoon ſo to be reſtor'd.

V. 262. *Add too th' enchanting tales of bliſsful Plains*
Elyſian; Styx, &c.
For Fiction reſts upon the baſe of Truth.

"That great expectation, ſays Wollaſton, which men have of continuing to live in another State beyond the grave, has commonly been admitted as one proof, that they ſhall live.—That they generally had ſuch an expectation

pectation can ſcarce be denied. The hiſtories of Mankind, their deifications, rites, ſtories of apparitions, the frequent mention of the Hades with rewards and puniſhments hereafter, &c. all teſtify, that even the Heathen world believed, that the Souls of men ſurvived their bodies. Their ignorance indeed of the ſeats and circumſtances of the departed has begot many errors and ſuperſtitions, and theſe have been multiplied by licentious Poets and idle Viſionaries; but this, being no more than what is uſual in like caſes, ought to be no prejudice againſt the fundamental opinion." Rel. Nat. p. 208.

Ην δε τω της Ιταλιας κατα την μεγαλην Ἑλλαδα περι λιμνην Αορνον ὑπο καλυμενην, μαντειον αντρον, και θεραπευτηρες τε αντρω ψυχαγωγοι, ὑπως ονομαζομενοι εκ τε εργε· ενταυθα ὁ δεομενος αφικομενος, ευξαμενος, ενταμων σφαγια χεαμενος χοας, ανεκαλειτο ψυχην, ὁτεδε των πατερων η φιλων, και αυτῳ απηντα ειδωλον αμυδρον μεν και ιδειν αμφισβητησιμον, φθεγκτικον δε και μαντικον· και συγγενομενον ὑπερ ων εδειτο, απηλλατετο.

Maximus Tyrius, Diſſ. XXVI. S. 2.

"There is, ſomewhere in Magna Græcia, near a place called the lake Avernus a cave of Divination; and certain Miniſters attending it; the conductors of Souls; ſo ſtiled from the nature of their office. The ſupplicant, who came thither, after having offered prayers, ſacrifices and libations, called up the ſpirit, whether of a parent, or of a friend; and the ghoſt appeared, ſhadowy and dubious to the ſight, but poſſeſſing ſpeech and the power of Divination; and, hav-

having given the ſatisfaction required, immediately vaniſhed."

Inſtances without number of the general belief, which the antients entertained of the Soul ſurviving the body, might ſtill be added. But this may ſuffice: The fact being eſtabliſhed, their ſuperſtitions about it in no reſpect affect the force of the Poet's argument; and his concluſive reflection upon it is highly juſt——

"*That* fiction reſts upon the baſe of truth."

V. 272.—*Subſtantial forms, a vital countenance*
And earthly members ———

Need the reader be told, that the firſt words in theſe lines have no alluſion to thoſe ſubſtantial forms, by which the Ariſtotelians eſſentially characterized every natural ſubſtance; regarded by modern philoſophers as *terribiles viſu formæ*; but that the whole paſſage is founded upon a vulgar opinion, conveyed by Cicero in the ſubſequent quotations? "Animos enim per ſe ipſos viventes non poterant mente complecti; formam aliquam figuramque quærebant—Nihil enim animo videre poterant: ad oculos omnia referebant.—Magni autem eſt ingenii revocare mentem à ſenſibus, et cogitationem ab conſuetudine abducere. Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. p. 37—8. "For they were not able to comprehend how the Souls of men could poſſibly ſubſiſt by themſelves, and ſought to inveſt them with form and figure.—They were unable to ſee by pure intellect: They referred all things to ſight.—But it is a mark of

ſuperior underſtanding to abſtract the mind from the ſenſes, and to keep its thinking faculty free from the influence of habit." The Sophiſts, however, who, according to our Poet's repreſentation, to avoid groſſneſs of vulgar opinion, concluded, that the ſoul could not ſurvive the diſſolution of the body, fell into an extreme as little worthy of ſound philoſophy.

V. 286. ——————*voice of all mankind*
The voice of nature held—" *That God exiſts.*"

That the univerſal conſent of mankind is properly called the voice of nature, needs not be inſiſted on; and that all nations bear teſtimony, in their ideas and belief, to the exiſtence of the Deity, ſhould ſeem to admit no rational doubt, notwithſtanding the aſſertion of ſome few travellers. That theſe perſons ſhould have been ſufficiently acquainted with the language of ſome remote barbarians, among whom they have pretended not to find the idea of a God, it is much more reaſonable to doubt, from all our analogy on this ſubject. The moſt enlightened of the antients held this conſent to be univerſal. " Ipſique in hominibus nulla gens eſt, neque tam immanſueta, neque tam fera, quæ non etiamſi ignoret qualem habere deum deceat, tamen habendum ſciat." Tully de Leg. Lib. I. Sect. 8.— " There is no nation among mankind ſo uncivilized and barbarous, which, though ignorant of the proper atributes of God, hath not acknowledged his Being." And Seneca (Ep. 116.) ſays: Nec ulla gens uſquam eſt adeò extra leges moreſque projecta eſt, ut non aliquos Deos credat. " There is not, any where, a nation thrown

thrown ſo entirely beyond the confines of law and morality, as not to believe the exiſtence of a God."

The Annotator cannot help taking occaſion here to add what immediately follows the paſſage juſt quoted from Seneca; as it will be found, in more reſpects than one, much to our purpoſe. Cum de animarum æternitate differimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet *conſenſus hominum*, aut timentium inferos, aut colentium. "When we are diſcourſing about the eternity of Souls, we hold *the common conſent of men*, (whether they worſhip or only fear the infernal deities), to be of no ſmall moment."

Every one, who reads, will recollect a number of modern Authors, and thoſe of the moſt philoſophical character, who inſiſt on the general conſent of mankind to—The exiſtence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul—as a Fact; and the fact itſelf as an important argument. It is needleſs to mention the names of Cudworth, Grotius, Locke, Wilkins, Clarke, &c. &c.

V. 294. *Countleſs was multiplied th'Eternal ONE.*

Although the Poet in this and the ſix lines, next following, ſeems more particularly to allude to the Polytheiſm and groſs idolatry of the antient Egyptians, as repreſented by many Authors of high antiquity and reſpect; yet it is not credible, that the extreme groſſneſs of their worſhip, or rather, their ſuperſtitious veneration of ſtrange objects, when it deſcended to the

brutes and even to the inanimate creation, ſhould have been maintained, either in belief or practice, but by the very loweſt and moſt ignorant of the vulgar. It could ſurely be none other, of whom a modern Philoſopher, (Bayle, I believe) could, with any appearance of truth or juſtice, have obſerved, that the groſſneſs and extent of their idolatry was ſuch, "that, with the Egyptians, every thing was God, but God himſelf." A public inſcription on the Temple at Sais, preſerved to us by Plutarch in his Iſis and Oſiris, ſufficiently proves, that, at leaſt, the Prieſts and Rulers of Egypt, (and why not the People in general, to whom it was conſtantly viſible?) had ſome true, and even ſublime notions of the one Supreme God.—Εγω ειμι παν το γεγονος, και ον, και εσομενον; και τον εμον πεπλον υδεις πω θνητος απεκαλυψεν.—"I am all that hath been, that is, or ſhall be; and no mortal hath at any time lifted my veil." Edit. Xylandri, Vol. II. 354. Folio.—And Proclus, diſcourſing on the Timæus of Plato, affirms, that the God of the Egyptians was αφανης και εμφανης, "at once inviſible and conſpicuous." Is it not probable, according to the opinion of many learned Antients, (ſee them in Cudworth) that the Polytheiſm of this people may generally be conſidered as the worſhip of the ONE Supreme under the different names and attributes of Ammon, Iſis, Oſiris, Serapis, Eicton, Neith, Cheph and Ptha?

But according to the ſentiments of the very learned and ingenious Author of the Indian Antiquities (particularly conſonant with thoſe of the profound Cudworth, Lib. I. Ch. 4. Sect. 36.) ſomething of a purer theology

theology prevailed among them. Mr. Maurice aſſerts, that the Wing, the Globe and the Serpent, conſpicuous on moſt of the temples of Upper Egypt, were a ſymbol of the Trinity; not to mention the Grecian veſtiges of this doctrine, found in the Hymn * attributed to Orpheus, and taught by Pythagoras, Parmenides and Plato.

As this note is meant ſcarcely more as a ſtricture upon the ſingle verſe at the head of it, than on the whole paſſage from V. 286, aſſerting the univerſal ſuffrage of mankind to the Exiſtence of a God, (previouſly noticing their errors concerning his attributes,) it will not be foreign to our purpoſe to add, from this reſpectable Writer, "that viſible traces of this doctrine, (the divine Triad,) are diſcovered not only in the *Three Principles* of the Chaldaic Theology, in the *Triplaſios Mithra* of Perſia; in the Triad, *Brahma*, *Veeſhnu* and *Seeva*, of India, where it was evidently promulged in the Geeta, fifteen hundred years before the birth of Plato; but in the *Numen Triplex* of Japan; in the Inſcription upon the famous medal found in the Deſerts of Siberia, 'To the Tri-une God,' to be ſeen at this day in the valuable cabinet of the Empreſs at Peterſburgh; and in the *Tanga-Tanga*, or *Three* in *One*, of the South Americans." Pref. to Vol. I. of Ind. Ant. p. 116.——It ſhould appear from hence, that how groſs ſoever, according to our Poet, the conceptions of the Deity

* Cicero, in his Natura Deorum, Lib. I. 38. tells us, it was the opinion of Ariſtotle, that Orpheus never exiſted, and that the Orphicum Carmen was the compoſition of Cercops, a Pythagorean,

Deity were among the vulgar and illiterate in the Pagan and the barbarous Nations, yet many individuals, or perhaps even orders of men, were found in them of much more enlightened notions. And Mr. Maurice, after taking an extenſive view of the Chriſtian Trinity, in conſequence of having traced a divine Triad ſo widely diſſeminated over the Earth, does not heſitate in his concluſive retroſpect on his reſearches concerning this ſubject, to affirm, " that this doctrine was originally revealed from Heaven to the Anceſtors of the human race, known to the Hebrew Patriarchs, and propagated by themſelves and their Poſterity during their various migrations and diſperſions, throughout the world." See Contents to the firſt chapters of the Theology of Hindoſtan. Sec. Div. of Vol. I. p. 174.

V. 301. *On ſuch ſtrange figments muſing, wiſdom's Friend,*
That ſage Athenian, predicted erſt,
At the full period of revolving time,
Man's aid long wiſh'd, the advent of a God.

" In experience and practice, ſays Dr. Clarke, (in his Evidences), it hath appeared altogether impoſſible for Philoſophy and bare Reaſon to reform mankind effectually, without the aſſiſtance of ſome higher principle."

Socrates long ago foreſaw, and acknowledged this, and has expreſſed the ſtrong perſuaſion of his mind upon it with a degree of confidence, which ſome of the Learned have been inclined to attribute to ſomething like prophetic inſpiration. The celebrated paſſage alluded

luded to by our Poet is in the Second Alcibiades of Plato: Edit. Fic. p. 459. I will cite it. All Readers will not however ſee it in the ſame light.——Σωκ.—Αναγκαιον ȣν εςι περιμενειν, ἑως αν τις μαθη, ὡς δει προς θεȣς και προς ανθρωπȣς διακεισθαι. Αλ.—Ποτε ȣν παρεςι ὁ χρονος ȣτος, ω Σωκρατες, και τις ὁ παιδευσων; ἡδιςα γαν μοι δοκω ιδειν τȣτον τον αν ανθρωπον τις εςιν. Σωκ.—Οὑτος εςιν ῳ μελει περι σȣ, αλλα δοκει μοι ὡς περι τῳ Διομηδει φησι την Αθηναν; Ομηρος απο των οφθαλμων αφελειν την αχλυν—

"Οφρα ευ γινωσκοι ημεν θεον ηδε και ανδρα"

ȣ̓τω και σȣ δειν απο της ψυχης πρωτον αφελοντα την αχλυν, ἡ νυν παρȣσα τυγχανει, τοτηνικαυτ' ηδη προσφερειν δι' ὡν μελλεις γνωσεσθαι ημεν κακον ηδε και εσθλον. νυν μεν γαρ ȣκ αν μοι δοκῃς δυνηθηναι.——Soc.—Wherefore it is neceſſary to wait till we are taught by ſome one, how we are to conduct ourſelves both towards the Gods and towards Men. Alcib.—When will that be, Socrates, and who ſhall be the teacher? For moſt cheerfully ſhall I acknowledge him, whoſoever he may be. Soc. He it is, under whoſe guardianſhip you are. For it appears to me, as Homer ſays "Minerva removed the miſt from the eyes of Diomede, that he might truly diſcern God from man," ſo you want ſome one to remove the cloud with which your mind is darkened, that he may adminiſter means, by which you may diſtinguiſh good from evil: for at preſent you ſeem incapable of doing it."

V. 326.———*for when the ſtiff'ning limbs*
Speak diſſolution nigh, the vigorous mind
Quicken'd exults, to inſpiration raiſed, &c.

Tully,

Tully, ſpeaking of the death of Socrates ſays: Supremo vitæ die de hoc ipſo multa diſſeruit—et cum pænè in manu jam mortiferum illud teneret poculum locutus ita eſt, ut non ad mortem trudi, verùm in cœlum videretur aſcendere. Tuſc. Diſp. I. p. 71—"On the laſt day of his life he diſcourſed of many things relative to that ſubject, and juſt as he took the deadly cup in his hand, he converſed, not with the air of one condemned to die; but of one aſcending to the enjoyment of Heaven."—The learned reader will recollect many particulars at the concluſion of Plato's Phædo confirming this account of the Roman Philoſopher; as they bear teſtimony to the compoſure, ſerenity, preſence of mind and ſublime hopes of the Athenian ſage in his laſt moments. Seneca, according to Tacitus (Ann. Lib. XV.) diſplayed perhaps more than his uſual eloquence at the neareſt approaches to death—Et noviſſimo quoque momento, ſuppeditante eloquentiâ, advocatis ſcriptoribus pleraque tradidit, quæ, in vulgus edita ejus verbis, invertere ſuperſedeo. "And at his laſt moments likewiſe, his eloquence ſupplying matter, the Amanuenſes were called, and he delivered many things, which having been publiſhed in his own words, I forbear to give any other repreſentation of them."—Cicero compares the expiring moments of ſuch perſons to thoſe of dying ſwans, gifted, according to antient ſuperſtition, by Apollo with a ſpirit of divination—quâ providentes, Says he, quid in morte boni ſit, cum cantu et voluptate moriantur, ſic omnibus bonis et doctis eſſe faciundum—Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. 73.—"whence foreſeeing the good, which death preſents, they depart with ſinging and joy; and thus ſhould it fare

fare with all the good and the wiſe." One might add many inſtances, more recent, of perſons, who, a few days before death, have been ſaid to fortel the preciſe hour of their own departure; to which, as well as to inſtances of antient times, our Poet's concluding line on this ſubject probably alludes

"And words prognoſtic of approaching death."

but I ſuppoſe few of my readers unacquainted with anecdotes of this nature, whatever be their authenticity.

V. 332. *When comes it, that in ſleep*———

——— ——— ———

——— ——— *invigorate then*
The mind her genuine force the more diſplays.

Cyrus, in his death-bed diſcourſe to his Children, holds this laſt ſentiment, but carries it ſomewhat farther than the Poet.—Atqui dormientium animi maxime declarant divinitatem ſuam. Multa enim, cùm remiſſi et liberi ſunt, futura proſpiciunt. Ex quo intelligitur, quales futuri ſint, cùm ſe planè corporis vinculis relaxaverint. Cic. de Senect. S. 22.—"But the ſouls of perſons aſleep ſhew particular ſigns of their divinity. For, then diſengaged and free, they diſcover many things yet to come. Whence we may conclude, what will be their future powers, when entirely delivered from the bondage of the fleſh." The learned reader will find a great deal upon this topic in Cicero's firſt Book de Divinatione, S. 25. He inſtances Socrates foretelling the exact time of his own death from

a dream, three days before it took place. He mentions the prophetic viſions of Zenophon, of Sophocles and of many others, together with the opinions of Plato and Ariſtotle and other Philoſophers in ſupport of the authority of dreams in the antient art of divination. In the 29th S. of the ſame Book he cites a fanciful, but curious paſſage from Plato, as conveying the ſentiments of Socrates on the different ſituation and circumſtances of mind and body thought moſt conducive to true, or to falſe dreams. But the quotation of it would render my Note much too long. Something of the ſame kind occurs in Tyrius Maximus, near the end of the 1st S. of Diſſ. 28. ει δε πȣ τις εϛι καθαρα ψυχη, &c. in his explanation of the famous dream of Epimenides.

V. 340. *If of corporeal mould, exiſt the mind*
Infinity of parts reſults, &c.

The Cardinal Polignac, in his Anti-Lucretius, Lib. V. Sect. 3. refuting the atomic ſyſtem of Epicurus, draws the ſame concluſion from theſe premiſes:

At tot erunt mentes, quot partes corpore in uno.

Nor fewer minds than atoms will exiſt
In the ſame body———

V. 344. *Say, 'midſt ſuch numbers and contention ſtrange,*
How equity or truth their baſe can fix, &c.?

Polignac, in the ſame Section, ſtates the ſame abſurd con-

conſequence; the ſame confuſion of all moral Ideas, as here intimated by I. H. Browne, to flow alſo from thinking matter:

At verò ſi, naturæ vi, cogitat et vult
Quæque atomus, pariter rectoque et idonea pravo,
Virtutem vitiumque ſequi, et præponere poſſit
Alterutrum, ac proprios delectu fingere mores.

But if by nature's power each atom thinks;
Each wills; each equally propenſe and apt
To good, to ill, to virtue or to vice;
Each then may give to either preference;
Each its own moral character aſſume.

The French Poet purſues the ſame ſubject in a light ſomewhat different at Sect. 4. but ſtill reaſoning to the ſame concluſion———

Nam res perpetitur quæ tot ſimul anxia motus,
Res ea, quæ timet atque cupit, guadetque doletque,
Quæ ſentit, varios et ſenſus comparat, una eſt
Ac ſimplex: ideò non conſtat partibus ullis.
Si fingatur enim multis è partibus eſſe,
Parvula quantumvis, vel ſubtiliſſima fiat,
Officio pars quæque ſuo jam dedita, certè
Neſciat officium alterius, neque judicet inter
Senſus diverſos, quis ſuavior: hæc neget, illa
Affirmet diſcors: velit una, quod altera nolit.

That anxious thing, that buſy moving power
Which fears, deſires, rejoices, mourns, perceives,

Compares the various notices of ſenſe,
Is ſimply one; nor can of parts conſiſt.
If 'twere of many parts, or members, fram'd,
Atoms how ſubtle, or minute ſoe'er
Imagin'd, each its office muſt diſcharge,
Unconſcious of its neighbour's deſtin'd part;
Each would its own free judgment ſeveral form
'Twixt like ſenſations; this affirm, what that
Denies perverſe; this will, what that rejects.

St. Jerome in the following paſſage repreſents, with ſcarcely leſs vivacity than the Poet though in a different point of view, that confuſion, or rather deſtruction of all perſonal identity or individuation, which muſt follow from ſuppoſing the ſoul to conſiſt of material parts—"Since our bodies are in daily flux, and are continually increaſing or decreaſing, we ſhould become ſo many different men with every daily change: I ſhould be one man at ten years old, another at thirty, another at fifty; and all grey-headed, as I am now, ſtill another." From a French tranſlation.

How much were it to be wiſhed by the diſciples of Democritus, that Proteus were not the mere creature of fable? He had been at leaſt one example of that abſurd inconſiſtency, which, from the doctrine of theſe men, were it admitted, muſt be aſcribed to that ſyſtem of being called a human Creature.

V. 349. ——————*But haply intellect*
In ſome determin'd form and apter ſite
Of matter may conſiſt——

"Eut

"The faculty of thinking, ſays Wollaſton, cannot ariſe from the ſize, figure, or motion of it; (matter;) becauſe bodies by the alteration of theſe only become greater or leſs; round or ſquare, rare or denſe, &c. tranſlated from one place to another with this or that new direction, or velocity, or the like; all which Ideas are quite different from that of thinking: There can be no relation between them. Theſe modifications and affections of matter are ſo far from being principles, or cauſes of thinking and acting, that they are themſelves but effects, proceeding from the action of ſome other matter, or thing upon it, and are proofs of its paſſivity, deadneſs, and utter incapacity of becoming cogitative. This is evident to ſenſe." Nat. Rel. p. 187.

V. 357.—*Haply in motion's energetic power*
The mind conſiſts? &c.

The reader will perhaps be entertained with comparing the different expreſſion of the ſame ſentiment and reaſoning in the French and the Engliſh Poet; as no mark of deſigned imitation appears, more here than in the former paſſages brought into compariſon—

Et ſaltem id conſtans inconcuſſumque manebit,
Principii, quodcunque ſuat, motum eſſe volentis.
Sed nil velle poteſt, niſi primum intelligat: ergo
Hanc motûs cauſam conſtat ſimul eſſe ſcientem.
Mens igitur prima eſt motûs, atque unica cauſa.
Ac velut humanum corpus finita regit mens,

Men-

Mentem infinitam, ſic magno in corpore mundi,
Numine cuncta ſuo quæ dirigat, eſſe fatendum eſt.
Lib. V. Sect. II.

That motion from ſome principle, that wills,
Its birth derives, ſtands on unſhaken proof.
But naught, devoid of intellect, can will:
Then motion from intelligence muſt ſpring,
And mind its firſt, its only cauſe be found.
And as man's finite mind his body rules;
So the Mind Infinite that body ſways,
The Univerſe; his Deity o'er all
Preſiding ———

Whether both the French and the Engliſh Poet may not have been originally indebted to Cicero for the concluding thought in each paſſage will admit of doubt. That both have expreſſed it more philoſophically will admit of leſs. The Roman orator in the 8th. Section of his "Somnium Scipionis" has the following paſſage. Ut ipſum mundum, a quâdam parte mortalem, ipſe Deus æternus, ſic fragile corpus animus ſempiternus, movet. "As the eternal God moves the world, which to a certain degree is mortal, ſo the everlaſting Soul moves our frail body." Tully has again expreſſed the ſame ſentiment in his treatiſe de legibus — Princeps ille deus, qui omnem hunc mundum regit, ſic animus humanus id corpus, cui præpoſitus eſt — "The Supreme God, who rules this World, as the human Soul does that Body, over which it preſides."

V. 377. ——————————————— *itſelf*
Its own prime mover, and whate'er itſelf
By its own eſſence moves will never die:
Pure eſſence never can deſert itſelf.

Cum pateat igitur, ſays Cicero, adopting the language and ſentiments of Plato from the Phædon, æternum id eſſe quod ſeipſum moveat, quis eſt, qui hanc naturam animis eſſe tributam neget? Tuſc. Diſp. p. 53. —— "Since it appears therefore, that that *ſubſtance*, which moves itſelf is eternal, who can deny the attribute of eternity to Souls?

Quintilian, ſo far as the eternity of the Soul may be concluded from its immortality, uſes the ſame argument—Anima immortalis eſt: nam quicquam ex ſeipſo movetur, immortale eſt: Anima autem ex ſeipſo movetur; immortalis igitur eſt Anima. Lib. V. c. 14. de Enthymemate. "The Soul is immortal; for whatever moves of itſelf is immortal: but the Soul moves of itſelf; the Soul is therefore immortal."—— With regard to the motion of the Soul, the foundation of this argument, Cicero in a paſſage, a little preceding the one above cited from him, explains it thus: "Solum igitur, quod ſeipſum movet, quia nunquàm deſeritur à ſe, nunquàm ne moveri quidem deſinit." "That alone, which moves itſelf, can never ceaſe to be in motion, becauſe it can never at any time deſert itſelf: i. e. cannot abandon any one of its eſſential qualities?" But after all, ſhould it not appear, that our Author has taken for granted what his argument ſhould have proved, namely, that motion is an eſſential

tial quality of the Soul? Cicero from the laſt paſſage proceeds, with his maſter Plato, to give this proof; but it is an unſound one, and undoubtedly appeared ſuch to Mr. Browne; inaſmuch as they make motion, meer motion to be the beginning and principle of all things, and ſeem to leave no diſtinction betwixt motion and mind; an abſurdity which the Poet had already expoſed to ridicule.

What Socrates, Plato, and Cicero after them, ſay with regard to motion as applied to the Soul; viz. the νους, mens aut animus; Ariſtotle in his Treatiſe de Anima, "of animal Life," Lib. I. c. 2. acquaints us, was affirmed by many Philoſophers, before the firſt of theſe, above-named, of the ψυχη, or anima. Εοικασι γαρ ὁτοι παντες ὑπειληφεναι την κινησιν οικειοτατον ειναι τῃ ψυχῃ. και τα μεν αλλα παντα κινεισθαι δια την ψυχην· ταυτην δ' ὑφ' ἑαυτης —— "All theſe Philoſophers ſeem to have thought, that motion was the peculiar property of "Animal Life," and that, whilſt all other things were moved by this "ψυχη," *that* was moved by itſelf." — Quintilian in the paſſage above, appears evidently to uſe "Anima" in the ſame ſenſe as "Animus," and the beſt Dictionaries allow either of theſe words ſometimes to mean the Soul. But much confuſion and obſcurity have ariſen betwixt the antient naturaliſts and metaphyſians from the too frequent indiſcriminate uſe of theſe terms; originally ſignifying very different things. —— In the third chapter of the ſame book, Ariſtotle combats the opinion of thoſe, who define the "ψυχη" chiefly by motion. And when in chap. 5. book II. he admits the "Νους" to be part of the "ψυχη,"

"ψυχη," the meaning of the latter ſeems conſiderably extended beyond that, in which he firſt uſes it.

V. 381. *How, without form, or local circumſtance*
Can aught exiſt? — Conceive how God exiſts.

The Poet has here evidently recourſe to the language of Cicero for the ſolution of this difficulty; but with great improvement on the philoſophy of his Author — Illud modò videto, ut Deum nôris, etſi ejus ignores et locum et faciem: ſic animum tibi tuum notum eſſe oportere, etiam ſi ignores et locum et formam. Tuſc. Diſp. p. 70. —— "Take notice only of this; that you acknowledge the being of God, although you are ignorant of his place or his form: on the ſame ground you ought to acknowledge that of the Soul, although ignorant of its place and its form."

V. 384. ———— *or elſe, the Sophiſt's Creed,*
That God himſelf is Matter, granteſt thine.

Matter exiſts in parts, every one of which by the term is imperfect; but in a Being abſolutely perfect there can be nothing imperfect. —— Again — Men not converſant with books, and unacquainted to what length of abſurdity human error can proceed, muſt be ſhocked to hear, Balbus in Cicero (de Nat. Deor.) aſſerting "that the World is God." "The Univerſe, or ſum total of finite Beings, cannot be God. For if it is, then every thing is divine; every thing God, or of God, and ſo all things together muſt make but one thing. But the contrary to this we ſee; there being

evidently many beings diſtinct, and ſeparable from one another, and independent of each other. Nay, this diſtinction and ſeparation of exiſtence, beſides what we ſee without us, we may even feel within ourſelves. We are ſeverally conſcious to ourſelves of the individuation and diſtinction of our own minds from all other; nor is there any thing of which we can be more certain. Were we all the ſame Being, and had one Mind, as in that caſe we muſt have; thoughts could not be private or the peculiar thoughts of any one perſon; but they muſt be common acts of the whole Mind, and there could be but one Conſcience common to them all. Beſides, if all things conjunctly are God, or the perfect Being (I dread the mention of ſuch things, though it be in order to refute them) how comes this remarkable inſtance of imperfection, among many others to cleave to us, that we ſhould not know even ourſelves, and what we are? In ſhort no collection of Beings can be one Being, and therefore not God. And the Univerſe itſelf is but a collection of diſtinct Beings." Wollaſton, p. 75—6.

This ſubject might be conſidered in various other Lights; but in none perhaps more analogous to common ſenſe than thoſe, in which it is preſented above.

V. 392. *Hence, whilſt with body leagued, the mind remains,*
Full oft ſhe ſallies forth, her wing expands, &c.

That abſtraction of mind, deſcribed in this paſſage, was, according to Aulus Gellius, remarkably exemplified in Socrates. —— Stare ſolitus Socrates dicitur, pertinaci ſtatu

ſtatu perdius atque pernox, à ſummo lucis ortu ad ſolem alterum orientem, inconnivens, immobilis, iiſdem in veſtigiis, et ore atque oculis eundem in locum directis, cogitabundus, tanquam quodam ſeceſſu mentis atque animi facto à corpore. Lib. II. Cap. 1. —— "Socrates, it is ſaid, was uſed to ſtand in the ſame conſtant poſition day and night, from one ſun-riſing to another, without ſo much as winking; immoveable (unmoved) on the ſame ſpot; his face and eyes directed to the ſame quarter; his mind having, as it were, made a ſeceſſion from the body." The abſtraction of Socrates was, probably enough, very extraordinary; but with reſpect to his not winking for ſo long a ſpace, ſurely Aulus Gellius has ſtrained the matter at the leaſt to the utmoſt limits of poſſibility. Things, perhaps more ſtrange in this way, are related of certain Devotees in India; but the hyperbolical manner of expreſſion, in uſe there, puts a reader pretty conſtantly upon his guard; ſo that he has the ſcale of common ſenſe generally ready for immediate application. But an antient Roman Author of ſuch reſpect, *as Aulus Gellius, might ſurprize the faith of perſons unguarded. That, which this writer adds immediately after the above paſſage, from Favorinus, who ſays of Socrates "πολλακις εξ ἡλιου εις ἡλιον εστηκει ασφαλεστερος των τρεμνων "that he often ſtood from one day to another more immoveable than a ſtock" is much leſs exceptionable; as omitting the moſt improbable particulars of Aulus Gellius's anecdote.

* Of whom Henry Stephens ſays — tantum virum, tam bene de omni fere literarum genere meritum, &c.

Præf. Dedic. ad noctes Attic.

V. 403. ——————— *Is this the ſum of life?*
Are thus in empty air our vows diſſolv'd?
Falls thus our promiſed bliſs, &c.

I cannot queſtion the good reception of the following paſſage from Mendels-ſohn's Phedon. Entret. III. p. 263 — 5. —— " Or que tous ces êtres enſemble s' arretent au milien de leurs courſe, que non ſeulement ils s' arrêtent, mais qu' ils perdent tout le fruit de leurs efforts : c' eſt ce qui ne peut jamais être entré dans le plan de cet univers, que le Créateur a préféré à tout autre. Comme êtres ſimples ils ſont * *indiſtructibles* ; comme ſubſtances, dont l' exiſtence eſt independante des autres êtres créés, leurs perfections doivent être de durée, et avoir des ſuites infinies ; comme êtres raiſonables, ils font de continuels efforts pour croître en perfection, et la nature, pour cette progreſſion ſans fin, leur offre d' aſſez ſublimes attraits ; et comme fin ſuprême de la Création, ils ne peuvent être ſubordonnés à d' autres fins ; ni par conſéquent être arrêtés dans la progreſſion, ou dans la poſſeſſion de leurs perfections. Convient-il à la Sageſſe ſuprême de produire un monde pour y faire la félicité des eſprits qu' elle y place, en les rendant capables d' admirer ſes merveilles, et, l' inſtant après, les priver à jamais de cette même félicité ? Convient-il à la Sageſſe divine de faire d' un phantôme de bonheur, qui revient et ſe perd toujours, le dernier but de ſes merveilles ? Ce ne peut pas être en vain, O mes Amis, que l' auteur de la nature nons a imprimé le deſir d' une felicité éternelle. Ce deſir peut être ſatisfait ; et il le ſera." ————

* Sans la Volunté de Dieu.

V. 411.

V. 411. *But can the mind, 'tis aſk'd, of knowledge aught*
Acquire, or keep acquir'd, the ſenſes once
Extinct? ———————

Although the manner of the Soul's ſubſiſtence, after its ſeparation from the body, is a queſtion, any preciſe ſolution of which is placed beyond the reach of our intellect; yet the reaſoning and even conjectures of great men on this ſubject will not fail to intereſt that curioſity, which the ſubject itſelf ever inſpires. —— "It is worth our conſideration, ſays Locke, whether active power be not the proper attribute of ſpirits, and paſſive power of matter." Eſſ. on Hum. Underſt. Lib. II. chap. 23. —— "Hence may be conjectured, that created ſpirits are not totally ſeparate from matter, becauſe they are both active and paſſive. Pure ſpirit, viz. God, is only active; pure matter is only paſſive: thoſe Beings, that are both active and paſſive, we may judge to partake of both." Wollaſton takes this to be the argument of Socrates in the Phædo, who adds that the Soul is αδιαλυτος, and therefore ανωλεθρος, which Cicero (Tuſc. Diſp.) interprets thus: — nec diſcerpi nec diſtrahi poteſt, nec interire igitur —— "incapable of being broken or deſtroyed by diſſolution of parts; that cannot be ſeparated, and therefore imperiſhable." No ſuppoſition needs here be made againſt our Poet's doctrine before inſiſted on, "that the Soul itſelf does not conſiſt of parts," it being only conceived, according to the ideas of Locke aud Wollaſton, that it may be joined to ſomething, which has them. —— The two following paſſages from the 9th. Section of the Religion of Nature may ſerve to ſet this matter

matter in a light ſomewhat clearer, and perhaps aſſiſt our Poet in anſwering the queſtion at the head of this note. "That which being confined to the body, and able to act only according to the opportunities this affords, can now perceive viſible objects only with two eyes (at two windows) becauſe there are no more, might doubtleſs ſee with four, if there were ſo many properly placed and diſpoſed, or, if its habitation were all eye (window all round) might ſee all round. And ſo, in general, that, which now knows many things by the impreſſions made at the end of the nerves, or by the intervention of our preſent organs, and, in this ſituation and incloſure, can know them no other way, may, for all that, when it comes to be looſed out of that priſon, know them *immediately*, or by ſome other medium. That, which is forced to make ſhift with ſigns of things in its reaſoning, may, when it ſhall be ſet at liberty and can come at them, reaſon upon the intuition of things themſelves, or uſe a language more ſpiritual or ideal. I ſay it is not impoſſible, that this ſhould be the caſe, and therefere no one can ſay with reaſon, that it is not."

"If we ſhould ſuppoſe the ſoul to be a being by nature made to inform ſome body, and that it cannot exiſt and act in a ſtate of total ſeparation from all body; it would not follow from hence, that what we call death muſt therefore reduce it to a ſtate of abſolute inſenſibility and inactivity, which would be eqûal to non-exiſtence. That which is ſo neceſſary to it may be ſome fine Vehicle, that dwells with it in the brain, and goes off with it at death." Mr. Wollaſton's explanation of this Hypotheſis then follows; to which I may refer the reader: It will

will probably reward his curioſity. See S. IX. of Rel. Nat. p. 196—7,

V. 428. *What? when erroneous viſion ſhe corrects;*
The diſtance true, or magnitude, or form
Of objects, falſely by the ſenſes ſcan'd
Scorning their haſty ſuffrages, &c.

Polignac deſcribes the fallaciouſneſs of our ſenſe of ſeeing in a lively manner. Whether his firſt inſtance of ocular deception ever takes place but from abſolute careleſſneſs and inadvertence may, however, well be doubted——

———Oculi referunt perſæpe rotundum
Quod re quadratum verâ: perſæpe colores
Affingunt rebus, qui non ſunt: ut modò nubes
Depictas, geminum cernunt modò in æthere ſolem,
Cæruleos montes, et ponti mobilis undam
Nunc viridem, nunc purpuream. Mendacibus ergo
Diffide———————
Cauſa igitur non eſt omnis, quæ cauſa videtur;
Et ſenſus ratio judex, non ſerva profectò eſt.
Anti-Lucret. Lib. VI. S. 2.

The eye for circular reports the ſquare:
Colour untrue to objects often gives;
A painted ſky, or double ſun beholds;
Cerulean mountains; ocean's agile wave
Now green, now purple. Lying ſenſe diſtruſt.
All is not cauſe, which cauſe to ſenſe appears:
Reaſon, her ſovereign, knows alone to judge.

Sir

Sir John Davies takes notice of this corrective faculty in the following manner:

Then ſhe the ſenſes checks, which oft do err,
And e'en againſt their falſe reports decrees;
And oft ſhe doth condemn what they prefer:
For with a power, above the ſenſe, ſhe ſees.
Immort. of the ſoul, S. 1.

Senſe thinks the planets, ſpheres not much aſunder:
What tells us then, their diſtance is ſo far?
Senſe thinks the lightning born before the thunder:
What tells us then, they both together are.
S. 2.

Many other inſtances of great beauty and energy are adduced in the ſame ſection.

"The ideas, we receive by ſenſation, are in grown people altered by the judgment without our taking notice of it. When we ſet before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, v. g. gold, alabaſter, or jet, it is certain, that the idea, thereby imprinted in our mind, is of a flat circle variouſly ſhadowed with ſeveral degrees of light and brightneſs coming to our eyes; but we having by uſe been accuſtomed to perceive, what kind of appearance convex bodies are wont to make in us; what alterations are made in the reflections of light by the difference of the ſenſible figures of bodies, the judgment preſently, by an habitual cuſtom, alters their appearances into their cauſes; ſo that from that which truely is variety of ſhadow or col-

colour, collecting the figure, it makes it paſs for a mark of figure, and frames to itſelf the perception of a convex figure and an uniform colour; when the idea we receive from thence is only a plane variouſly coloured, as is evident in painting. Mr. Locke, from whom the above obſervations are taken, (Book II. Ch. 9. S. 8.) proceeds to Mr. Molineux's famous inſtance of the cube and ſphere, which, it is affirmed, a blind man able to diſtinguiſh one from the other by his touch, would not at firſt diſtinguiſh by his ſight, were ſight given to him.—And he adds "I leave this with my reader as an occaſion for him to conſider, how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement and acquired notions, where he thinks he has the leaſt uſe or help from them."

If, from the metaphyſical conſideration of this curious ſubject, we were to turn our attention to it in a phyſical, or moral view, we ſhould find its importance grow upon us, and have cauſe to think but the more highly of the ſoul of man from the faculty it poſſeſſes of correcting the frequently fallacious notices of ſenſe, and be the more diſpoſed to join our Poet in his concluſion of its divine origin. Profeſſor Ferguſon, in his "Hiſtory of civil ſociety," conſidering this topic, under a phyſical and moral aſpect, expreſſes himſelf in the following manner: "He (Man) muſt ſcrutinize the objects of one ſenſe by the perceptions of another; examine with the eye before he ventures to touch, and employ every means of obſervation, before he gratifies the appetites of thirſt and hunger. A diſcernment acquired by experience becomes a faculty of the mind,

and the inferences of thought are ſometimes not to be diſtinguiſhed from the perceptions of ſenſe.

The objects around us, continues he, beſide their ſeparate appearances, have their relations to one another. They ſuggeſt when compared, what would not occur, when they are conſidered apart; they have their effects and mutual influences; they exhibit, in like circumſtances, ſimilar operations and uniform conſequences. When we have found and expreſſed the points, in which the uniformity of their operation conſiſts, we have aſcertained a phyſical law. Many ſuch laws, and even the moſt important, are known to the vulgar, and occur upon the ſmalleſt degrees of reflexion: But others are hid under a ſeeming confuſion, which ordinary talents cannot remove; and are therefore the objects of ſtudy, long obſervation and ſuperior capacity. The faculties of penetration and judgment are by the man of buſineſs, as well as of ſcience, employed to unravel intricacies of this ſort; and the degree of ſagacity, with which either is endowed, is to be meaſured by the ſucceſs, with which they are able to find general rules applicable to a variety of caſes, that ſeem'd to have nothing in common; and to diſcover important diſtinctions between ſubjects, which the vulgar are apt confound." p. 39 & 40.

V. 445. ——————————*though aware*
By others how enjoy'd that genial gift
Refus'd himſelf; for happier light deſing'd!

——————Verùm, inquis, hic quoque ſentit
Eſſe aliis, ſibi quod nato ad meliora negatur.

" But

"But yet you ſay, that is, you allow, a perſon born blind to be aware, that others poſſeſs the faculty of ſeeing, denied to himſelf; although he can have no true idea of the faculty itſelf." The Tranſlator taking this to be the ſenſe of this paſſage has not ſcrupled to paſs over *inquis* and to put theſe words into the mouth of the Poet, with the proceeding ones, in anſwer to a ſuppoſed enquiry at the beginning of the paragraph. The reaſoning ſeems more clear by this omiſſion, than it is, perhaps, in the original.

V. 449.——————————*The mind,*
If borne by towering genius to the ſkies,
Contemplates there eternal beauty's form,
And this impreſs'd, &c.

The charming enthuſiaſm of this whole paſſage is truly Platonic. It may give the reader pleaſure to ſee, how one deeply tinctured with the ideas of that heathen Divine has expreſſed our Poet's ſentiment more at large. "Souvenez vous, mes amis, de ces momens enchanteurs, dont vous avez joui toutes les fois, que votre ame, contemplant une beauté céleſte, oublioit le corps & ſes beſoins, & s'abandonnoit entiérement au ſentiment, dont elle ètoit remplie? Quel frémiſſement! quel enthouſiaſme! Il n'y a au monde que la préſence de la divinitè, qui puiſſe produire en nous ces ſublimes tranſports. Auſſi chaque idée d'une beauté ſpirituelle eſt-elle, en effet, un regard de l'ame ſur l'eſſence de la divinité; car le beau, le regulier, le parfait que nons remarquons, eſt un foible empreinte de celui qui eſt la

beauté, l'ordre & la perfection ſubſtanciels. Mendelsſohn. Phédon Entret. p. 168.

The reader will not be diſpleaſed with the two following, but ſeparate, Stanzas from ſir J. Davies in S. 3.

So when the ſoul finds here no true content;
Like Noah's dove, can no ſure footing take:
She doth return from whence ſhe firſt was ſent,
And flies to him that firſt her wings did make.

Of him ſhe thinks, ſhe cannot think too much;
This honey, taſted, ſtill is ever ſweet:
The pleaſure of her raviſh'd thought is ſuch,
As almoſt here ſhe with her bliſs doth meet.

Tyrius Maximus, a profeſſed Platonic, has a ſublime paſſage not foreign to our purpoſe in his firſt Diſſert. Sect. 7 — 8, a tranſlation of which I will preſent to the Reader, but without the original; not to extend my note too far beyond bounds. —— The ſenſes being lulled aſleep, all the paſſions huſhed, and every thought of this mortal ſtate baniſhed from the mind, he ſuppoſes the Soul beginning to ſoar in contemplation, and proceeds thus —— Ιουτι δε εκειστε και αφισαμενῳ, &c. —— " As the Soul, receding from the Earth, approaches nearer to thoſe ſupernal regions, the contemplator, finds ſuch objects as preſent themſelves, more clear, more highly illumined, and, as it were, a prelude to the Divine Nature; the reports of which only, meeting him in the progreſs of his aſcent, will, after its accompliſhment, ſtand verified to his ſight. But neither

neither the heavens, nor thoſe Bodies which they offer to his view, notwithſtanding their glory and the deep impreſſions they bear of the Divinity, as his true and legitimate offspring, will fix the limits of his journey. He muſt mount ſtill higher, and lift his head above the Heavens themſelves, till he arrive at that perfectly ſerene region. ——

Where winter never comes, nor miſts obſcure
Its cloudleſs ſkies; its light for ever pure;

"Where none of thoſe bodily affections intervene, which here diſquiet the miſerable ſpirit, and depreſs its faculty of contemplation by their tumult and uproar. For who, that is overwhelmed by a multitude of paſſions and heterogenous thoughts, can be able to comprehend the Divine Nature? One might as well think of diſcovering the law, or the ruler in a Democratic State, divided by its multitude and confuſion of voices: ——

What 'midſt the din and clamour of a mob
Was e'er diſtinctly heard?

"The mind therefore, fallen into ſuch tumult and abſorbed in its immenſe vortex, navigates an unruly and impracticable Ocean, till Philoſophy comes to her aſſiſtance and lends her counſel, as Lencothoe did her fillet to Ulyſſes."

V 473. *All thine allotted time on earth regard,*
As in ſome forum paſs'd, or peopled inn.

Ex

Ex vita ita diſcedo tanquàm ex hoſpitio, non tanquàm ex domo. — Cic. de Senectute Sect. 22. —— "I quit this Life, as I would an Inn, and not my Home."

V. 478. ———*He, firſt who quits the ſhore,*
Gains firſt the wiſh'd for port.

The Poet ſeems here to have taken the converſe of the Philoſopher's ſentiment — Sin, reflantibus ventis, rejiciemur, tamen eodem paulò tardius referamur neceſſe eſt. — Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. Sect. ult. —— "But if we are driven back by the turning of the wind, we ſhall neceſſarily arrive a little the later in port."

V. 484. ———————*For his beheſt*
It is, by whoſe appointment ſtation'd here
'Twixt fear and Hope we live, that none his poſt
Unorder'd quit.——

Vetat enim dominans ille in nobis Deus injuſſu hinc nos ſuo demigrare. Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. 74. — "For the Deity, who rules within us, forbids our departure hence without his Decree." Such was the doctrine of the Platoniſts and other wiſe men, and it was derived to them, originally from the Pythagoreans. Nor is it ſtrange, that ſo natural a ſentiment ſhould have had the ſanction of good and wiſe men in all ages. Favorinus as quoted by Stobæus (Serm. 274. de vitæ Laude) ſays: "Θεοδωρος μεν γαρ ὁ Κυθηραιος ἀδεμιαν ἱκανην προφασιν εφασκεν ειναι τῳ σοφῳ, προς την τȣ βιȣ καταλυσιν." It was indeed the ſaying of Theodorus, the

the Cytheræan, that to a wiſe man there could never be any juſt occaſion for procuring his own death." The Stoics however, who thought, that ſuch occpaſions might ſometimes not be wanting, were uſed to interpret them as decrees of the Gods; and Cicero, in a paſſage immediately following his words quoted above, only uſes the language of that Sect in ſaying: Juſtam cauſam Deus dederit, &c. that God had furniſhed juſt occaſion of voluntary death to Socrates (who choſe not to eſcape the execution of his ſentence) to Cato of Utica and to others. But Seneca, who was himſelf a Stoic, may be apprehended rarely to have countenanced this opinion of his own School. — Invenies enim profeſſos Sapientiam, qui vim afferendam vitæ ſuæ negent, et nefas judicent ipſum interemptorem ſui fieri: expectandum eſſe exitum quem natura decrevit. — Sen. Ep. 70. — "For philoſophers, it is found, will not allow, that a man may offer violence to his own life, judging the ſelf-murderer to be guilty of a great crime, and that men ſhould wait for that diſſolution which Nature hath decreed them."

Tyrius Maximus, ſpeaking of the deſire which a philoſophical, contemplative and good mind may feel of "ſhuffling off this mortal coil," or rather of eſcaping from that "ſea of troubles" under which, like Shakeſpeare, he repreſents human life, goes on to aſk: "Πως ου αν τις εκνηξαιτ' αν και ιδοι θεον; &c. Diſſ. I. S. 8. "But how canſt thou emerge from this ocean? How canſt thou behold the face of the Deity? Thou ſhalt not enjoy the full and perfect viſion of him, till he call thee to him, which, before long, he will do. Wait however

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ever his ſummons: Old age will arrive, and become thy harbinger. Death, whoſe approach cowards lament and tremble at, will ſucceed, and will be expected with joy, and received with fortitude by all ſuch as cordially deſire to be united with God."

V. 496. *Nay, tho' permitted by almighty power,*
Once more the genial ſtate of youth to know,
Or infancy recal, the proffer'd boon,
Rejected with diſdain, were never mine.

Quò quidem me proficiſcentem haud ſanè quis facilè retraxerit, neve, tanquam Peliam, recoxerit: et ſi quis deus largiatur, ut ex hac ætate repueraſcam, et in cunis vagiam, valde recuſem: nec verò velim, quaſi decurſo ſpatio, ad carceres à calce revocari. — Cic. de Senectute Sect. 22. — "Whither journeying, in the manner I am, no one would eaſily draw me back again, to fuſe me anew in the caldron of * Pelias. And if ſome God would permit me to return from my preſent advanced age to the ſtate of childhood, and to recommence my Life in the cradle, I would reſolutely refuſe the offer; unwilling, now juſt on the point of finiſhing my career, to be recalled from the goal, in order to ſtart again in the race."

* See the ſtory of Pelias in the ſeventh Book of Ovid's Metamorphoſes.

ANNO-

ANNOTATIONS

ON THE

SECOND BOOK.

ANNOTATIONS

ON THE

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V. 8. "*Forbear: Theſe murmurs 'gainſt thy God forbear.*"

MAN is certainly not doom'd to be unhappy. It is no juſt cauſe of complaint, that God, having created him in ſuch a rank as to render it neceſſary, that he ſhould be endowed with nobler powers and faculties than the Brutes, hath placed him in a more precarious ſtate; at the ſame time, that it is a more elevated one.—It is true, that few of the brutes are likely to fall ſhort of the happineſs deſtined for them: they have, indeed, but little chance to miſs it, as being more effectually confined to the track appointed them, than a probationary creature, like man, could have been. But is not the great ſuperiorty of happineſs to which a human mind may, by the improvement and proper exertion

of its faculties, riſe, a vaſt overbalance for all the diſadvantages, under which our ſpecies labours, were they even more numerous than we find them? Would any man, to whom the choice, of exiſting either in the brute or human ſpecies, were permitted, deliberately chuſe the latter, in which he knew it were impoſſible for him to attain any thing worth deſiring beyond the narrow bounds of inſtinct, rather than the former; in which, if not wanting to himſelf, he might ſtill exalt the dignity of his nature, and probably acquire a conſiderable ſhare of happineſs and perfection, even in his preſent condition? What no reaſonable being would chuſe, let not preſumptuous man blame his maker for not putting to his choice. If man is what he ought to be, and is placed where he ought to be, what ſhould be his object, but to conform his conduct to his ſtation, in order to attain his own proper happineſs and perfection, in the only way, in which they are attainable*?

Although the Poet, in the courſe of his argument, and after anſwering the cavils and objections of different ſects of philoſophers, will ſufficiently prove the unreaſonableneſs of man's diſcontent with his ſituation in the ſcale of created beings, yet the intimations conveyed above, though they may ſeem to anticipate the proceſs of his reaſoning, will not perhaps be found out of place by ſome readers, whoſe feelings might otherwiſe be ſhocked by objections, which the Poet is obliged to bring forward.

V. 27.

* The above paſſage is partly taken from *Burgh's Dignity of human Nature*, but with many alterations.

V. 27.———"*To virtue be her claims*
All in full meaſure granted———

"The natural and uſual effect of virtue is happineſs, and if a virtuous man ſhould in ſome reſpects be unhappy, yet ſtill his virtue will make him leſs unhappy; for at leaſt he enjoys inward tranquility and a breaſt conſcious of no evil. And which kind of life, I pray, ought one to prefer; that which naturally tends to happineſs, though it may be diſturbed, or that which tends to unhappineſs? In brief, virtue will make a man here, in any given circumſtances, as happy as a man can be in thoſe circumſtances." Wollaſton, S. 9. p. 182. and again at p. 203.—"It is therefore the way, which a wiſe man would chuſe for his own ſake. But then it doth not follow from hence, that there is no perturbation in human affairs; no caſes, in which the the uſual effect of virtue may be overpowered by diſeaſe, violence, diſaſters. It doth not render men invulnerable; cannot command the ſeaſons, nor prevent many calamities, under which virtue and vice muſt fall undiſtinguiſhed. There may be a direct road to a place, and ſuch a one, as he, who ſets out for that place, ought to be to found in, and yet it is poſſible, he may meet with robbers or accidents in it, that may incommode, or hurt him in his journey."

The pretenſions of virtue are here fairly ſtated; and, in any caſe, the preference ſhe claims over vice ſufficiently aſſerted; and whatever may be the occaſional ſufferings of the good, when the whole probable ſcheme of man's deſtination is taken into account, as we ſhall

ſee

ſee it is in the proſecution of the grand argument of this Book, the juſtice and wiſdom of the Supreme Being will be found amply vindicated.

V. 35 ——— *So fails her ſovereign power,*
That oft her zealous votaries ſhe leads
To perils imminent. ———

This aſſertion has been ſhewn in the Commentary to come from the mouth of an Objector. Although his concluſions from the fact are there ſhown to be inadmiſſible, the fact itſelf cannot be denied to be, but too well eſtabliſhed; as the following inſtance from Valerius Maximus (Lib. ix. cap. 2.) among many which might be produced, will ſufficiently teſtify.

Apertior et tetrior alterius Ochi, cognomine Artaxerxis, crudelitas, qui Ocham ſororem! —— vivam capite defodit; et patruum, cum centum ampliùs filiis ac nepotibus, vacuâ areâ deſtitutum, jaculis confixit; nullâ injuriâ laceſſitus; ſed quòd in his maximam apud Perſas probitatis et fortitudinis laudem conſiſtere videbat. "Leſs concealed, and of blacker die, was the cruelty of the other Ochus, ſurnamed, Artaxerxes; who buried his ſiſter alive; and ſetting his uncle, with more than a hundred ſons and grandſons in a vacant area, ſhot them with arrows; and this he did unprovoked by any injury, and only becauſe he ſaw, that the great admiration, paid them by the Perſians, was on account of their probity and courage." Seneca, after having commended the great merit of Julius Græcinus, the Father of Julius Agricola, adds "quem C. Cæſar occidit

occidit ob hoc unum, quòd melior vir erat, quam eſſe quemquam tyranno expediret. Lib. II. de Benef. Sect. 21." " Whom Cæſar ſlew for this ſole reaſon; that he was a better man than it ſuits a Tyrant, that any man ſhould be." Such as theſe are the worſt caſes of Virtue; but we muſt not forget where lies the recompence.

V. 66. *But if thy home life's ſweeteſt charm poſſeſs,*
A lovely conſort —— &c.
—————————— around thee cling
In emulative haſte to ſhare thy kiſs,
A ſmiling progeny of infant years.

This paſſage is manifeſtly imitated from Lucretius, Lib. 3.

At jam non domus accipiet te læta, neque uxor
Optima, nec dulces occurrent oſcula nati
Præripere, et tacitâ pectus dulcedine tangent.

The claſſical Reader will at once recognize, in theſe beautiful lines of the Roman Poet, a much admired ſtanza in Gray's church-yard Elegy.

For them no more the blazing hearth ſhall burn,
Nor buſy houſewife ply her evening care;
No children run to liſp their ſire's return,
Or climb his knees, the envied kiſs to ſhare.

V. 95. *Thus reas'ning ſome two principles of things,*
Two Gods, have feigned ——

Whether

Whether this doctrine, ſuppoſed to be held by the Magi of Perſia, originated with Zoroaſter, the founder of their Sect, is a doubtful point, which it would not be eaſy to determine. Cudworth (ſee Intellect. Syſt. p. 288.) ſeems to think that the three names, or perſons, Oromaſdes, Mithras and Arimanius, attributed to the Divinity, were meant to expreſs the attributes of Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power, and is inclined, with Gerard Voſſius, to allow, that they imported alſo a dark conception of the Trinity. —— Euſebius in his *Evangelic Demonſtration*, &c. ſpeaks of a book of Zoroaſter exiſting in his time, in which he read the following paſſage, word for word, — " God is the firſt of incorruptible Beings; eternal; unbegotten. He is not compoſed of parts. There is nothing like, or equal to him. He is the author of all Good; impartial; the moſt excellent of all excellent Beings, and the wiſeſt of all intelligences; the parent of Juſtice and of good Laws; ſelf-inſtructed; all-ſufficient; the Creator of all things." Tranſlated from the French of the Chev. Ramſay's Diſcourſe on Mythology, p. 4. —— This French Author ſays, that the more modern Literati of Perſia and Arabia, who have preſerved to us the remains of the antient Doctrines of Zoroaſter, aſſure us, that the firſt Magi admitted " only one *eternal* Principle." But he allows, with Hyde and other Authors, that they believed in two principles; the one good, and the other evil, though they did not hold them to be co-eternal. Plutarch, in his Iſis and Oſiris, gives ſome account of the tenets of Zoroaſter, and repreſents him likewiſe as maintaining the two principles; but as it ſhould ſeem, neither of them eternal

à parte ante, but ſpringing from a ſort of blind, unintelligent and unintelligible Nature, Ει γαρ ϗθεν αναιτιως ωεφυκε γενεϑαι, αιτιαν δε κακϗ τ'αγαθον ϗκ αν ωαρασχοι, δει γενεσιν ιδιαν και αρχην ὡσπερ αγαθϗ και κακϗ, την φυσιν εχειν.—νομιζϗσι γαρ τϗς μεν ϑεϗς ειναι δυο, &c. Plut. de Iſid. et Oſir. Edit. Fol. Xyland, p. 369. "If nothing hath exiſted without a cauſe; as Good cannot furniſh the cauſe of Evil, it neceſſarily follows, that both Good and Evil have each its own peculiar origin and principle in *Nature*.——Some have thought, there were two Gods, &c.—Zoroaſter, the Magus, continues Plutarch, who is ſaid to have lived five hundred years before the Trojan war, held this opinion. From him we learn, that Oromaze was the name of the good Being, Ariman, that of the bad one; and he inculcated, that, of all things falling under the cognizance of ſenſe, the good Being moſt reſembled light, and the bad one darkneſs and ignorance; that Mithra was a Being betwixt the other two, and on that account was called by the Perſians, the Mediator."

"They ſay, that Oromaze ſpringing from pureſt light and Ariman on the other hand from pitchy darkneſs, the two principles are therefore at war with one another." Plutarch adds, "that the Magi moreover relate many ſtrange fables about theſe Gods," of which indeed he produces ſufficient proof: The Reader will find them in the above diſcourſe. A part of their creed, as he acquaints us on the authority of Theopompus, was, that one of theſe Gods obtains a predominance over the other for the ſpace of three thouſand years, each being controled in turn; and that, for

three thouſand years more, they engage in hoſtile contention with each other; each deſtroying the works of his Antagoniſt; but that at laſt Pluto (Ariman) failing, mankind ſhall enjoy a ſtate of felicity, neither wanting food, nor caſting any ſhadow." Iſid. and Oſir. p. 370.—That they caſt no ſhadow, muſt be ſuppoſed to mean, that they were to be equally ſurrounded, at all points, by light. Plutarch, in the ſubſequent part of this Treatiſe, ſhews the Chaldeans, Ægyptians, Greeks and, among the latter, many of their moſt diſtinguiſhed Philoſophers, to have maintained the two oppoſite principles of Good and Evil in their ſyſtems of Nature.

If it be true, that Zoroaſter and the Magi held the Unity of God, and the ſublime ſentiments attributed to them by Euſebius and Writers of later date, Plutarch's authorities will looſe their value. Theſe latter were however, in point of time, probably neareſt the antient ſources of information. He himſelf lived almoſt three hundred years before Euſebius, and Theopompus near, or about, the time of Herodotus and Thucydides.

Manes, or Manichæus, born in Perſia, took up the idea of the two principles in the third century of Chriſtianity. —— See Moſheim's Ecc. Hiſt. ——

V. 114. *Avaunt, ye Magi! with theſe ſottiſh dreams:*
Far hence, ye ouze-bred monſters of the Nile!

Plutarch, who finds the two principles in the Ægyptian Theology (ſee the Iſis and Oſiris) repreſents the Typhon

Typhon of that people under the ſame attributes as the Perſian Ariman.

V. 116. *Reaſons the Stoic better? whatſoe'er*
Attracts man's fondeſt wonder, he eſteems
No good; fame and riches, &c.

Nunquam meherculè ego, neque pecunias iſtorum, neque tecta magnifica, neque opes, neque imperia, neque eas, quibus maximè adſtricti ſunt, voluptates, in bonis rebus, aut expetendis, eſſe duxi. Cic. Paradoxa Stoic. I. Oliv. "For indeed I have never held, that either the riches of thoſe Men, their magnificent houſes, their power, their offices of command, nor any of thoſe pleaſures which moſt engage them, are to be reckoned in the number of goods, or of things deſirable."

V. 119. ——————————— *or holds*
Himſelf their ſole poſſeſſor, tho' he live
In loweſt penury obſcure. ———

Paupertas ſi malum eſt, mendicus beatus eſſe nemo poteſt, quamvìs ſit ſapiens — At Zeno eum non beatum modò, ſed etiam divitem dicere auſus eſt. Cic. de finib. Lib. V. Sect. 28. "If poverty be an Evil, a beggar cannot be happy, although he may be wiſe. But Zeno has ventured to ſtile him not only happy, but even rich."

V. 122. ——————— *with like reaſon, pain,*
Conſiſtent with himſelf, he deems no Ill;
With fire ſurround him, &c.

Sit enim idem cæcus, debilis, morbo graviſſimo affectus, exſul, orbus, egens, torqueatur eculeo: Quem hunc appellas Zeno? Beatum, inquit, etiam beatiſſimum. Cic. ex eadem ſect.—"For ſuppoſe this ſame perſon to be blind; weak; affected by the moſt violent diſorder; an exile; an orphan; in poverty; under an engine of torture; what ſay you of him Zeno?—He is happy, even very happy."

V. 129. *Of health, or ſtrength, or beauty's graceful form*
How think'ſt thou, Stoic?———

Plutarch, in his "Diſcourſe on common Senſe againſt the Stoics," near the beginning, gives us their opinion, and his own in anſwer to this queſtion. Ἤδη τοιγυν αυτο τυτο σκοπει πρωτον, ει κατα τας κοινας ἐστιν εννοιας, &c. "Firſt then conſider this, whether in the language of common ſenſe, they can be ſaid to agree with nature, who think all natural things indifferent; and eſteem neither health, vigour of conſtitution, beauty, nor ſtrength deſirable, commodious, profitable or conducive to our perfection; and hold, that their contraries, as diſeaſe, pain, deformity and weakneſs are neither hurtful, nor ought to be avoided; allowing at the ſame time, that the latter are abhorrent from, and the former agreeable to, our nature. Is not this repugnant to common ſenſe?"

V. 131. *Objects, he anſwers, not be deſir'd;*
To be accepted rather;———

Itemque illa, quæ in corpore excellerent, ſtultè antiquos

tiquos dixiſſe per ſe eſſe expetenda: et ſumenda potiùs, quam expetenda. Cic. de fin. Lib. IV. Sect 8.—"And likewiſe thoſe things, which might claim a degree of excellence relatively to the body, and which the antients fooliſhly ſaid, are worthy to be deſired for their own ſake, the Stoics inſiſt, are rather to be accepted, than to be deſired, &c." And Cicero begins the next Section with the following irony.—O! magnam vim ingenii, canſamque juſtam, cur nova exiſteret diſciplina!—"How wonderfully ingenious! and how juſt an occaſion truly for the eſtabliſhment of a new Sect!" "Euge! quàm pulchrè eſt ſapere!" ſays our Poet in the ſame tone. v. 86—orig.——

V. 148. ——— *Erſt famous they,*
In council one, ———

In the catalogue of royal and noble authors (Vol. II. Edit. 2d.) we meet with the following comprehenſive character of Lord Somers. "All the traditional accounts of him, the hiſtorians of the laſt age, and its beſt authors, repreſent him, as the moſt incorrupt Lawyer and the honeſteſt Statemen; as a Maſter-Orator, a Genius of the fineſt taſte, and a Patriot of the nobleſt and moſt extenſive views; as a Man, who diſpenſed bleſſings by his life, and planned them for poſterity."——In 1708 he was made Lord Preſident of the Council, from which poſt he was removed in 1710, upon the change of the miniſtry. He afterwards grew very infirm in his health; which indiſpoſition is ſuppoſed to be the reaſon, that he had no other poſt than a ſeat at the Council Table after the acceſſion of George I. He

I. He died of an apoplectic fit, April 26, 1716, after having for ſome time ſurvived the powers of his underſtanding. Gen. Biog. Vol. XI.—Burnet, in his hiſtory, gives us a high idea of his learning.

V. 149. ——————*and one in battle*——————
——*nor leſs diſplay'd how bright, how frail*
The flower of genius blooming but to fade!

The Duke of Marlborough's military and political character and decline are thus conciſely, and not inelegantly, drawn by Voltaire—" Ses talens militaires eclaterent dans la guerce de 1710. Il n'etoit pas comme ces généraux, auquels un Miniſtre donne, par ecrit, le project d'une campagne. Il etoit alors maître de la cour, du parlement, de la guerre, et des finances; plus roi que n' avoit été Guillaume, auſſi politique que lui, et beaucoup plus grand capitaine. Il avoit cette tranquillité de courage an milieu de tumulte, et cette ſérenité d' ame dans le peril—premier don de la nature pour le commandement. Guerrier infatigable pendant la campagne, Marlborough devenoit un negotiateur auſſi agiſſant pendant l' hyver.—A l' avenement du George premier à la couronne en 1714, il fut rappellé et rétabli dans toutes ſes charges. Quelques années avant ſa mort, il ſe retira des affaires publiques et mourut dans l' enfance, agé 72. Or vit le vainqueur de Hockſtet jouer au Petit-palet avec ſes pages, dans ſes dernieres années."—Smollet ſays too, that, ſometime before his death, his faculties had been greatly impaired. What is ſaid of Swift in the next note, completes the mortifying account of great parts in ruin; no unprofit-

able

able ſubject of contemplation for thoſe, who ſtill poſſeſs them.

V. 160. ——————*exiſting ſtill he breathed,*
Survivor of himſelf, and prov'd too well,
From outward ſhocks, how vulnerable Man!

The Works of Dean Swift are too conſpicuous a monument of his genius and talents, not to make it impertinent to attempt his intellectual or literary character; eſpecially after the Sketch preſented by our Poet. Yet a ſlight recollection of the melancholy change, which it ſuffered in the latter part of his life, may not be unacceptable. In 1732, about 13 years before his death, in a Letter to Mr. Gay and Mr. Pope, he makes complaints of infirmity both of body and mind, and alſo of the deſertion of his friends. Theſe were afterwards, repeated with greater ſenſibility and ſelf-pity. The following line is very expreſſive of his feelings and opinion of himſelf——

Vertiginoſus*, inops, ſurdus, malè gratus amicis.

"Giddy, poor, deaf, and diſagreeable to my friends."

In 1741, he became ſo very bad, as to be utterly incapable of converſation. Strangers were not permitted to approach him, and his friends found it neceſſary to appoint guardians of his perſon and eſtate. In 1742, his

* As Dr. Swift undoubtedly meant this Line for an hexameter, it is unfortunate, that a falſe quantity ſhould have eſcaped him in the the compaſs of ſix words.

rea-

reaſon was ſubverted, and his rage became abſolute madneſs. This intellectual derangement was ſucceeded by deplorable diſorders of body, and after ſome time he ſunk into a ſtate of total inſenſibility. After the Dean had continued ſilent a whole year in a ſtate of helpleſs idiotiſm, on being told by his houſekeeper, on the thirtieth of November, that it was his birth-day, and that bonfires and illuminations were preparing to celebrate it as uſual, he immediately replied: "'Tis all folly: they had better let it alone."—In 1744, he, now and then, called his ſervant by name, and once attempting to ſpeak to him, but not being able to expreſs his meaning, he ſhowed ſigns of much uneaſineſs, and at laſt ſaid: "I am a fool." He is ſaid not to have ſpoken above twice afterwards; and then he remained perfectly ſilent till the latter end of October 1745, when he died without the leaſt pang or convulſion in the 78th year of his age. See Hawſkworth, and the Gen. Biog.———

I cannot cloſe this Note without obſerving, that our Poet has viſibly ſnatched the pencil from Horace to ſketch a feature or two in his portrait of Dean Swift; but he has uſed it like a maſter——

Et Sermone opus eſt modò triſti, ſæpe jocoſo;
Defendente vicem modò rhetoris, atque poetæ.
Sat. 10. Lib. I.

Now change from grave to gay, with ready art;
Now play the orator's, or poet's part.
Francis.

Scri-

Scribendi omne tulit qui punctum, ſive facetas
Mimi ageret partes, ſeu rhetoris atque poetæ.

——————— in each province, who,
Of claſſic writing ſhone; whether aſſum'd
The wit's, the critic's, or the poet's part.

Francis ſeems to have miſtaken the meaning of Horace's *Rhetor*; which, here at leaſt, cannot well ſignify Orator.

V. 177. *Canſt thou, grave Stoic! then God's juſtice own,*
Yet not diſcern his will?

Is it not ſtrange, that the Stoics, who are ſuppoſed to have acknowledged the attributes of juſtice and wiſdom in the Deity, ſhould not ſee how natural, and how probable it were, that theſe ſhould diſpoſe the divine Will to rectify the confuſion of this world in a future ſtate; and that this ſect ſhould not have been induced unequivocally to conclude for the Immortality of the Soul? It appears however, that ſome of them entertained dark and imperfect notions about this doctrine; but believing the ſouls of all men to have only a temporary exiſtence beyond this life. But others of the ſect thought, that the ſouls of fools ſhould poſſeſs it only for a ſhort duration, whilſt thoſe of the wiſe were to continue till the deſtruction of the univerſe. See this notion confirmed by Diog. Laert. Lib. VIII. S. 157. and in a note by Aldobrandini upon the paſſage; as alſo in the obſervations of Menage.—Theodoret, in his Therapeutics gives the following account of this matter; Diſcourſe V. p. 73. fol. Οἱ δὲ Στωικοι, τας χωριζομενας

των σωματων ψυχας, διαρκεις μεν καθ' ἑαυτας ζῆν εφασαν· αλλα την μεν ασθενεστεραν επ' ολιγον· την δε ισχυραν μεχρι της τυ παντος εκπυρωσεως. "The Stoics held, that ſouls, being ſeparated from their bodies, ſtill ſubſiſted by their own eſſence; the weaker only for a ſhort time, but the more vigorous till the conflagration of the univerſe."—Turtullian, de Anima, S. LIV. partly corroborates this odd notion of the Stoics, adding other curious particulars.—Qui aliquod illi tempus indulgent, ab exceſſu uſque in conflagrationem univerſitatis, ut Stoici, ſuas ſolas, id eſt, ſapientum animas in ſupernis manſionibus collocant.—Quos equidem miror, quòd imprudentes animas circa terram proſternant, cùm illas à ſapientibus multò ſuperioribus erudiri adfirment. Ubi erit ſcholæ regio in tanta diſtantia diverſoriorum? Quâ ratione diſcipulæ ad magiſtras conventabunt, tanto diſcrimine invicem abſentes? Quis autèm illis poſtumæ eruditionis uſus ac fructus, jamjam conflagratione perituris?—"They, who allow it ſome portion of exiſtence, from the time of its departure, for inſtance, till the conflagration of the univerſe, place it, as the Stoics did their own ſouls, meaning thoſe of the wiſe, in the ſupernal manſions.—I cannot indeed but wonder at theſe men, that they ſhould humble the ſouls of the unwiſe to take their ſtation near the earth, whilſt they affirm that theſe are to be inſtructed by thoſe of the wiſe, placed far above them. Where will they place their ſchool in this wide interval betwixt their habitations? How will the diſciples go backwards and forwards to their teachers, whilſt the diſtance from each other is ſo great? But what will be the uſe or fruit of this poſthumous erudition to thoſe, who are ſhortly to periſh

periſh in the conflagration?"—Epiphanus, Origen and Lactantius are ſaid to admit, that the Stoics decidedly held the Immortality of the Soul in a manner, ſomewhat conformable to the notions of other Philoſophers; but they are generally ſuppoſed to be miſtaken on this point; ſo that our Poet's remonſtrance with this ſect appears not, on the whole, ill founded.

V. 190. *Th' exiſtence of a God acknowledg'd ſtands*
Man's univerſal Creed. ———

See the note on V. 286 of the firſt book for the ſentiments of Tully and Seneca, on the argument of univerſal conſent.—It will be found applicable to this place. The Annotator has only to obſerve here, that, as his Author has not entered into any abſtract or metaphyſical proof of the being of God, and hardly more than alluded, either in this or the former book, even to the argument of univerſal conſent; he undoubtedly thought, as Butler has done in his Analogy, that he might "take for proved, that there is an intelligent Author of nature and natural Governor of the world. For as there is no preſumption againſt this, prior to the proof it; ſo has it often been proved with accumulated evidence; from this argument of analogy and final cauſes; from abſtract reaſonings; from the moſt antient tradition and teſtimony, and from the general conſent of mankind."—See Butler's Introduction to his "Analogy."

V. 208 ——— *To this aſylum flies*
The robber's clan, &c. ———

The vanity of this reliance of wicked men is thus expreſſed by Socrates in Plato's Phædo, p. 80. Edit. Fic. Ει μεν γαρ ην ὁ θανατος τυ παντος απαλλαγη, ἑρμαιον αν ην τοις κακοις αποθανυσι, τυ τε σωματος, ἁμα απηλλαχθαι, και της αυτων κακιας, μετα της ψυχης· νυν δε επειδη αθανατος φαινεται υσα, υδεμια αν ειη αυτη αλλη αποφυγη κακων υδε σωτηρια, πλην τυ ως βελτις-ην τε και φρονιμωτατην γενεσθαι. "If death be a diſſolution of the whole man, it would be an advantage to the wicked to be delivered by death from the body and its corruptions, together, with the ſoul. But now, ſince it appears, that the ſoul is immortal, there remains no refuge from evil or ſafety to bad men, unleſs in the attainment of the higheſt wiſdom and perfection, to which the ſoul can be advanced." From this paſſage, as well as from many others, which might be cited from Plato, we may, without heſitation conclude, that the Socratic ſchool looked upon this preſent life as a ſtate of probation, and that retribution was to have place in a future exiſtence. We find Socrates indeed even aſſerting eternal puniſhment, in a ſubſequent paſſage in this dialogue. For he ſays of thoſe whoſe wickedneſs was great and incorrigible: (p. 84) τυτυς δε ἡ προσηκυσα μοιρα ῥιπτει εις τον ταρταρον, ὁθεν υποτε εκβαινυσιν'— "Their juſt lot caſts theſe down into Tartarus, from whence they never come out."—What follows this paſſage in Plato, intimating the notion of a purgutory, is highly curious; but I muſt refer the learned reader to it.

V. 216. *Nature unalter'd keeps her deſtin'd courſe.*

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The objector ſeems to advance the antient doctrine of fate, as conveyed by Manilius in this line.

Fata regunt orbem, certâ ſtant omnia lege.

Fate rules the world; by fate's unalter'd law
Subſiſts the univerſe———

V. 217. *What laws, what order mean'ſt thou, Sophiſt, ſay? One law to Man, &c.*

"Concerning this grand queſtion, whether there be a divine providence, or not, I uſe, ſays Wollaſton, to think for myſelf after the following manner. Firſt, the world may be ſaid to be governed, at leaſt cannot be ſaid to be ακυβερνητος, or left to fluctuate fortuitouſly, if there are laws by which natural cauſes act, the ſeveral phænomena in it ſucceed regularly, and, in general, the conſtitution of things is preſerved: if there are rules obſerved in the production of herbs, trees, and the like; if the ſeveral kinds of animals, in proportion to their ſeveral degrees and ſtations in the animal kingdom, are furniſhed with faculties proper to direct and determine their actions; and, when they act according to them, they may be ſaid to follow the law of their nature: If they are placed and provided for ſuitably to their reſpective natures and wants or (which amounts to the ſame thing) if their natures are adapted to their circumſtances; and laſtly, if particular caſes, relating to rational beings, are taken care of in ſuch a manner, as will agree beſt with reaſon. ——By the providence of God, I mean his governing the world by ſuch laws, and making ſuch proviſions

viſions as are mentioned above.——We may with confidence aſſert, that it is impoſſible for any thing, whoſe exiſtence flows from ſuch a being, ever to grow ſo far out of his reach, or to be ſo emancipated from under him, that the manner of its exiſtence ſhould not be regulated and determined by him." R. N. S. 5. p. 95—6.

V. 227. *Theſe different kinds know each their certain law,*
Nor leap its bounds; whether divinely breath'd,
Inſtinct its call'd, &c.

This note may be conſidered as a continuation of the laſt; only carrying the reader's attention a little more minutely to that great law of animals, inferior to man, called inſtinct; by which every tribe, the loweſt as well as the higheſt, and all, from their firſt exiſtence, ſeem endued with ſome obſcure diſtinction of objects without; ſome preconception or anticipation in favour of that aliment, that ſituation, &c.: which the Author of nature meant for their peculiar good.—Simul atque natum ſit animal, ipſum ſibi conciliari et commendari ad ſe conſervandum, et ad ſuum ſtatum, et ad ea, quæ conſervantia ſunt ejus ſtatus, diligenda: alienari autèm ab interitu iiſque rebus quæ interitum videantur afferre. Cic. de Fin. Lib. III. S. 5.—"As ſoon as an animal is born, it is conciliated to itſelf, and truſted to the preſervation of itſelf, and to its proper condition and to the choice of thoſe things, which tend to the preſervation of that condition."—See alſo, Lib. IV. 7. and V. 9 —Seneca in his 121st Epiſtle has many acute obſervations relative to the inſtinct of animals. I will ſelect one, or two—ante omnia eſt *Mei* cura: hoc animalibus ineſt cunctis: nec inſeritur, ſed innaſcitur—"Above all things

things is the care of *Self:* this is common to all animals; not ingrafted, but innate." With regard to the terror, which ſome ſpecies of Birds naturally feel at the firſt appearance of a hawk or cat, he ſays: Apparet illis ineſſe ſcientiam nocituri, nec experimento collectam, nam antequàm poſſunt experiri, cavent. "It appears too, that they poſſeſs the knowledge of what will hurt them, and that not collected from experience, for antecedently to it they ſhew this caution."—My younger readers will find this ſubject very agreeably, as well as intelligently treated in the "Spectacle de la Nature", Vol. I. Dial. 10. and in the works of Buffon, Goldſmith and others, on natural Hiſtory.

V. 228 ———*whether divinely breathed,*
Inſtinct 'tis call'd———

——ſive afflatu divinæ contigit auræ——

Mr. Browne had evidently his eye upon theſe lines of Virgil from Georg. IV. V. 219———

His quidem ſignis, atque hæc exempla ſecuti
Eſſe apibus partem divinæ mentis, et hauſtus
Ætherios, dixere———————

Led by ſuch wonders, ſages have opin'd,
That bees have portions of an heav'nly mind.
WARTON.

The reader will perhaps wiſh that, for the ſake of the original, the Tranſlator had himſelf exhibited upon this paſſage a ſmall portion more of that *divinæ mentis*, with

with which, on moſt other occaſions, he has ſhewn himſelf ſo handſomely giſted.

V. 230. *A portion limited their ends to ſerve.*

Their ends to ſerve.—What ends? it has been demanded by ſome, who think, we may be miſtaken in confining all the purpoſes of the brute-creation to their preſent exiſtence. Theſe perſons have pretended, that ſome of the arguments for the immortality of man conclude equally in favour of that of the brutes.

But ſurely the firſt poſition of the Poet in the former Book "that every animal on earth, except man, enjoys its lot, nor demands any thing beyond it," a poſition again repeated at the beginning of this, ſtates a wide difference betwixt the natural claims of man and of the lower animals as referred to the juſtice of God; on which turn the ſtrongeſt arguments of natural religion for the future ſtate of mankind.—The intentions of nature, reſpecting the brute-creation, appear to be accompliſhed in their preſent ſtate; their inſtincts directing them ſucceſsfully to the principal purpoſes of their being; to all thoſe objects indeed, in which, to us, their happineſs ſeems concerned. Farther, there appears no faculty in the brutes calculated for the moral diſcrimination of actions; none, from whence we can infer them to be placed, as men are, in a ſtate of probationary diſcipline.—Thoſe pains, anxieties and diſquietudes to which man, from moral cauſes, is continually liable; his love of virtue, his thirſt of knowledge and intellectual perfection, to which we may add his natural and conſtant longing and purſuit after ſuch a degree of happineſs as this

this life never gives, and is abſolutely incapable of affording him; all theſe conſiderations, I ſay, and many more which might be adduced; conſiderations in which the brutes have viſibly no concern; ſhould ſeem to conſtitute a moſt decided difference betwixt the claims of men and thoſe of the lower animals on the juſtice of their common Creator.—The only ground, in a moral view, on which any thing like an argument might apparently be made out for the immortality of the brutes, is the needleſs and unmerited ſufferings of ſome of the domeſtic animals in the ſervice of man. That the infliction of theſe, on the part of their ſevere taſk-maſter, muſt one day be accounted for by him, is highly probable; becauſe there is reaſon to believe, that theſe cruel violences often occaſion the patient and ſubmiſſive creatures very acute feelings of pain. Why then, it will be aſked, ſhould they not expect ſome future recompence for their portion of miſery in this world, whatever it be, which they can have done nothing to deſerve? In anſwer to this, the Annotator begs leave to advance a conjecture, which he has never met with elſewhere; but which perhaps may not be thought deſtitute of probability; namely, that to the intelligence of brute-animals theſe cruelties and the pains conſequent upon them, with very few exceptions, may appear entirely as *accidents* and devoid of all meaning or intentional harm towards them; as much as the fall of a tree or of a houſe, by which they might happen to ſuffer contuſion, diſlocation or the fracture of limbs, with their conſequent pains and inconveniences. If, with their general inability to reſiſt the power of man, they conceive his cruelties to proceed from *intention*, their ſufferings muſt be exquiſite indeed.

It may now perhaps be aſked, on a probable ſuppoſition, that the brutes often ſuffer from natural evils; as, for inſtance, from hunger or thirſt, or the extremes of heat and cold, to which they muſt be frequently liable, more particularly in their wild ſtate, why might they not look for future recompence on that ſcore?—Till it can be proved that evils purely phyſical, are not neceſſary evils, wherever they take place in the whole ſyſtem of the univerſe, and that the phyſical happineſs of every animal in the creation, rational or irrational, is not ſuperior to its phyſical miſery, it will be difficult, upon this foundation, to build any concluſive argument even for the Immortality of the human ſoul. Till phyſical evil, I ſay, can be proved, not to have its origin in neceſſity; and its preponderance over good, with regard either to man or beaſt throughout this preſent life, can be aſcertained, the queſtion of a future recompence on that ground may remain unanſwered, without affecting the truth, or probability of any thing before advanced.

V. 238 ——————————*ſagacious he*
The world's immenſe, ſtupendous ſyſtem views,
And traces an artificer Supreme.

What claſſical reader, on the peruſal of theſe lines, will not anticipate me in the following reflections from Cicero (de Natura Deor. Lib. II. S. 38) Quis enim hunc hominem dixerit, qui cùm tam certos cœli motus, tam ratos aſtrorum ordines, tamque omnia inter ſe connexa et apta viderit, neget in his ullam ineſſe rationem, eaque caſu fieri dicat, quæ quanto conſilio gerantur, nullo conſilio aſſequi poſſumus? An cùm machinatione quadam moveri aliquid videmus, ut ſphæram, ut horas, ut alia per-

permulta; non dubitamus, quin illa opera ſint rationis: cùm autem impetum cœli admirabili cum celeritate moveri vertique videamus, conſtantiſſime conficientem viciſſitudines anniverſarias, cum ſumma ſalute et conſervatione rerum omnium; dubitamus, quin ea non ſolùm ratione fiant, ſed etiam excellenti quadam divinâque ratione?—" Could he be judged to deſerve the name of a man, who having obſerved ſuch regularity in the motions of the heavens, the fixed orders of the ſtars, and all things ſo connected and fitted together, ſhould deny, that reaſon were diſcoverable in the ſyſtem, and affirm, that thoſe things were made by chance, which are governed by wiſdom beyond the reach of all human counſel? When we behold any body put into motion, by certain laws of mechaniſm, as a ſphere, a clock and many other kinds of works, we make no queſtion, that they are the reſult of reaſon. Can we then, on obſerving the movements of the heavens, performed with ſuch wonderful velocity, and conſtantly completing their annual revolutions, for, and with the perfect welfare and conſervation of all things, but be ſatisfied, that theſe things are effected by reaſon, and that tranſcendent and divine?" Who, engaged in this train of reflection, may not exclaim with our Milton———

Theſe are thy glorious works, Parent of Good;
Almighty! thine, this univerſal frame,
Thus wondrous fair; Thyſelf, how wondrous then!
Book V. C. 153.

or, with Virgil——Deum namque ire per omnes
Terraſque, tractuſque maris, cœlumque profundum.
VIRG. Georg. IV. 221.

That God pervades, and, like one common ſoul,
Fills, feeds, and animates the world's great Whole.
WARTON.

The reader may not diſlike to ſee, how an illuſtrious Italian Poet has expreſſed his ſentiment of the Omnipreſence of God, from a general and rapid view of his works.

Ovunque il guardo io giro,
Eterno Dio! ti vedo:
Nell' opre tue t' ammiro;
Ti riconoſco in me.
La terra, il mar, le ſphere
Parlan del tuo potere:
Tu ſei per tutto, et noi
Tutti viviamo in te.
METASTASIO.

Where'er I lift my wond'ring eye,
It kens th' eternal Deity:
His preſence nature all declares;
His preſence my exiſtence ſhares.
All earth, all ocean, and the countleſs ſtars
His power confeſs: He fills unbounded ſpace:
All live, all move in him, of animated race.

V. 241. *To him, the Father, and the Lord of all,*
Soon recogniz'd, the child of nature breaths
His humble prayer——

"If I ſhould never pray to him, ſays Wollaſton, or worſhip

worſhip him at all, ſuch a total omiſſion would be equivalent to this aſſertion—"There is no God who governs the world to be adored," S. I. So naturally does the duty of prayer ſeem to reſult from our very firſt acknowledgment of the power, the wiſdom and the goodneſs of the Deity, anterior to all revelation of his will.

V. 243. ——————*Ideal beauty next*
His heart enamours; to its heav'nly ſource
Soaring, &c.

Mendels-ſohn has well rendered this Platonic idea—Phedon, Ent. III. p. 256. "Le Beau, qu' offre à l' œil obſervateur le magnifique ſpectacle de la nature, forme ſon gôut et raffine ſon ſentiment: le ſublime excite ſon admiration, et éleve ſes idées au-deſſus de la ſphere de l' humanité."

V. 247. *Fairer to him naught ſeems, more godlike naught,*
Than the warm heart's expanſive kindneſs, borne
To others weal, or woe — &c. — to 253.

It is not unpleaſant ſometimes to obſerve the different manner, in which a Poet and a Philoſopher render the ſame ſentiment. Cicero, ſpeaking of the *honeſtum*, which he conſiders as the reſult of all the virtues (De Fin. Lib. v. Sect. 23.) takes occaſion to expreſs the ſeveral gradations of ſocial affection, in the following comprehenſive and agreeable manner. The Poet is equally, if not more, comprehenſive; but could not, conſiſtently with poetic ſpirit, have adopted that climatic

matic particularity, which perhaps conſtitutes the beauty of the paſſage in proſe. — Nihil eſt tam illuſtre, nec quod latiùs pateat, quam conjunctio inter homines hominum, & quaſi quædam ſocietas & communicatio utilitatum, & ipſa caritas generis humani: quæ nata à primo ſatu, quo à procreatoribus nati diliguntur, & tota domus conjugio & ſtirpe conjungitur; ſerpit ſenſim foras cognationibus primùm, tum affinitatibus, deindè amicitiis; pòſt, vicinitatibus; tùm civibus, & iis, qui publicè ſocii atque amici ſunt, deinde totius complexu gentis humanæ. —" Nothing is more noble, or of more extenſive effect than the fellowſhip of Man with his ſpecies; that participation and communication of benefits; that endearment of human creatures one to another: which, originating in the firſt ſtock, produces the affection of parents toward their offspring; then a union of the whole family by marriages and deſcents: It ſpreads abroad by degrees to the next kindred; then to affinity; from thence to friendſhip; proceeding to neighbourhoods, it afterward reaches communities, particularly thoſe, with which we are publicly leagued, and finiſhes with that expanſive philanthropy, which embraces all mankind."

V. 259. *Thyſelf, O Man, with every Being round,*
Partaking life compare: ſo deſtitute
Of ſelf-defence what Creature elſe exiſts?

The deſtitute condition in which man comes into the world, the numerous wants and weakneſſes, which accompany his infancy and childhood, make a moſt ſtriking difference betwixt his ſtation, and that of the inferior

inferior creatures, in the ſame period of exiſtence. The neceſſity, which this unprovided condition furniſhes for the exerciſe of many virtues, ſhould ſeem, among other reaſons, ſtrongly to argue the great end or deſignation of this preſent life, to be a ſtate of moral diſcipline in order to certain degrees of perfection and happineſs here, capable of completion only in a future and better ſcene of exiſtence. The tenderneſs, vigilance, prudence and forethought of parents, are continually called into voluntary acts for the preſervation, education and well-being of their children. Theſe principles and theſe acts, varied in a thouſand ways, according to varieties of circumſtance, and the numberleſs objects of free choice and purſuit, ſo as to prove them of a different nature from the direct and ſimple tendencies of inſtinct in Brute-creatures, muſt ſurely be allowed to ſtamp a ſtrong character of moral excellence on our ſpecies; as, on the other hand, a neglect or violation of theſe duties, and the miſery thence ariſing, be thought to exhibit a character of moral turpitude, not leſs marked. If we were next to proceed to the relative duties of children towards their parents, we ſhould find affection, obedience, gratitude, and a willingneſs and deſire to render back, on the old age, all needful ſervice for what their own infancy had received; or rather a train of voluntary acts flowing from theſe principles, to be equally natural and incumbent on them, and the neglect of ſuch offices equally reprehenſible. —— Now Nature, we ſee, makes no requiſition of duty on the part of the riſing generations of brute-animals toward thoſe, which produced them: They can therefore be no way accountable for not performing any thing of the ſort.

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The parents, on their part, were involuntarily led by their inſtincts to the aſſiſtance and proviſion, which they afforded their offspring: As they had no choice, they could have no merit. The relation which ſubſiſts, for a ſhort ſpace, betwixt the parent-animal and its young, appears mechanical and impulſive, and is always diſſolved, when no longer neceſſary, and that without regret or feeling on either ſide. How different is the caſe of Man! His actions are free and voluntary, and the good or ill conſequences reſulting from them are generally, at leaſt, always ſufficiently known, to render him reſponſible for them. But why is Man placed in this ſtate, and what is the end propoſed in his moral diſcipline and probation? Is there any thing more probable, as was intimated above, than that he is placed in this ſtate to prepare him for another, better or worſe, according to his conduct; and that his improvement and perfection as a rational being, or rather that happineſs to which theſe naturally tend, is the ultimate end of his probation; although that tendency is continually liable to obſtruction in this world from the free and evil agency of thoſe, who act in contradiction to their duties? Happineſs in ſome meaſure here, and in a much greater hereafter, appears then to be the end, propoſed by the Deity, to a virtuous conduct in this Life; and miſery, not the end propoſed, but, on the whole, the probable and perhaps the neceſſary conſequence of a vicious and wicked one. — Theſe are ſlight intimations only on an important ſubject. A few ſtrictures, within the compaſs of a note, will not admit a full or regular train of reaſoning. Some ſteps may have been omitted; but

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it is hoped they are ſuch, as reflection will eaſily ſupply. The chief deſign of this ſort of annotations is, as was mentioned in the advertiſement, to induce the Reader to purſue ſuch topics, only hinted here, as may furniſh either natural or moral arguments for the Immortality of the Soul.

V. 289. ——————— *What ſlaughters thence,*
And blood fraternal, flow! what impious deeds,
Hath fair Religion's borrow'd ſemblance wrought!

The Church of England, of the preſent day, in which the ſpirit of toleration and indulgence goes to the utmoſt length conſiſtent with any eſtabliſhment at all, may ſurely triumph on the impoſſibility of being reached by any part of this reflection. But how nearly it concerns thoſe churches, which ſtill admit the diabolical horrors of an Inquiſition, let the following ſtriking, and, I fear juſt, repreſentation declare. —— "Behold the blood-thirſty Inquiſitor, who has grown grey in the ſervice of the Mother of abominations; who has long made it his boaſt, that none of her prieſts has brought ſo many hundreds of victims to her horrid altars as himſelf! Tne venerable butcher ſits on his bench; the helpleſs Innocent is brought bound from the dungeon, where no voice of comfort is heard, no friendly eye glances compaſſion; where damp and ſtench, perpetual darkneſs, and horrid ſilence reign, except when broken by the echo of his groans; where he has languiſhed out months and years in the want of all that nature requires; an outcaſt from family, from friends, from eaſe and affluence, from a pleaſant habi-

tation, from the bleſſed light of the world. He kneels, he weeps, he begs for pity. He ſues for mercy by the love of God, and by the bowels of humanity. Already cruelly exerciſed by torture, nature ſhudders at the thought of repeating the dreadful ſufferings under which ſhe had almoſt ſunk before. He proteſts his innocence. He calls heaven to witneſs for him, and implores the Divine power to touch the flinty heart, which all his cries and tears cannot move. The unfeeling monſter talks of hereſy and the profanation of his curſed Superſtition. His furious zeal ſtops his ears againſt the melting voice of a fellow creature, proſtrate at his feet. And the terror, neceſſary to be kept up among the blinded votaries, renders cruelty a proper inſtrument of religious ſlavery. The dumb Executioners ſtrip him of his rags. The rack is prepared: The ropes are extended: The wheels are driven round. The bloody whip and hiſſing pincers tear the quivering fleſh from the bones. The pullies raiſe him to the roof: The ſinews crack: The joints are torn aſunder. The pavement ſwims in blood. The hardened Miniſter of infernal cruelty ſits unmoved. His heart has long been ſteel'd againſt compaſſion. He liſtens to the groans; he views the ſtrong convulſive pangs when Nature ſinks, and ſtruggles, and agoniſing pain rages in every pore. He counts the heart-rending ſhrieks of a fellow-creature in torment, and enjoys his anguiſh with the calmneſs of one, who views a philoſophical experiment. The wretched victim expires before him. He feels no movement but of vexation at being deprived of his prey, before he had ſufficiently glutted his helliſh fury. He riſes: no thunder roars:

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no lightning blaſts him: He goes on to fill up the meaſure of his wickedneſs. He lives out his days in eaſe and luxury: He goes down to the grave, gorged with the blood of the innocent; nor does the earth caſt up again his accurſed carcaſe. —— Can any one think ſuch ſcenes would be ſuffered to be acted in a world, at the head of which ſits, enthroned in Supreme Majeſty, a Being of infinite goodneſs and perfect juſtice; who has only to give his word, and ſuch monſters would in an inſtant be driven by his thunder to the center of the earth? Can any one think, that ſuch proceedings would be ſuffered to paſs unpuniſhed; if there were not a Life to come; a day appointed for rewarding every Man according to his works?" —— Extract from Burgh's Dignity of Human Nature, p. 202. The reaſoning is good. Though a ſuperſtitious abuſe of religion has too often given juſt cauſe for our Poet's exclamation, and for the horrid picture drawn by the Orator in proſe; let men beware, how they fly from ſuperſtition to Atheiſm, or to a Contempt of all religion; one, or both of which this generation has lived to ſee ſweeping myriads of the human race before it; ſuch numbers in ſo ſhort a ſpace, as probably never fell beneath any ſcourge, to which our nature has been ſubject.

V. 296. *Behold's th' Almighty this? Or fruitleſs rolls*
His thunder in the ſkies; or reſts untouch'd
By ſtate of mortal things th' Immortal Mind?

Aſpicis hæc, an te, Genitor, cum fulmina torques,
Nequicquam horremus? cæcique in nubibus ignes
Terrificant animos, et inania murmura miſcent?
Æn. Lib. IV. v. 208.

——————— Say, Father, ſay
If yet thy eyes theſe flagrant crimes ſurvey?
Or do we vainly tremble and adore,
When through the ſkies the pealing thunders roar?
Thine are the bolts? or idly do they fall
And rattle through the dark aërial hall?

PITT.

A learned Friend, who intimated to me this paſſage from Virgil, as the ſubject of the Britiſh Poet's imitation, though he allows conſiderable merit to the copy, thinks, that it looſes ſomething of the force and beauty of the original by the ſubſtitution of the word *librat* for *torquet*.

Aſpicit hæc Deus, an nequicquam fulmina librat?
Pectora an humani nihil immortalia tangit?

BROWNE.

V. 302. *I never doubted yet, that human things*
The Deity engage. ———

From what Ulyſſes ſays to Minerva (Iliad X. v. 279.) may we not infer Homer's idea of a providence?

——————— ἥτε μοι αιει
Εν παντεσσι πονοισι παρισταται, ȣδε σε ληθω
Κινυμενος. ———————

In all my labours I thy preſence prove,
Nor am I hid from thee, where'er I move.

But

But the natural and unreaveled idea of providence cannot be better expreſſed than in theſe words of Thales, as we have them from Philoponus — ελεγεν, ὡς ἡ προνοια μεχρι των εσχατων διηκει, και ουδεν αυτην λανθανει, ουδε το ελαχιστον. — "He uſed to ſay, that providence extends to the loweſt of all beings, and that nothing is hid from it; no, not even the moſt minute object."

V. 306. *Examples ſignal of his ire are ſent,*
The nations to alarm; but ſparing yet
They come———

How juſtly the poet Perſius thought on this ſubject, is elegantly ſhewn in the verſes ſubjoined, from Sat. II. v, 24.

Ignoviſſe putas, quia, cùm tonat, ocyùs ilex
Sulphure diſcutitur ſacro, quam tuque domuſque.

What, becauſe thunder ſtrikes the harmleſs tree,
Shatters the neighb'ring oak, and paſſes thee,
Argu'ſt thou, thence, the thunderer appeaſed?
If he be patient, muſt he needs be pleaſed?
Anonym. Tranſlator.

Cicero, in the following ſpirited apoſtrophe, expoſtulates with the Gods on that delay or reſervation of their vengeance, which is ſometimes, he might have ſaid, very often, ſhewn towards men. — Prô dii immortales! cur interdùm in hominum ſceleribus maximis aut connivetis, aut præſentis fraudis pœnas in diem

diem reſervatis?—Orat. pro Cœlio, S. 24.—"Oh! ye Immortal Gods! why do ye, ſometimes, either connive at the greateſt crimes, or reſerve the puniſhment of preſent fraud to a future day?"——

With reſpect to nations this long forbearance is more manifeſt, as it ſeems natural to expect, than with regard to individuals.

V. 315. ——————*What, though the ken*
Of Mortals thou elud'ſt, yet from thyſelf
Vain each attempt to fly————

The antient Poets and Naturaliſts all ſeem to have entertained preciſely the ſame ideas of a ſelf-accuſing conſcience with ourſelves. Even Lucretius concurs with the reſt: After enumerating the various puniſhments and tortures, to which malefactors are obnoxious in this life, he ſays:

Quæ tamen etſi abſint, at, mens ſibi conſcia facti,
Præmetuens adhibet ſtimulos, torquetque flagellis.
Nec videt intereà, qui terminus eſſe malorum
Poſſit, nec quæ ſit pœnarum denique finis;
Atque eadem metuit, magis hæc ne in morte graveſcant.
LUCR. Lib. III.

Yet though theſe menac'd not each impious deed;
By fearful preſages, the conſcious mind
Brings its own torture, and inflicts the ſcourge:
Nor ſees, mean-time, where terminate her Ills,

Or

Or ceaſe her puniſhments; for ſtill ſhe dreads
A black Hereafter, fraught with ſharper pains.

The deſcription of conſcience by Cicero, in his oration for Sextus Roſcius Amerinus, who had been accuſed of parricide, is ſingularly ſtrong and impreſſive—Nolite enim putare, quemadmodùm in fabulis ſæpenumerò videtis, eos, qui aliquid impiè ſceleratèque commiſerint, agitari et perterreri Furiarum tædis ardentibus. Sua quemque fraus, et ſuus terror maximè vexat: Suum quemque ſcelus agitat, amentiáque vexat: Suæ malæ cogitationes conſcientiæque animi terrent. Hæ ſunt impiis aſſiduæ domeſticæque Furiæ, quæ, dies noctesque, parentûm pœnas à conſceleratiſſimis filiis repetant. S. 24. —"Do not imagine, according to the repreſentation of Poets, thoſe, who have committed ſome wicked or impious deed, to be tormented and terified by the flaming torches of the Furies. No: 'Tis a man's own knavery, and his inward terror, which torment him; his own villany and abandoned ſpirit, which puniſh him; his own evil thoughts and conſcience, which affright him. Theſe are the conſtant and internal furies of the wicked, which, day and night, ſeek to avenge unhappy parents on the flagitiouſneſs of their children."

V. 329. *Should tedious life ſtill lengthen out thy ſpan,*
What would repay thy wretchedneſs? The ſmile
Of gentle friendſhip ſooths not thee; unheard
Th' applauſes of the good,———

Sin horum ad ſeros aliquis pervenerit annos
Non habet unde iſthoc compenſet; nam neque dulces

Carpit

Carpit amicitiæ fructus, neque laude bonorum
Paſcitur, ——— ——— ———

And that, which ſhould accompany old age,
As honor, love, obedience, troops of friends,
I muſt not look to have ———

Macbeth, Act V. S. 3.

A Friend, who hinted to me this parallel paſſage from Shakeſpeare, is of opinion, that marks of an imitation of it are diſcoverable in that, cited from Mr. Browne. It is, with regret that I diſſent from the opinion of an accompliſhed Critic: A reſemblance, but no imitation, appears to me ſufficiently viſible. I am however obliged by the opportunity given me of bringing two paſſages of this ſort together, for the reader's compariſon. The pleaſure of comparing like paſſages of different authors upon the ſame topic, where the reſemblance is accidental, or at leaſt problematically ſo, is perhaps greater than that which we experience in the caſe of deſigned imitation; if the exerciſe of mind alſo, in determining the ground of compariſon, be not one of the more philoſophical provinces of Criticiſm—The reſemblance, found in the two paſſages in queſtion, may perhaps be beſt explained by the doctrine of Aſſociation of ideas upon ſimilar ſubjects.

V. 341. *Appal'd, O Wretch! thou leav'ſt no art untried*
——— *to gain*
Some fleeting ſpace, and this a thouſand woes
Condemn'd to prove. ———

Many inſtances of extravagant weakneſs, ſuggeſted by

by doubt, fear or apprehenſion, on the approaches of death, might be produced. The following lines, as ſpoken by Iphigenia in Euripides, convey a ſentiment, not out of character, where it is found; but there are many paſſages, in different parts of Euripides, which would incline one to believe, he means to apply it very generally on the ſubject of death.

——————— μαινεται δ', ὁς ευχεται
Θανειν. κακως ζην κρεισσον, η θανειν καλως.

Iphig. V. 1251. I. Barnes.

——————— of his ſenſes he is 'reft
Who hath a wiſh to die; for life, *though ill*,
Excels whate'er there is of good in death.

POTTER.

Whether Euripides, though a ſcholar of Socrates, and the friend of Plato, when he became, in his old age, the convivial gueſt of the young King* of Macedonia, had adopted any thing of the philoſophy of Democritus, which was afterward taught by Epicurus, and that poſſibly within the long life-time of the Poet, I know not; but his ſentiments not unfrequently ſavour of that ſchool.—What a profeſſed Admirer, and great practical Adept in its philoſophy thought, and felt too, upon the ſubject of death, is left on record by Seneca, who, in Epiſt. 103. thus introduces the famous verſes of the Epicurean Miniſter of Auguſtus. Miſerrimum, et miſerrima omnia efficiens, metus mortis. Inde illud Mæcenatis turpiſſimum Votum; quo et debilitatem

* Val. Max. L. 9. c. 12.—Aut Gell. L. 15. c. 20.

non recuſat, et deformitatem, et noviſſimè acutam crucem, dommodò, inter hæc mala, ſpiritus prorogetur. —"A wretched thing, and converting every thing into wretchedneſs about us, is the fear of death. Hence that daſtardly and diſgraceful wiſh of Mæcenas; in which he willingly compounds with debility, deformity and laſtly with the tortures of the Croſs, ſo that his life, amidſt theſe evils, might be prolonged"———

Debilem facito manu,
Debilem pede coxâ:
Tuber aſtrue gibberum;
Lubricos quate dentes.
Vita dum ſupereſt, bene eſt:
Hanc mihi, vel acutâ
Si ſedeam cruce, ſuſtine.

Yes; I conſent, my hand be maim'd:
My foot, my hip-bone ſhall be lam'd.
Looſe all my teeth; I'll not rebel.
Rather, O! Life, than I would prove thy loſs,
A lump my gibbous back ſhall ſwell;
Nay, fix me on the torturing Croſs;
Grant me but Life, and all is well!

Is it credible, that an effeminate voluptary, ſhould prefer mutilation, deformity and even torture to the mere inſenſibility of non-exiſtence? For this forlorn hope is the doctrine of the ſchool. Let him believe the ſincerity of this choice, who will: There is no creed, to which ſuch faith may not ſubſcribe. I can admit no other explanation of this matter, than that theſe pretended philoſophers are extremely doubtful of their

their own ſyſtem, and are, in many a bitter moment, before their laſt, compelled, in ſecret, to exclaim with our Poet:

Ah! the preſaging thought of future doom,
Howe'er we wiſh its warning to contemn,
The mind ſtill urges, nor reſigns its Hold!

V. 351. ——————*of thoſe, who know*
By worthieſt deeds to captivate mankind
Whoſe rare inventions diſtant ages bleſs.

Quique alios norunt ſibi devincire merendo
Aut qui præclaris ditârunt ſæcla repertis.

The claſſical reader will here recollect the Worthies of Virgil in the Elyſian Fields. Lib. VI. v. 663.

Inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes,
Quique ſui memores alios fecere merendo.

——————— Thoſe who poliſh'd life
With arts invented; or conſign'd their names
To memory by well-deſerving deeds.

TRAPP.

I have neither Dryden's, nor Pitt's tranſlation at command, where I happen to be writing this note.

V. 362. ——————*approaching death*
Seems but to them, all ills, all dangers paſt,
Their port of long ſought ſafety, now in ſight.

Cicero ſpeaking of the latter end of good men, ſays: eo tamen ſimus animo, ut horribilem illum diem aliis, nobis fauſtum putemus—portum potiùs paratum nobis et perfuginm putemus, quo utinam, velis paſſis, pervehi liceat! Tuſc. Diſp. Lib. I. Sect. 49.—Let our minds be ſo diſpoſed, as to regard that day as an happy one to ourſelves; dreadful as it is to others.—Let us regard death rather as a port of ſafety, to which we are bound; at which we ſhould wiſh to arrive, with all the ſail we can make.

V. 379 to 383. ——— *Worceſter's Prelate, he,*
Now full of days, &c. ——

Although, perhaps, the exemplary departure of Socrates, or of ſome other wiſe and virtuous heathen, had been rather more appoſite to the deſign of our author's Poem, which profeſſedly treats of a future ſtate and the hopes of mankind, as relative to it, founded only on the light of nature; yet the character and death of Biſhop Hough are ſo beautifully drawn, that it is impoſſible not to be pleaſed with the portrait, though another might have been more in place.—This Prelate was born in 1650. He appears to have paſſed with credit through the different ſcenes of his education, and to have ſtruggled through difficult ſituations, in difficult times, with uncommon courage, conſtancy, prudence and temper.—After the Revolution, he was, in 1690, advanced to the biſhoprick of Oxford, and tranſlated to that of Litchfield and Coventry in 1699, on the death of Archbiſhop Tenniſon. In 1715, the Primacy was offered him; which it is ſaid, he refuſed

out

out of modeſty.* Two years afterwards he was promoted to the See of Worceſter, and, although, at that time, almoſt ſeventy years of age, he was twenty ſix years biſhop of that dioceſe. He died March 8, 1743, full of days and honor.—He was a great Benefactor wherever he came. When he was removed from the See of Oxford to that of Litchfield and Coventry, he did not meerly repair, but almoſt rebuild, as well as adorn, the epiſcopal houſe at Eccleſhall; and upon his tranſlation to Worceſter he rebuilt a great part of the epiſcopal palace there, and made very liberal improvements in the caſtle at Hartlebury. He is ſaid, to have executed all theſe ſchemes of building and repair with the niceſt judgement. But the ſtriking excellencies of his moral character claimed the greateſt regard. During an epiſcopacy of fifty three years, he diſplayed an amiable pattern of all thoſe virtues, which are the ornament of the religion he explained, and of the faith he profeſſed. In a letter, which he wrote to his friend, Lord Digby, a ſhort time before his death, the following paſſage is worthy of being extracted, and is appoſite to the Poet's character of him.—" I am weak and forgetful—in other reſpects, I have eaſe to a degree beyond what I durſt have thought on, when years began to multiply upon me. I muſt wait contentedly

* If the world are well informed, Dr. Hough was not the laſt Biſhop of Worceſter, who, with every ſhining talent and qualification, which, after the long (and ſtill unbroken) ſucceſſion of illuſtrious characters that have ſuſtained the Primacy, its honor ſhould ſeem peculiarly to demand, had, notwithſtanding, the moderation to decline it.

for

for a deliverance out of this life into a better, in humble confidence, that, by the mercy of God, through the means of his Son, I ſhall ſtand in the reſurrection on his right hand. And when you, my Lord, have ended thoſe days which are to come, which I pray may be many and confortable, and as innocent and exemplary as thoſe I have paſſed, I doubt not of our meeting in that ſtate, where the joys are unſpeakable and will always endure." The preſent Tranſlator of Mr. Browne's Poem remembers to have heard the firſt Lord Lyttleton ſay, that he knew this Biſhop of Worceſter in his latter days, and that, in his figure, his whole appearance and manners, he thought him the moſt venerable of human Beings.

V. 429. ——————*mendacious praiſe*
And glory counterfeit allure not theſe,
Nor falſe ambition——

Falſus honor juvat, et mendax infamia terret
Quem, niſi mendoſum et mendacem?——
HOR. or JUV.

Whom does falſe fame allure, or ſlander fright
But the falſe knave, whoſe actions ſhun the light?

V. 442. ——————*All eager ſeek,*
Like infants, toys and baubles, thrown away
Ere well attain'd ——

Ac, veluti infantes pueri, crepitacula poſcunt
Ardenti ſtudio, mox parta relinquere gaudent.

Sub

Sub nutrice puella velut ſi luderet infans,
Quod cupidè petiit, maturè plena reliquit.
HOR. Lib. II. Ep. I. v. 99.

Thus a fond girl, her nurſe's darling joy,
Now ſeeks impatient, and now ſpurns her toy.
FRANCIS.

V. 461. *The Deity, perchance, if man may dare*
His counſels ſcrutinize, our ſyſtem thus
Arrang'd, &c. ———

In theſe and the five ſubſequent verſes is repreſented the more popular account of the Origin of Evil; one which did not want its advocates among ſome of the antient Philoſophers. Many have been the ſolutions, offered at leaſt, to this difficult queſtion, by the learned both antient and modern. The ſhorteſt and that, which, by ſome has been thought the beſt, is the opinion of Plato; namely, that, as nothing but the Supreme Being himſelf can, in every poſſible reſpect, be all-perfect, every thing, of whatever nature, without the Deity; every thing, in other words, which is not Himſelf, muſt neceſſarily, in ſome degree or other, be imperfect. But this account of the matter does not ſeem to hinder that, according to our Poet's ſuppoſition, the Deity may ſo have formed his probationary creature, Man, as to derive good from evil. And it muſt indeed exiſt, from neceſſity, or from what other cauſe it may, before it can, according to the Poet's idea, be, in any light, converted to man's advantage.

V. 473.

V. 473. ——————*The principle of man,*
Form'd of no terrene elements, &c.

Moſes Mendels-ſohn has well expreſſed, and in few words, Plato's great metaphyſical argument for the Soul's Immortality, here recapitulated by Mr. Browne. " La faculté de ſentir n' eſt pas une faculté du corps, ni de ſon organiſation. Mais elle eſt, comme nous l' avons démontré, la propriété d' un être ſimple par eſſence, et par conſéquent * indeſtructible. La perfection que cette ſubſtance ſimple a acquiſe, doit, par rapport à elle-même, avoir des ſuites ſans fin, et devenir propre, de plus en plus à remplir les vues de Dieu dans la nature." Phedon Entret. III. p. 287.

V. 481—5. *Elſe were that unextinguiſhable thirſt,*
Which prompts the mind to knowledge high, and far
This mortal ſphere beyond, &c.

Chacun de nos deſirs ſe perd, en quelque maniere dans l' Infini. Notre envie de ſavior eſt illimitée; notre ambition eſt inſatiable; le ſentiment du beau s' étend à l'infini; le ſublime nous ravit, et nous attire par ſon immenſe élévation. Voilà pourquoi nous aimons tant à laiſſer un libre cours â notre imagination, et à reculer à l' infini les bornes de l' eſpace. Ces efforts toujours renouvellés, et dont nous plaçons le but toujours plus loin, ſont proportionnés à l' eſſence, aux propriétés et à la deſtination des eſprits; et les merveilleux ouvrages de l' Infini préſentent des objets d'une aſſez vaſte Eten-

* Sans la volunté de Dieu.

due

due pour aiguillonner éternellement nos deſirs. Entret. III. p. 262—3.

V. 486. *Since right, moreo'er, and juſtice ſtrict require*
That virtue quaff th' unmingled cup of bliſs,
And vice her bitter portion, &c.

Ils ont de plus, comme êtres moraux, un ſyſtême de devoirs et de droits, qui ne ſeroient qu'un tiſſu d'abſurdités et de contradictions, s'ils étoient repouſſés, ou s' ils trouvoient des obſtacles inſurmontables ſur le chemin qui conduit à la perfection. Et enfin le déſordre et l'injuſtice qui regner dans la ſociété, et ſemblent rendre la deſtinée des hommes ſi malheureuſe, nous renvoient à une longue ſérie de cauſes et d'effets, dans laquelle ſe débrouille et s'éclaircit tout ce qui paroît ici bas inexplicable. Quiconque fait ſon devoir avec fermeté, et ſait ſe roider contre le malheur, et ſouffrir avec réſignation les adverſités, jouira un jour de la récompenſe de ſes vertus; le ſcélérat au contraire, ne peut guere quitter cette vie ſans reconnoître, en quelque maniere, que les forfaits ne ſont point le chemin de la félicité. En un mot, Dieu contrediroit tous ſes attributs, ſa ſageſſe, ſa bonté, ſa juſtice, s'il n'avoit créé les êtres raiſonnables, et ne les avoit portés, à la perfection, que pour une durée limitée. Entret. III. p. 288—9.

Dies deficiet, ſays Tully, ſi velim numerare, quibus bonis malè evenerit: nec minus, ſi commemorem, quibus improbis optimè. "Time would fail me, were I to enumerate the inſtances, in which evil has happened to the good; nor leſs, would I recount thoſe, in which good has been the lot of the wicked."

Our excellent Wollaſton, after taking a wide ſurvey of human miſery from the hiſtory of our ſpecies, and that as being particularly experienced by the innocent and the good, proceeds thus:—"How among all thoſe millions, who have ſuffered eminently, can it be imagined, that there have not been multitudes, whoſe griefs and pangs have far out-weighed all their enjoyments; and yet who have not been able, by all their innocence, prudence or any other power in them, to eſcape that bitter draught they have drunk? And then how can we acquit the juſtice and reaſonableneſs of that Being, upon whom theſe poor creatures depend, and who leaves them ſuch great looſers by their exiſtence, if there be no future ſtate, where the proper amends may be made? ſo that the argument is brought to this undeniable iſſue—If the ſoul of man is not immortal, either there is no God upon whom we depend; or he is an unreaſonable Being; or there has never been any man, whoſe ſufferings in this world have exceeded his enjoyments without his being the cauſe of it himſelf. But ſurely no one of theſe three things can be ſaid. Ergo ——

"That, continues he, which aggravates the hard caſe of the poor ſufferers mentioned above, if there be no future ſtate, in which their ſufferings may be brought into the account, is, that many times their perſecutors and tormentors paſs their lives in plenty and grandeur; that is, the innocent have not only the portion, that properly belongs to the criminal and unreaſonable part of mankind; but the guilty have that, which belongs rather to the innocent. Such a tranſpoſition of rewards and puniſhments, ending in

it-

itſelf without any reſpect to ſomething, which is to follow hereafter, can never conſiſt with the nature of a governor, who is not very much below rational; a thought, which God forbid any one ſhould dare to admit of him. To ſuppoſe the virtuous and the wiſe left ultimately but in the ſame ſtate with the unjuſt and the profligate, is to ſuppoſe ſuch a conſtitution of nature, as never can flow from a principle of reaſon; a God of truth and equity: and therefore ſuch a conſtitution as leaves the former in a worſe condition, than the other, can much leſs be ſuppoſed."

V. 500. ——————— *Thine were a God*
Creation's lower ſyſtem ruling well,
And fitly to its end; its higheſt work
Left in diſorder all, and incomplete.

There is, in Claudian, a beautiful paſſage which commences his Poem on Rufinus, expreſſing this ſentiment; but with the ſame falſe inference ſo often made by ſuperficial reaſoners from the like repreſentation of the ſtate of mankind in this preſent Life: for though, as the Reader will ſee below, he recals his accuſation of Providence at "abſtulit hunc tandem," on the juſt vengeance which at length befel the monſter, Rufinus, in his overthrow by Stilicho; yet the ſole deſtruction of Rufinus is by no means ſufficient to ſatisfy Claudian's own objections; as neither the puniſhment nor removal of the monſter, though they prevented future miſchief from his hands, made any recompence for that miſery which thouſands of his fellow-creatures had already ſuffered, by his means. No complete retribution can poſſibly take place in this

world: nor is there any way left us to vindicate the wiſdom, goodneſs or juſtice of the Deity, but by ſuppoſing this life a ſtate of moral diſcipline and probation, and that another muſt neceſſarily ſucceed it, in which the confuſion and miſery occaſioned by one part of our ſpecies to the other, will finally be rectified, and done away, and due recompence awarded to each. As however the concluding lines of Mr. Browne's Poem immediately ſubſequent to thoſe at the head of this note, not to mention the note immediately preceding this, and many others before that, and indeed the general tenor of the Poem, moſt ſatisfactorily obviate all Claudian's objections, though he fails to do it himſelf, the introduction of the lines in queſtion may need no further apology.

Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit ſententia mentem;
Curarent Superi terras, an nullus ineſſet
Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia caſu:
Nam cum diſpoſiti quæſiſſem fœdera mundi,
Præſcriptoſque mari fines, anniſque meatus,
Et lucis noctiſque vices; tunc omnia rebar
Conſilio firmata Dei; qui lege moveri
Sidera, qui fruges diverſo tempora naſci,
Qui variam Phœben alieno juſſerit igni
Compleri, ſolemque ſuo: porrexerit undis
Littora: tellurem medio libraverit axe.
Sed cùm res hominum tantâ caligine volvi
Aſpicerem; lætoſque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios, rurſus labefacta cadebat
Relligio; cauſæque viam, non ſponte, ſequebar
Alterius, vacuo quæ currere ſemina motu
Affirmat, magnumque novas per inane figuras

Fortunâ,

Fortunâ, non arte, regi; quæ numina ſenſu
Ambiguo; vel nulla putat; vel neſcia noſtri.
Abſtulit hunc tandèm Rufini pœna tumultum,
Abſolvitque deos: jàm non ad culmina rerum
Injuſtos creviſſe queror: Tolluntur in altum,
Ut lapſu graviore ruant.

Oft in my mind have ſprang diſtracting doubts,
Whether the Gods this lower ball regard;
Or left abandon'd, with all mortal things,
To float at hazard, it no Ruler owns.

When the fair ſyſtem of the world I ſcan'd;
Each part harmoniouſly conjoin'd — his bounds
To ocean ſet — the year's unvaried courſe —
Darkneſs and light alternate — all things then
Seem'd by the counſels of th' Almighty Mind
Eſtabliſh'd: He, methought, the planets rang'd;
Bade each in order move; in ſeaſon due
The fruitage of the earth to ſpring; the moon's
All-varying orb with borrow'd light to ſhine,
And Phœbus with his own; he ſtretch'd the ſhores,
And equal on its Axis pois'd the Earth.

But when I ſaw, in darkeſt gloom involv'd,
Th' affairs of men, this mortal ſcene; the bad
Triumphant thro' a length of proſperous years;
The good with ills oppreſs'd; my wavering mind
Swerv'd from Religion's awful creed; and laps'd,
'Gainſt better Will, to Epicurus' ſchool.
I ſought the cauſe of things, from motion's power
On atoms, meeting in the void of ſpace;
Judging new forms, throughout the vaſt Inane,

By

By fortune govern'd, not by wiſe deſign;
I held the Gods ambiguous; or none
Believed; or ignorant of human things.

Vengeance at length, Rufinus! met thy deeds;
Thy miſchiefs ended, and the Gods abſolv'd.
Hence, that th' unjuſt proud fortune's ſummit reach,
Now ceaſe I to complain: They only riſe,
From greater height, the greater fall to prove.

The learned Reader, who may wiſh for any further anſwer to the Philoſophy of Epicurus; his fortuitous concourſe of Atoms; his ideas concerning the Deity and his attributes, and the mortality of the human Soul, than Mr. Browne's Poem hath afforded, will find abundant ſatisfaction in the ſecond and third books of Polignac's Anti-Lucretius, and in that part of the ninth, which has been given to the public; with the other books; not to mention other parts of that celebrated work. The learned and unlearned may, for the ſame purpoſe, be refer'd to Cudworth's, "True intellectual ſyſtem," where they will ſee the opinions of Democritus, Epicurus and Anaximander, &c. relative to theſe important points examined at large, and refuted with great learning and ability. Every thing, almoſt that can farther be wiſhed for, will be found in Wollaſton's "Religion of Nature," and Butler's "Analogy."—Books, which cannot be too much read.

V. 504. *No: Time will come; Nature through all her works*
That future age proclaims, when God (but aſk
Not how) to juſtify, &c. ——

But

But aſk not how: It is ſufficient to have proved the Immortality of the Soul, and a ſtate of future rewards and puniſhments: In what theſe ſhall conſiſt, or, in what manner, it ſhall pleaſe the Deity to diſpenſe them, the light of nature is unable to teach us. We may conclude all natural inveſtigations on this ſubject with the ſentiments of Socrates, as given us, from Plato, by the intereſting pen of Mendels-ſohn. Socrates, addreſſing himſelf to the interlocutors of the dialogue, ſays: — Quelqu'un de vous pourroit me dire: "Voilà qui eſt à merveille, mon cher Socrate, tu nous a convaincus de la certitude d'une vie à venir; mais ne faudroit-il pas nous dire encore, quel lieu doivent occuper les eſprits ſéparés de leurs corps? Quelle région de l'Ether habiteront-ils? & quels ſeront les objets de leurs occupations? De quelle maniere les ames vertueuſes ſeront récompenſées, & comment celles, que le vice a ſouillées ſur la terre, ſeront éclairées & conduites dans de meilleures voies?" Si quelqu'un me fait toutes ces queſtions, je lui répondrai: Mon ami, de pareilles demandes paſſent la portée de mon eſprit. † Je t'ai conduit

† Although Socrates here, at the concluſion of this ſolemn diſcourſe, refuſes to ſay any thing of the ſcenes or the nature of future rewards and puniſhments; yet, in other parts of the Phædo of Plato, which Mendels-ſohn has, almoſt every where, cloſely followed, he alludes not only to the inventions of the Poets and Mythologiſts upon this ſubject; but gives us his own conjectures. They are however, as they could be, nothing more. In Plato's Gorgias likewiſe will be found a pleaſing deſcription of the iſlands of the Bleſt, and a very forbidding one of Tartarus, with a beautiful account of the impartiality of the Judges. In the eleventh Diſcourſe of Theodoret's Therapeutics, "περὶ τέλους καὶ κρίσεως, *of the final Judgment*," is a very learned diſquiſition on the different notions held by the antient Philoſophers, more particularly by Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato and Plutarch,

conduit par tous les détours du labyrinthe, & je t'en montre l'iſſue. Que d'autres guides te menent plus loin. Entret. III. p. 289.

It remains now but to expreſs an earneſt wiſh, that the various arguments, images and ſtrictures preſented by the foregoing Poem and its Accompaniments may lead us "to conſider, this little ſcene of human life, in which we are ſo buſily engaged, as having a reference, of ſome ſort or other, to a much larger plan of things. — One would think it impoſſible, that creatures, endued with reaſon, could avoid reflecting ſometimes upon all this: reflecting, if not from whence we came, yet, at leaſt, whither we are going, and what the myſterious ſcheme, in the midſt of which we find ourſelves, will, at length, come out, and produce; a ſcheme, in which it is certain we are highly intereſted, and in which we may be intereſted even beyond conception." ‡ But for all farther ſatisfaction, to be obtained beyond this point, which natural Religion has made her utmoſt efforts to reach, and at which ſhe quits us, after having awakened an anxious deſire of higher knowledge and more certain proſpects, Recourſe can only be had to the light of Revelation.

tarch, with an intereſting compariſon, to ſhew the vaſt difference, betwixt them, and the doctrines of Revelation, on this momentous Topic.

‡ Butler's Analogy, p. 197—9.

MVSEVM BRITAN NICVM